The Political Carousel: Elite Power-sharing, Political Instability and the Allocation of Senior Government Posts in Africa

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Geography

University of Sussex

September 2019

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature: .....

Date:..... .....

Acknowledgements

There are large amount of people, without whom, I would have not been able to complete this thesis. Firstly I would like to thank my primary supervisor Clionadh Raleigh. Professor Raleigh's tireless energy and vision provided guidance throughout my time at Sussex. Her knowledge, feedback and encouragement were integral to the completion of this project, and she has my deepest thanks.

Secondly, I want to thank my colleagues and friends James Moody and Andrea Carboni. Our time jointly managing ACLED and working on joint papers was at times stressful, but always instructive and rewarding. I would also like to thank our old manager Caitriona Dowd, who taught us the discipline to be able to handle our responsibilities in the latter part of our studies.

There are other members of faculty I would like to thank: Professor Katie Walsh for helping get back on track during a period when I considered even leaving the project; Professor Dominic Kniveton for his continued advice, good humour and slight irritation of Professor Raleigh; Dr Daniel Watson for his always interesting conversation.

Thirdly, there are the workers who helped me compile the data necessary for this research project. There are almost too many people to count who made this research project possible, but I would like to extend special thanks to my core team of data workers: Hazem Abu Habib, Camille Maala, Catrin Hepworth, Andrea Carboni, Stern Kita and Rob Dickenson.

Then there are the various people who made my time in Brighton fun. I would like to thank my housemates and friends: James Moody, Tristan Blackburn, Ethan Potter, Oli Winston, Zach Payne, Tyler Alion and Ant Hayes for making my four and a half years in the city filled with laughter, food and drink. I give the same thanks to the Sussex University Mountaineering Club: Callan Jobson, George Allen, Dan Harrison, and Samuel Colossimo. You provided constant entertainment, laughter and gave me a hobby I hope to keep for the coming decades.

Lastly, I want to thank my family for their consistent support. It is a shame that my father is not alive to see me hand in this project, due to the personal interest and advice he gave me during the first half of my PhD. I would like to thank my siblings for understanding that PhD researchers are generally pretty hard up, and so offering to pay for the drinks when coming to see me. I would lastly like to thank my mother Alison Cahn. Using her experience as an editor, she gave me constant advice and feedback on how to improve the flow and clarity of my work, and sacrificed her time to make sure I stayed on track. I love you mum, and couldn't have done it without you.

Thesis Summary

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This research project examines how various political events and factors influence the composition of senior government elites in a range of African states. Using a newly created dataset of African cabinet ministers, this thesis creates a number of metrics to measure elite volatility and ethnic, regional and political representation. These metrics are used to assess leader and regime strategies of elite power-sharing. It then employs a range of quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate how factors such as ethnic demography, regime strength, economic performance, opposition cohesion and popular unrest influence these metrics. Through this process the thesis aims to demonstrate how the distribution of political power within a state can be estimated by allocation and reshuffling of cabinet ministers.

This research project contributes a number of key findings. Firstly, most regimes represent the majority relevant subnational groups within the senior government, but that representation is unbalanced with certain groups being overrepresented and others underrepresented. Secondly, these imbalances and variation in which groups are favoured provide information on the distribution of political power. Thirdly, that different political environments lend themselves to different compositions in the senior government and different strategies of elite power-sharing. In the same vein, individual political events which alter the balance of power are accompanied with corresponding changes in senior government which reflect these shifts in the political hierarchy.

These findings contribute to the debates on the determinants of African political power distributions, elite designations and processes, formal vs informal institutions and the political survival literature. A broad benefit of this work is to demonstrate the variance in power sharing arrangements across the African continent. Furthermore, this project demonstrates that external events change leader and elite calculations, which in turn changes strategies of power sharing.

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1.0 Introduction

1.1 Motivation and Context of the Research Project

The main question of this research is:

Does the composition of the senior government represent the distribution of political power in African states?

Politics in Africa is frequently described as a process of negotiation between political elites and nodes of power within a multipolar environment of political authority (De Waal, 2009; Reno, 1999; Bagayoko et al., 2016). Coups, riots, rebellions, political alliances and party politics are perceived as symptoms of the distribution of political power among different elite players (Arriola, 2009; Arriola, 2013; Choi and Kim, 2018; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Langer, 2005; Roessler, 2011; Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Lindemann, 2011a; Lindemann, 2011b; De Waal, 2009). Consequently, the judicious distribution of power among competing elites and interests is a major concern for leaders seeking to retain or strengthen their rule. This project argues that the allocation of senior government posts is an important tool for leaders to ensure their political survival. The composition of the cabinet therefore provides insight into how leaders balance and manage the competing power blocs within the state, and which blocs are deemed powerful enough to be included into the leader's or regime's calculations.

If the composition of the senior government reflects the distribution of political power, then different types of political environment should have noticeably different configurations of senior government. Furthermore, events that acutely change the distribution of political power should be associated with a change in the composition of the cabinet. This research project tests this theory through examining how a number of political variables – regime strength, opposition unity, elections, economic performance and mass protest – are associated with different patterns in cabinet size, the allocation of posts among different ethno-political blocs and ministerial volatility.

This research project shows how the commonly accepted features of African politics – such as elite bargaining, patronage and subnational identities – interact with different landscapes of political power and political histories to create different cabinet characteristics and divergent forms of elite power-sharing.

This research project shows the important role the allocation of official positions within the state apparatus plays in informal or semi-formalised strategies of power-sharing between elite actors. While a few previous studies have used formal positions to approximate the divisions of power – notably Francois, Rainer and Trebbi's annual cabinet dataset and the Ethnic Power Relations dataset. - this project has created a new dataset which significantly improves upon existing data in terms of disaggregation, detail and multiple forms of identity. This new dataset is not only used to show the commonalities across African polities but also to explain the political diversity observed across the continent.

The diversity shown between different individual African states has caused some theorists to question whether it is possible to analyse 'African politics' or merely politics in Kenya/Tanzania/Liberia/etc. (Allen, 1995). This research project shows that the diversity of African politics does not preclude researchers from systematically analysing leader-regime-elite interactions. Generalised descriptions of the process of African politics - such as 'winner-take-all', 'exclusionary' or 'broad-based' – only describe different regimes at different points in time, failing to accurately describe the dynamic relationship between regimes and elites, which are in a continual process of negotiation. This paper demonstrates that common trends in the strategic motivations of African regimes and elites can lead to a variety of elite power-sharing arrangements.

1.2 Ongoing Debates and Gaps in Existing Research

In the existing literature on African politics, patron-client relationships are presented as the main bonds tying leaders to elites and elites to the communities they represent (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, 1993; Berman, 1998; Reno, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997). Yet the non-institutional nature of these patrimonial relationships means that they are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. As a result, research that examines the role of neo-patrimonialism in political power-sharing and coalition building has been unable to conduct a systematic analysis of power-sharing or elite-bargaining strategies. This limits the ability of the neo-patrimonial approach to account for why some strategies of power-sharing are adopted and others are dismissed, why some configurations are stable and others degenerate into conflict (Lindemann, 2008).

Traditionally, neo-patrimonial relationships have been approximated through the ethnic composition of the state, with ethnic heterogeneity or demography serving as an approximation of interest group polarisation and patronage networks (Posner, 2004a; Francois et al., 2015). If all African politics derived from a zero-sum competition between ethnic clusters, then political coalitions and regimes should remain largely static. Yet across Africa, political coalitions inside and outside of government are in a constant state of flux. Opposition parties frequently materialise and fragment with rapidity. Longstanding rulers fall to popular protests, insurgencies or defections from within the regime. Regimes which retain power through thin margins form loose coalitions with any group which can help secure their majority. Existing research has proven that ethnicity is an important factor for guiding the political loyalty of the general public, but that the importance and effect of ethnicity varies across countries and time periods (Bratton et al., 2012; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Wahman, 2017; Basedau et al., 2011).

Within these limitations of accurately observing and quantifying elite relationships within government, an increasing body of literature estimates leader strategies of power-sharing through the composition of senior government positions (Lindemann, 2011a; Wimmer et al., 2009; Langer, 2005;

Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015). Kramon and Posner (2016) summarises the importance of senior government positions in managing intra-elite relations:

> "Scholars such as Joseph (1987), van de Walle (2007), and Arriola (2009) emphasize the extent to which presidents keep themselves in power by co-opting other powerful elites—usually elites that control ethnic or regional support bases that are distinct from the president's—by granting them access to portions of the state in exchange for their loyalty and that of their followers. [. . .] In practice, this is done by allocating cabinet positions, with the understanding that the holders of those cabinet positions will use their ministries to enrich themselves and shore up their own regional or ethnic support bases, and then deliver them to the president when called upon."

However, the existing research is limited in a number of ways. Firstly, many existing studies which explore elite power sharing – such as Lindeman's (2011a; 2011b) work on Zambia and Uganda and Cheeseman's (2011) work on elite settlements in the aftermath of conflict – focus on individual cases to extrapolate wider relationships at play throughout the continent. Secondly, large-N comparative studies – such as Francois et al.'s data on African cabinet ministers and Arriola's (2009) study on cabinet size and coups – focus on general trends in cabinet composition and leader survival strategies, rather than how these strategies diverge and change according to different political topographies. Consequently, the existing literature fails to account for the variance in elite power-sharing arrangements, and why these arrangements are frequently volatile and subject to change.

This contrasts with the level of detail in existing research on ministerial stability or political survival strategies in Latin American and European countries. Martinez-Gallardo (2014) and Camerlo and Perez-Linan (2015) both analyse how political crises or scandals affect ministerial tenure or turnover. Long-established studies on European regimes have shown how the political and ideological fragmentation of parliament affects regime stability (Powell, 1981; Taylor and Herman, 1971). This research project aims to improve upon the existing African research by demonstrating how different political variables, which influence the distribution of political power, lead to divergent strategies of elite power-sharing.

To achieve this, I created a dataset that provides a disaggregated resource for analysing the status of elite coalitions and power-sharing in multiple countries. The data set is then used to examine how specific political factors, established in the literature to affect the distribution of power, are associated with variations in cabinet size, ethnic representation and stability. This in turn shows how the make-up and volatility of senior government posts offers a useful mechanism for estimating the distribution of political power. The focus of this research project is on how political events influence elite power-sharing strategies, and not how these strategies actually effect regime or leader survival.

1.3 Chapters of Research Project

To demonstrate how the allocation of senior government posts reflects the distribution of political power, this project needs to achieve two objectives: show the insufficiency of current metrics, especially those based on a regime's supposed institutional traits or ethnic demography; and show that events which change the distribution of political power within a state result in substantive changes within the senior government and political elite. The chapters are therefore laid out in the following manner:

1.3.1 Literature Review

This section provides a review of the existing literature on politics in Africa, along with features which are commonly associated with African governance: political survival, elite interests, patronage and subnational identities such as ethnicity. This section also situates this research project within the context of existing research and outlines how the project will bridge gaps in the current literature.

1.3.2 Introduction to African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (ACPED)

This section will introduce the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (hereafter ACPED). This section acts as an introduction to ACPED's collection process and the metrics derived from the data. This section also demonstrates ACPED's improvements over existing datasets which similarly seek to merge subnational identities (mainly ethnicity) with hierarchies of political dominance, specifically temporally disaggregated data and multiple metrics of identity. These improvements make the data ideal for investigating how changes in the distribution of political power are reflected by changes in power-sharing at the elite level. Lastly, this section investigates the relationship between ACPED's metrics and other datasets which measure the institutional character of states (democratisation, personalisation of power, etc.) and their distribution of power. ACPED metrics are shown to vary widely within the regime classifications of existing datasets such as PolityIV or Varieties of Democracy (VDEM). This unexplained variance within existing datasets shows the necessity of ACPED as both an alternative and a supplementary means of investigating the distribution of political power.

1.3.3 Ethnic Arithmetic or Political Calculus? Representation and Accommodation in African Cabinets (joint paper with Professor Clionadh Raleigh)

This chapter investigates generalised characteristics of ethnic representation and the allocation of posts among different groups in Africa. Previous literature on African political representation focusses on the dynamics of exclusion of political losers within a zero-sum game (Langer, 2005; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997). There are similarly counter narratives which argue that African regimes

attempt to be as representative and balanced as possible in order to minimise dissent against the regime and broaden their support base (Francois et al., 2015; Lindemann, 2011b; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Arriola, 2009).

The historical record shows that demographic weight does not determine the ethno-political hierarchy (prominent examples include the Tutsi domination of Burundi or Kabre dominance of Togo). Furthermore, the ethnic arithmetic paradigm assumes regimes react automatically to ethnic demographics and does not account for the geographical and temporal variance seen across and within countries.

Overall this chapter finds that, although most salient ethno-political groups are represented within the cabinet, in many instances the allocation of seats does not reflect the ethnic demography of the country in question. Political salience is not necessarily defined by size, with certain small groups acting as kingmakers or dependent allies of the regime (De Mesquita et al., 2005; Posner, 2004a; Londregan et al., 1995). Nor do the positions of groups within the ethno-political hierarchy remain static over time. In more fluid political environments, groups which have previously been key allies in multi-ethnic coalitions have fractured and former adversaries have teamed up when politically expedient. In more stagnant or enduring regimes leaders may be able to retain control without changing the ethno-political power-sharing within their cabinet. This chapter demonstrates that there is no 'one size fits all' calculation for managing ethno-political interests in Africa's varied states.

With these points established, the remaining chapters of the research project will examine how different political contexts or changes in the political environment can lead to regimes adopting different power-sharing configurations or prioritising certain ethno-regional groups.

This chapter is co-authored with my supervisor Professor Clionadh Raleigh. My contribution involves processing and supplying the necessary data and writing the initial drafts of the paper which would become the basis of the finalised paper. Professor Raleigh is responsible for the final analysis and the finalised draft included in this thesis.

1.3.4 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility

The former chapter establishes that strategies of representation and the allocation of posts vary across different political contexts. This chapter develops this argument by examining two potential political contexts which, as indicated by the literature, should change a leader's calculations over what elite power-sharing arrangement is most robust. The two contexts under study are: the twelve months before an election and periods of economic downturn.

The vast majority of states in Africa hold elections which, in spite of many states falling short of consolidated democracies (Hassan, 2017; Resnick, 2017; Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; Cheeseman, 2010),

nominally places the regime in danger of replacement by the opposition. Consequently the pre-electoral period is a time when leaders should be implementing elite coalition strategies to reduce opposition coordination and broaden regime appeal (Arriola, 2009; Arriola, 2013; Wahman, 2013; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). Poor economic performance restricts the resources available to the regime to use for patronage, weakening the regime's ability to retain thesupport of included elites (Schedler, 2013; De Mesquita et al., 2005). Poor economic performance also weakens the regime's legitimacy and popularity with the electorate, making the regime more vulnerable to opposition elites and the leader more susceptible to being challenged t from within the regime (Alesina et al., 1996; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011). However, all regimes may not react to these challenges in the same way. Regimes in Africa vary widely in terms of electoral vulnerability and political dominance. Some parties or leaders have remained in power and dominated politics for decades, while others have seen multiple democratic (and undemocratic) changes in regime. To account for this variance, regimes are classified as either stronger 'hegemonic' regimes, or weaker 'competitive' regimes (Schedler, 2013).

This chapter finds that during the twelve months before an election, competitive regimes tend to have larger cabinets which are less dominated by the leader's ethnic group, with posts allocated more equitably among ethnic groups. In contrast, in hegemonic regimes the allocation of posts becomes less proportionate and the leader's co-ethnics become a more dominant force in the cabinet. While competitive regimes face a legitimate threat from the opposition, leaders in hegemonic regimes are most in danger from rival factions within the regime and so will reformulate their cabinet so their network dominates to ward off threats from internal rivals (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Schedler, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2002).

Similarly, competitive and hegemonic regimes react differently to economic decline. Cabinets in competitive regimes contract – shrinking in size while becoming less ethnically representative – during periods of poor economic growth.. During periods of high economic growth competitive regimes expand the size of the cabinet and become more ethically representative. In contrast, hegemonic regimes are able to accumulate slack resources (due to their longevity and lack of an effective opposition) which allows the leader maintain the size and inclusivity of their cabinets during periods of poor growth. These findings corroborate with the argument that weaker regimes are more responsive to the opportunity presented by short-term bonanzas or the threat posed by short-term crises (Schedler, 2013; De Mesquita et al., 2005). In contrast, hegemonic regimes are designed to weather political and economic crises. (*ibid.*).

Importantly, this chapter provides an empirical context to support the arguments of the Ethnic Arithmetic or Political Calculus chapter and demonstrates that leader/regime survival strategies change according to context.

This chapter also finds that the cabinet experiences greater change in the post-electoral period, even in cases where the regime holds onto power. This finding creates the impetus for the following chapter where the effect of different electoral outcomes on elite power-sharing strategies is investigated.

This chapter is entirely my own work.

1.3.5 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains

This chapter investigates how regimes alter their power-sharing strategies after surviving an election. Existing literature on elections in anocratic or autocratic states argues that elections function as a means of information gathering, allowing regimes to estimate their strength compared to the political opposition (Miller, 2015; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Previous studies have examined how regimes use electoral results to guide their strategies in distributing state resources, with a few examining specific states in Africa (Jablonski, 2014; Masaki, 2018). But no studies have examined how regimes use electoral results to inform their elite power-sharing strategies and alter their ruling coalition. There is a large body of literature on African regimes co-opting the opposition or prioritising their ethnic base or excluding disloyal elites (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Lindemann, 2011b; Van de Walle, 2007; Langer, 2005; Ndegwa, 1997), yet there are few studies looking at when regimes choose one strategy over the other. This chapter argues that elections provide a unique opportunity for the regime to assess its strength vis-à-vis the political opposition and tailor their elite power-sharing strategy accordingly. It addresses these two gaps in the current literature by examining how different configurations of regime and opposition strength cause leaders to alter the composition of their cabinets post-election.

Using the same regime classification as before, this chapter finds that more electorally vulnerable or 'competitive' regimes make dramatic changes to their cabinet after retaining power during an election. These regimes engage in significant co-option when facing a unified opposition in order to strengthen their support base. This is primarily achieved through increasing the representation of elites from the opposition's ethnic constituency, undermining support for the opposition. Conversely when the opposition is divided, these regimes capitalise on the opportunity to reward their own ethnic base and increase the dominance of the leader's co-ethnics in the cabinet.

In contrast, stronger or 'hegemonic' regimes do not engage in drastic changes to the ethnic or political composition of their cabinet post-election, supporting arguments that only weaker regimes launch defensive concessions when threatened by the opposition (Schedler, 2013; Magaloni, 2006; Horne, 2016). However, this chapter finds that hegemonic regimes do not reliably engage in the strategy of excluding opponents at the elite level post-election. These regimes in fact do co-opt a strong opposition through including opposition co-ethnics in the cabinet, though this is not shown through the immediate changes made to the cabinet post-election. Instead opposition co-ethnics appear to be well represented in the cabinet outside of the immediate post-electoral reshuffle. This shows that

hegemonic regimes, like competitive regimes, are reactive to opposition strength but implement longer-term strategies of opposition containment.

This chapter is entirely my own work.

1.3.6 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa (joint paper with Andrea Carboni)

This chapter investigates the influence of protests on the turnover of ministers. Politics in Africa is frequently presented in the existing literature (and in this research project) as a process of negotiation between political elites both inside and outside of the regime. In contrast, non-elite masses are given secondary importance, and are portrayed as constituencies to feed with patronage or resources to be mobilised by elites for voting and violence (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Szeftel, 2000; Ndegwa, 1997; De Waal, 2009; Francois et al., 2015).

Widespread protests – such as those seen during the Third Wave of Democratisation or during the Arab Spring - occur when a large section of the population demands a substantive change in how the government is run, either through reform, institutional changes or outright regime change (Lust-Okar, 2004; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992). In these cases, slight changes to the elite bargain – such as integrating a few elites from marginalised communities – are unlikely to mollify public discontent and ensure the leader's or regime's political survival. Consequently, regimes create 'crisis cabinets' tailored to counter the populist threat posed by protests.

It is accepted that regimes can rarely rely purely on repression to quash dissent and need to engage in accommodation to survive popular uprisings (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Carey, 2006). In spite of this, most of the literature on regime responses to protest has focussed on repression or has used government rhetoric to approximate whether regimes engage in concessions or co-option (Bhasin and Gandhi, 2013; Carey, 2006; Ash, 2015; Josua and Edel, 2015). This chapter represents a key addition to the literature by looking at how protest affects a regime's elite power-sharing calculations and how regimes or leaders seek to mollify public discontent through changes in the senior government.

Episodes of high ministerial turnover outside of the routine large-scale reshuffles which occur after an election or a democratic change in government, are rare and our initial investigation finds that there is not a strong relationship between protests and cabinet volatility. Many regimes in Africa manage to withstand high levels of public protest without resorting to drastically changing their ruling coalition.

Consequently, we isolate instances of high ministerial turnover and analyse the preceding political crisis. We find that these 'crisis cabinets' are made in response to a number of different threats, including factional fights within the regime, strong opposition movements (both armed and unarmed), managed political transitions and protests.

Crisis cabinets which are made in response to protest are defined by certain traits which reflect the unique challenges presented by mass protest. Firstly, crisis cabinets in response to protests occur in less democratic environments. In more democratic regimes the government's or leader's right to rule is regularly contested in public discourse, while more autocratic regimes are more reliant on projecting an image of uncontested power. This conforms with the theory that autocratic regimes are vulnerable to a 'snowball effect' in which protests are rare but quickly cascade into open rebellions against the regime (Schedler, 2013; Kricheli et al. 2011; Rød and Weidmann, 2013).

Secondly, protest-motivated crisis cabinets involve a higher turnover in personnel and the dismissal of long-standing ministers when compared to crisis cabinets which are spurred by other types of political crisis. Protests present the biggest threat to regimes when motivated by a desire for systemic reform to the political system (Josua and Edel, 2015). In response, regimes can signal a willingness to engage in substantive change through drastically changing their elite coalition and dropping long-term fixtures of the regime.

Thirdly, the regional protest hotspots tend to become better represented in the resulting crisis cabinets.

Lastly, we examine in depth the cases where protests caused the regime to create a crisis cabinet. Though popular protests often reflect the concerns of non-elites, they can cause significant change when the protests create a division within the regime elite. This was shown during the Third Wave of Democratisation in Africa and the Arab Spring (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Josua and Edel, 2015). Protests can damage the regime's legitimacy, reducing the cost and increasing the chance of success of a coup, defection or a factional conflict within the regime (Caspar and Tyson, 2014).

This paper was created with my colleague Andrea Carboni. My main contributions include the data processing, methodology and analysis. I also wrote the qualitative analysis of protest-motivated crisis cabinets in Ethiopia and Guinea. Mr Carboni took charge of the introduction, conclusion and literature review, along with the qualitative analysis of Tunisia. The concept for the paper was jointly conceived by Mr Carboni and myself.

1.3.7 Inclusion, Volatility and Political Violence across African Regimes (joint paper with Professor Clionadh Raleigh, Dr Hyun-Jin Choi and Dr Giuseppe Maggio)

This chapter investigates the effect of different elite power-sharing arrangements on patterns of political violence. Violence is frequently interpreted as a potential tool for political elites to negotiate with the regime and the leader. Excluded elites can force their inclusion into the state through mobilising personal armies, either through gaining representation through a peace agreement or through replacing the incumbent regime (LeVan, 2011; Mehler, 2011; De Waal, 2009; Chabal and Daloz, 1999).

A large body of literature has examined how the exclusion of ethno-political groups is related to political violence, focussing mainly on instances of civil war between state forces and rebel forces (Østby, 2008; Buhaug et al., 2008; Roessler, 2011). Furthermore, much of the political violence which occurs in Africa does not fit neatly into this state-rebel dyad. Activity by political or communal militias, typically operating as the private armies of elites, accounts for a large portion of violent events (Raleigh, 2016). Consequently, the current literature mostly interprets the use of violence for political leverage only in terms of exclusion and inclusion while the use of violence as a tool of included elites seeking to improve their position within the political hierarchy is understudied.

This chapter finds that in imbalanced regimes there is an increase in the incidence of rebel violence, especially if those regimes exclude multiple politically-relevant ethnic groups. Regimes which grant representation to the majority of ethnic groups but engage in large-scale over and underrepresentation suffer from a high instance of militia violence. Furthermore, when the cabinet is volatile and the position of elites is less secure, violence increases between non-state militias. These findings add a large caveat to the existing literature which focusses just on ethnic inclusion and exclusion. Leaders are not able to totally secure their rule by creating an inclusive broad-based coalition because included elites and communities will continue to compete over their position within the political hierarchy.

This chapter was created jointly with Professor Clionadh Raleigh, Dr Giuseppe Maggio and Dr Hyun Jin Choi. My contribution to this chapter was small, primarily supplying data and advising Dr Maggio, who was in charge of the quantitative analysis.

2.0 Literature Review

Each chapter of the research project includes a literature review which provides context for the chapter's research question and hypothesised relationships. This chapter provides a broader overview of the different strands of academic literature which have guided this project, along with the key findings and limitations within the existing literature. Common threads emerge from the all the chapters of the research project and these are the themes considered here. They are: the strategies employed to ensure political survival, the role of subnational identities such as ethnicity in politics in Africa, the importance of power-sharing within potentially fragmented political environments, and how instability in the political environment can lead to changes in previously stable elite bargains.

2.1 Political survival

Leadership politics in Africa is presented as both a potentially lucrative and potentially dangerous undertaking. Since independence, many African countries have developed 'imperial presidencies' in which power is centralised within the executive and position of leader (Prempeh, 2007). Presidents are often unencumbered by checks from the legislative and judicial branches of government (Kieh, 2018; Prempeh, 2007). Presidents, along with other executive positions such as the ministries of finance or defence, frequently control vast slush funds which are not subject to parliamentary or judicial oversight (McKie and Van de Walle, 2010). Presidents are often able to award major contracts or appoint individuals to senior government posts with no reference to anyone else(Kieh, 2018; Prempeh, 2007). Because of these powers, incumbents such as Kabila, Mugabe, Sassou-Nguesso, Dos-Santos and Biya have accumulated vast fortunes of personal wealth, often in spite of their country's enduring poverty and their limited public support (Felter, 2017). This means that the capture and retention of the highest executive office is a driving factor in political competition including party formation, electoral competition, factional infighting and military politicisation (Prempeh, 2007; Kollner and Basedau, 2005; Decalo, 1989; Kieh, 2018).

The literature also shows that just as incumbency confers considerable benefits in Africa, the loss of incumbency carries considerable risk including assassination, exile or arrest (Goldsmith, 2001). The Archigos dataset (Goemans et al., 2009) records 285 leader exits in Africa, from the immediate post-independence period to 2015. Of these exits, 93 resulted in the exile or imprisonment of the former leader while 27 resulted in execution. Literature on African politics frequently paints a picture of an imperial leader, a chief writ-large, attempting to navigate a hostile political environment and ensure the survival of their rule.

> "We find rulers who are not nearly as preoccupied with the problem of going somewhere as with the task of keeping themselves and their regimes afloat: they are trying to survive in a political world of great uncertainty and often turbulence." (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984).

The third wave of democratisation in the 1990s enabled leaders to vacate power through retirement, party selection proceedings, presidential-term limits and elections, all of which soften the risks involved in vacating the seat of power (Prempeh, 2007; Goldsmith, 2001). Yet even within this more forgiving environment, losing power still contains risks. Leaders in much of Africa are granted a degree of immunity while in office, but forfeit their immunity upon exiting their post, leaving them vulnerable to legal challenges (Fombad and Nwauche, 2011). Globally, former presidents have faced prosecution for alleged crimes or corruption perpetrated during their tenure. In Africa, leaders who have been deposed, failed to install successors or lost elections have been subject to criminal proceedings once out of office. Leaders such as Hassan Habre, Hosni Mubarak and Mohammed Morsi are examples of former leaders who were deposed and then faced trial. Jacob Zuma and Earnest Bai Koroma are two examples of ex-leaders who failed to install a successor and are currently either under investigation or facing trial. Hastings Banda and Didier Ratsiraka are examples of leaders who lost an election and were subsequently tried for crimes committed during their tenure. The legal vulnerability of former presidents means that the wealth and power accumulated during their reign can be quickly stripped from them by the new incumbent (Felter, 2017).

Given the risks of losing the power of the 'imperial presidency' and benefits of office, political survival is a key concern guiding the political decisions made by leaders. Existing literature has shown how leaders in Africa put political survival above other interests by: coup-proofing their military, often at the cost of military effectiveness (Decalo, 1989; Lindemann, 2011a); refusing to adopt economic strategies which may promote growth if these also lower support or promote the creation of independent power bases (Arriola, 2013; Goldsmith, 2001); adopting costly devolution or redistricting schemes (Green, 2011); empowering regional chiefs (Baldwin, 2014); and allocating aid or development funds to either reward loyal constituencies or to try to sway doubtful voters (Jablonski, 2014; Masaki, 2018).

Another aspect of politics which is increasingly perceived as a means for ensuring political survival is coalition building among elites. Much of this comes through the concepts outlined in De Mesquita's work on winning coalition creation and political survival (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Leaders need to create *winning* coalitions from the selectorate (the pool of individuals who can engage in choosing the leadership of the country, to protect themselves from both internal and external threats.

To build an effective coalition, these supporters should control resources critical to the leader's political survival. Relevant resources can include: financial wealth; political support from a subsection of society; coercive capacity; strong links with other influential countries; and technical expertise. These individuals are what this project classes as 'elites'. Elites are commonly referenced in the academic literature on Africa, and politics in general, but the term is rarely defined. Instead the term 'elite' acts as a container concept to mean someone of importance whose resources can be mobilised

in the exercise of power (Salverda and Abbink, 2013). This definition is inferred throughout the extant literature by referring to a wide array of power brokers – regime or opposition politicians, senior political party members, rebel or militia leaders, securocrats, financiers and traditional leaders – as 'elites' (De Waal, 2009; Langer, 2005; Arriola, 2013; Arriola, 2009; Baldwin, 2014; Mehler, 2011; Reno, 1999; Cheeseman, 2011).

2.2 Defining Regimes

Throughout this thesis, the phrase 'regime' carries two primary meanings. Firstly there is regime typology, which tends to use terms such as 'autocratic' or 'competitive' regimes. These references describe the rules guiding the exercise of, and access to, political power, as used in literature such as Schedler (2013). Under this definition, a change in government in a consolidated democracy from one party to another through elections would not represent a change in regime, although the parties may represent different interests or constituencies within the country.

This thesis primarily focusses on how changes in the elite environment (as shown by the cabinet) reflect shifts in the distribution of power in the wider political environment. This study therefore primarily uses 'regime' to refer to the individuals and interests which are represented by, or associated with, the government (Geddes et al., 2014), irrespective of the autocratic or democratic nature of that government. These interests could be an agglomeration of ethno-regional interests (for examples Kenya's various ethnic congress parties), the security establishment (for example military juntas), a dominant party/party factions or ruling family clans (for example the familial dynasties in Togo and Gabon). Given the imperial nature of the presidency and the concentration of political power in the executive in Africa, 'regime' throughout this thesis will generally refer to the leader and their retainers or supporters within the elite (Prempeh, 2007; Francois et al., 2015).

2.3 Patronage, personal networks and the African state

Leaders do not rule alone and need to convince other politically powerful individuals that it is beneficial to support the regime and ensure the leader's survival. Just as leaders can use the financial resources of the African state for self-enrichment, the reservoir of wealth contained in civil service departments and public enterprises are a necessary tool for creating a coalition of allies to insulate the leader from political threats (Berman, 1998; De Waal, 2009; Szeftel, 2000; Lindemann, 2008). De Mesquita et al. (2005) frequently refer to these benefits as 'private goods', but in much of the literature on African politics it is simply referred to as 'patronage'.

Within the literature on African politics, patronage is portrayed as the glue that binds elites within government to the regime or leader (Van de Walle, 2007; Van de Walle, 2003; Chabal and Daloz,

1999; Bayart, 1993; Berman, 1998; Reno, 1999; Arriola, 2009). There are several popularly cited reasons for the enduring role of patronage in African politics. Firstly the lack of constraints and oversight on the leader and the executive creates a system in which personal networks of obligation and mutual interest are a guiding factor in resource allocation rather than institutional rules (Francois et al., 2015; Prempeh, 2007; Jackson and Rosberg, 1984). This grants leaders, and elites included within their network, the ability to distribute state resources at their discretion and cultivate a network of clients.

Secondly, some theorists have argued that this practice took root after independence because the colonial rulers had not had sovereignty in mind when creating the state boundaries (Reno, 1999; Van de Walle, 2007; Van de Walle, 2003; Berman, 1998; Rothchild, 1995). The rulers of the newly independent African states needed to exert control over heterogeneous, contested and poorly integrated political environments. Including key elites and groups into the regime's patronage network allowed leaders to extend their rule over the fractious political environment of post-independence Africa. These patronage networks were frequently located within dominant ruling parties, such as the Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) of Ivory Coast or Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) of Tanzania (Van de Walle, 2007). Leaders continue to rely on creating webs of dependency or loyalty through patronage in the modern era in order to sustain their power, through winning elections, maintaining control over violent actors within the state or dominating factional struggles within government (Reno, 1999; Green, 2011; Baldwin, 2014; Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Lindemann, 2011a).

Lastly, fault-lines in African politics are often not due to ideology but rather pragmatic contests over the distribution of spoils of the state (Szeftel, 2000; Van de Walle, 2007; Van de Walle, 2003; Kendhammer, 2010; Carbone, 2007).

> "…neopatrimonial elites are more likely to take sides on pragmatic grounds in the struggles over spoils. Their political positions come to be defined according to whether they are insiders or outsiders in relation to the patronage system." (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994)

This situation makes patronage an effective instrument for creating coalitions of convenience which can be used to enhance the leader's survival prospects. Africa presents many examples of former rivals joining forces to increase their hold on political power. Examples include Alassane Ouattara and Henri Konan Bedie in Ivory Coast, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto in Kenya and Yoweri Museveni and Moses Ali in Uganda.

A key issue with the current literature is that the non-institutional nature of these patrimonial relationships means that they are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. Reno (1999) describes these relationships as a 'shadow state', a "a very real, but not formally recognized, patronage system that was rigidly organized and centred on rulers' control over resources."

Though political relationships in Africa are frequently described as personal or informal, the main sources of wealth are accessed through official positions in government (Lindemann, 2008; Lindemann, 2011a; Francois et al., 2015). Lindemann (2008) describes the relationship between the informal relationships which govern politics in Africa and formal positions within the state:

> "The allocation of public office determines the means that different elites have to influence what happens at the level of the state (including rent deployment) and is therefore an important instrument for the building of political coalitions."

In short, the neo-patrimonial 'shadow state' cannot exist without control over the wealth flows of the actual state. In the absence of reliable data on patronage networks, an increasing body of literature estimates leader strategies of power-sharing through the composition of senior government positions (Lindemann, 2011a; Wimmer et al., 2009; Langer, 2005; Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015).

2.4 The role of ethnicity and subnational identities

There is an academic consensus that subnational identities, most notably ethnicity, play an important role in shaping African politics. Subnational identities function as markers of 'common interest' and are presumed to govern the networks of mutual obligation and interest which guide the distribution of patronage (Ndegwa, 1997; Mhlanga, 2012; Berman, 1998; Rothschild, 1995; Szeftel, 2000; Azam, 2001). Ethnic, regional or religious elites within the African context act as 'bloc leaders' or 'super-representatives' which represent the interests of a large section of the selectorate and, if included, can deliver their constituency's support to the leader or regime (De Mesquita et al., 2005; Arriola, 2009). Elites gain legitimacy from effectively representing their group's communal interests and in return, their group's membership can, be mobilised to help elites achieve their political goals (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997; Langer, 2005). Szeftel (2000) quotes a Zambian political leader who summarises this process of political reciprocity:

> "If you do not act cohesively, your leaders won't get sufficient party and government posts. If your leaders do not get sufficient posts, they will not be able to wield sufficient power on your behalf in order to make sure that you ... get your fair share of the jobs and development funds going."

Many existing datasets on ethnic fractionalisation, polarisation or ethno-political hierarchies were created with the expressed intention of estimating the competing 'interest groups' attempting to access state resources and patronage (Alesina et al., 2003; Posner, 2004a; Cederman et al., 2010).

There is controversy over the degree to which constituencies benefit from the inclusion of their elite representatives in government. Van de Walle (2003) argues that these resources generally remain in elite hands and do not extend out past a small circle of followers. The IMF-mandated reforms of the 1980s limited fiscal resources and many African states now have smaller civil services in terms of population and public expenditure budgets in terms of GDP than most OECD states (*ibid.*). Van de

Walle (2003; 2007) and Randall (2007) instead characterise the attachment communities exhibit towards their elite representatives is due to the importance of symbolic representation rather than material dividends.

However, the shrinking of the civil service only limits some forms of patronage, such as public or parastatal employment, whereas other forms, such as targeted development or business licenses, are still available to maintain patron-client networks (Van De Walle, 2003; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Recent large-N studies have found that in Africa (and in less institutionalised countries in general) the co-ethnics or co-regionalists of either the leader or relevant senior government officials materially benefit from better health and education outcomes, better investment in infrastructure or education and the disproportionate allocation of aid and development projects (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Jablonski, 2014; Holder and Raschky, 2014; Burgess et al., 2015; Kramon and Posner, 2016).

Consequently, subnational identities are a serious concern for leaders when creating winning coalition and few political decisions in Africa are made without some "clientistic calculations or considerations of identity" (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Leaders frequently depend on the presumed loyalty of certain subnational groups to protect them from political challengers. This is shown by preferential recruitment of the leader's co-ethnics into the armed forces officer corps and elite military units, or loyalists into senior government positions (Decalo, 1989; Roessler, 2011; Lindemann, 2011a).[1] But creating exclusionary regimes which fail to represent a large segment of the population and retain power through force can motivate excluded constituencies to rebel against the regime (Choi and Kim, 2018; Buhaug et al., 2008). Many civil wars in Africa – including Somalia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Uganda, Liberia and Ivory Coast – have been attributed to leaders failing to effectively share power with other subnational identities and incorporate important bloc leaders into their ruling coalitions (Lindemann, 2008; Malaquias, 2000; Rothchild, 1995; Zack-Williams, 2010; Langer, 2005; Roessler, 2011).

Despite a general consensus about the importance of subnational identities and ethnicity on politics in Africa, the literature has become more contextual in its analysis over time. Theorists such as Posner (2004b) and Brubaker (2002) emphasise that the importance of subnational identities, and which identity labels are mobilised, are dependent on factors such as demography, security and government policy. In Ivory Coast, for example, president Henri Konan Bedie's policy of excluding and electorally disenfranchising northerners allowed Alassane Ouattara – a northern elite – to mobilise northern Ivorians to challenge Bedie's regime (Langer, 2005). The land policies of Kenyatta and Moi

[1] Omar Bongo of Gabon set up an elite presidential guard of Bateke co-ethnics to counter-balance the Fang-dominated regular army. Eyadema of Togo created a praetorian guard based around his home village of Paya.

regimes in Kenya led to antagonistic political competition between Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Luo as each group tried to capture the presidency and oversee the allocation of land (Boone, 2012). It is worth noting that 'Kalenjin' is not a single ethnic group but a linguistic umbrella which includes a number of discreet 'tribes' (Posner, 2007).[2] In Malawi, the Chewa and Tumbuka ethnic groups make up a significant percentage of the population and politically compete with each other, while in Zambia the two groups often act in concert under the broader category of 'Easterners' (Posner, 2004b). The size and type of political arena can also change which identities are politically relevant. Groups which compete against each other in local politics may act as a unitary political bloc in national elections (Carrier and Kochore, 2014).

Many theorists have argued that the move to multiparty elections would lead to parties and politicians representing narrow ethnic interests, causing electoral politics to become a zero-sum game in which the victors would capture exclusive rights to the state's wealth (Nyamnjoh and Rowlands, 1998; Van de Walle, 2007; Laakso, 2007), mirroring the arguments made by post-independent dictators to defend their autocratic rule. This assumption has been refined by more recent research. Less than a third of Sub-Saharan states have an outright ethnic majority with the largest group typically accounting for 41% of the population – meaning that it is rare that a party can attain power by relying on a single ethnic constituency (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Furthermore, many African states ban the creation of parties which explicitly promote narrow ethnic, religious or regional interests (Bogaards et al., 2010).

There are several studies which argue that African voters, much like their western counterparts, are primarily concerned with economic performance, development and competence when choosing leaders or local representatives (Bratton et al., 2012; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). Most cross-national research in Africa, however, shows that subnational identities do matter in guiding voting behaviour and political support, though patterns of support vary across different political contexts (Basedau et al., 2011). In cases where the ruling party dominates the political landscape without credible challenges, the ruling party is likely to be a broad-based coalition which collects votes from a wide range of different groups (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Carbone, 2007; Wahman, 2017). In these regimes, elites are likely to mobilise their ethnic constituencies during factional conflicts within the party or during the nomination stage of elections (Posner, 2007; Kendhammer, 2010; Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Egboh and Aniche, 2015). In more competitive political environments where ruling regimes retain power through thin electoral margins and opposition parties stand a credible chance of displacing the regime, the electorate is more likely to vote in ethnic blocs and elites are likely to

[2] The Kalenjin is considered to include the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen, Pokot, Elgeyo, Keiyo, Marakwet, Seibi, Dorobo, Terik, and Sabaot tribes.

mobilise their ethnic constituencies during national elections (Posner, 2007; Eifert et al., 2010; Langer, 2005; Jockers et al., 2009; Fox, 1997).

A common feature is that ruling parties tend to derive support from a wider array of identity groups than opposition parties, which tend to mobilise a narrow ethnic or regional constituency while making populist appeals in urban areas (Wahman, 2017; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). Overall, few electorally successful parties draw support from a single ethnic or regional group, although some successful parties may have an ethnic base or attain power through short-lived coalitions with other 'ethnic parties' (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Arriola, 2013). Joireman (1997) succinctly outlines the role ethnicity can play in African party politics:

> "Ethnicity can be a viable organising principle for an insurgent group but not for a political party which aspires to govern."

2.5 Balancing elite interests, sharing power and security

How leaders balance the interests of competing political identities and elites is key to ensuring their survival. In the absence of strong institutions, strategies of winning coalition formation and power-sharing are guided by concerns over security and political survival (Roessler and Ohls, 2018). Leaders are under pressure to balance the competing threats of external elites, who can oust or force concessions from the regime, and their nominal coalition allies, who can launch a coup from within the regime. Roessler describes this dynamic as the coup/civil war trade-off (Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Roessler, 2011).

In many contemporary African states, leaders are not only threatened by external elites engaging in armed rebellion. Since the widespread adoption of multiparty elections in the early 1990s, elites outside of the leader's ruling coalition can attempt to gain power through electoral competition. Many long-term leaders and regimes lost power in their country's founding election.[3] Between 1990 and 2017 approximately 40 percent of elections have resulted in a new leader taking power (Brookings Institute, 2015).[4] This threat is not spread equally throughout the continent. Appendix figure 1 shows that though leader and ruling party tenure are generally lower in 2017 than in 1990, many leaders[5] and ruling parties[6] have managed to survive the adoption of regular elections and hold onto power.

[3] Examples include Benin in 1991, Cape Verde in 1991, Malawi in 1994, and Zambia in 1991 (Cheeseman, 2010)

[4] Over two thirds of these transitions occurred in an open poll where the incumbent was not competing, and ten percent of these changes in leadership were direct successions where the regime's favoured successor became leader (Brookings Institute, 2015).

[5] The following leaders have been in office since the 1990s or earlier: Paul Biya of Cameroon, Idriss Deby of Chad, Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville, Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti, Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda.

[6] The following countries have had the same party in power since the 1990s or earlier, although the leaders have changed: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

Leaders also face non-democratic threats from external forces including protests[7] and external interventions.[8]

Though coups have continued to constitute a real threat in the multiparty era, with 25 coups taking place since 1990 (Brookings Institute, 2015), leaders also face multiple other internal threats such as formal leadership selection mechanisms, opposing factions within the regime or rebellious successors. Thabo Mbeki of South Africa was ousted by the decision of the ANC's National Executive Committee to withdraw support. Ian Khama was repeatedly challenged by factional rivals within the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which undercut Khama's popularity and led to the formation of the splinter Botswana Movement for Democracy (Makgalaand and Mac Giollabhuí, 2014). Jose dos Santos, president of Angola for 38 years, ceded power to his nominated successor Joao Loureco. Lourenco has subsequently cancelled government contracts with companies linked to Dos Santos and arrested Dos Santos' son (Cascais, 2018).

Though political power in African regimes is assumed to be concentrated within the presidency, there have been many cases of leaders being constrained by other government elites. For example, Bakili Muluzi of Malawi, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Frederick Chiluba of Zambia attempted to amend the constitution to extend their tenure but were blocked by parliament (including many MPs from the ruling party) (Posner and Young, 2007).

Leaders need to create coalitions that minimise both types of threat and create a coalition of elites which is resilient to external threats, while ensuring none of the coalition partners has the power or motivation to seize power. The existing literature argues that large and inclusive coalitions are an effective means of mitigating external threats such as protest, democratic opposition or insurgency, as these are motivated by elites who have been deprived of the benefits of state largesse (Choi and Kim, 2018; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Roessler, 2011). Exclusive ruling coalitions can foster civil wars in which excluded groups and their representatives try to depose the incumbent or force their inclusion in the ruling coalition via a negotiated settlement (Mehler, 2011; Buhaug et al., 2008; Wimmer et al., 2009; De Waal, 2009). In terms of non-violent competition, leaders generally need to draw on support from outside their own communities to remain electorally viable and keep the opposition from forming inclusive multi-ethnic coalitions of their own (Arriola, 2013; Wahman, 2013; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). This will likely necessitate a large and inclusive coalition of elites (Arriola, 2011; Ash, 2015).

[7] Which recently forced out Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Abdelazziz Boutaflika of Algeria.
[8] Which expelled Johnny Paul Koroma of Sierra Leone, Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast and Yayeh Jammeh of Gambia.

However, there are arguments that larger coalitions can endanger incumbent survival through making leaders more vulnerable to rivals from within the ruling coalition. Increasing the size of the ruling coalition limits the amount of spoils available to existing coalition members (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Continually expanding the coalition can encourage existing members to oust the incumbent in order to create a narrow coalition in which all members are better compensated (Choi and Kim, 2018).[9] Inclusive coalitions can pose internal risks to the incumbent through the inclusion of potentially disloyal groups who may be tempted to usurp power from within (Roessler, 2011). Lastly, sharing power with ethnic groups with a history of antagonism with the regime can incentivise co-ethnic hardliners to compete with or replace the incumbent rather than face sharing power with other groups (Sriram and Zahar, 2009).[10]

The contradictory arguments on effective elite power-sharing strategies may be due the gaps in the literature on elite power-sharing and political survival strategies in Africa. Though many studies examine the various threats facing African leaders and regimes, there are comparatively few studies looking at how African leaders create and alter their coalition of elites to minimise threats. Existing studies examining elite power-sharing typically focus on individual cases – such as Lindeman's (2011a; 2011b) studies on Zambia and Uganda, Woldense's (2018) on Ethiopia, and Langer's (2005) work on Ivory Coast – and use the results of the analysis to extrapolate wider relationships at play throughout the continent. There are few large-N cross-comparative works[11] which match the scope of studies examining the allocation of formal positions and leader survival strategies in other regions.[12] The studies do not examine in depth how different political factors can change which elite power-sharing strategies are most effective. Consequently, arguments over optimal strategies of elite power-sharing persist and the historical variation in strategies shown across Africa remains largely unexplained in the literature.

[9] Arriola (2009) finds that increasing the size of the coalition up to a point actually reduces the chance of a coup. However, the effect dampens as the coalition expands and eventually expanding the coalition increases the chance of deposition from within.

[10] Notable examples of outbidding include Islamist and northern opposition to Gaafar Nimeiry's inclusion of southerners in the Sudanese government and attempted coups by hardline military Tutsi's against Pierre Buyoya's inclusive government in Burundi (Kaufmann, 2006; Southall, 2006). Outside of a military context, President Diouf offered his electoral rival Abdulaye Wade the position of Vice-President, but was blocked by the ruling Socialist Party (Gandhi and Buckles, 2016).

[11] Some, examples include Kroeger's (2018) study of cabinet reshuffle patterns within military/personalist/dominant party regimes, or Roessler's (2011) study on ethnic purges and civil war or Roessler and Ohls' (2018) work on ethnic power-sharing.

[12] Examples include Martinez-Gallardo's (2014) work on political/economic crisis and ministerial stability in Latin America, Camerlo and Perez-Linan's (2015) study on how scandals and protests impact portfolio allocations in Latin America, or Huber and Martinez-Gallardo's (2008) study on ministerial stability on Western parliamentary democracies.

2.6 Political context, political change and elite power-sharing strategies

Literature on elite dynamics (in Africa and elsewhere) does provide information on some of the political variables that can account for the variation in elite power-sharing strategies.

The existing non-Africanist literature suggests that regime strength is a key factor in determining optimal strategies of leadership survival. Quiroz Flores and Smith (2011) argue that leaders who face little threat from external challengers will be concerned almost exclusively with managing internal threats, unless facing an insurgency or mass movement. This argument is supported by the repeated factional conflicts which have threatened leaders in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa. Schedler's (2013) global study on regime survival strategies in 'electoral-authoritarian' regimes argues that weaker 'competitive' regimes are more likely to engage in defensive concessions to retain power during times of uncertainty, while stronger 'hegemonic regimes' can instead rely on manipulation and repression to hamper the political opposition. Examples of this dynamic include the effective repression or exclusion of the opposition in the Tanzanian 2015 election and the Ethiopian 2015 election (Arriola and Lyons, 2016; Paget, 2017).

The political strength of opposition parties and movements is another factor dictating optimal strategies. A democratic opposition is meant to hold the regime accountable by providing a viable alternative coalition to the existing government (Ladd, 2013). The non-institutionalised, fragmented or transitory nature of most opposition parties is frequently pointed to as a source of regime longevity and unaccountability in Africa (Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Ochieng'Opalo, 2012). This description has merit for some countries at some time periods, for instance the Congo in the early 21st century hadover a hundred registered parties (Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009). However, this generalisation does not work for Africa as a whole. The number of effective parties varies dramatically (between 1.0 and 8.8) across the continent and within countries at different periods (Bogaards, 2004). These different configurations of regime/non-regime/opposition party power will present different levels of threat to the leader[13] and will need to be factored into their power-sharing strategy.

Another factor explored in the non-Africanist literature is the country's economic health. Leaders and regimes need sufficient economic resources to nourish their patronage networks in order to retain a viable coalition. Schedler (2013) summarises the threat succinctly:

[13] Various types of opposition party have proven capable of threatening or deposing the leader. Coalitions of convenience between opposition parties managed to win elections against entrenched incumbents in the 2002 Kenyan elections and the 2011 Ivorian elections. Well-established opposition powers managed to take power from the regime in 2000 Senegalese elections and 2015 Nigerian elections, while fledgling opposition parties managed to beat the incumbent regime in the 2011 Zambian elections and the 2012 Senegalese elections. Countries such as Ghana or Sierra Leone have seen a regular alternation in power between two established parties.

> "When the reservoirs of patronage resources dry up, the reservoirs of 'instrumental' regime support are bound to do so as well."

Poor economic performance can also weaken leader or regime popularity, which in turn makes the leader more susceptible to replacement from rivals inside and outside of the regime. Large-N studies have associated economic failure with coups, ruling party disintegration and opposition victories (Langer, 2005; Alesina et al., 1996; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Reuter and Gandhi, 2009). Beyond economic performance, the state's control (or lack thereof) over the financial landscape can dictate the leader's ability to limit opposition coordination, threaten those inside the regime into compliance and respond to public discontent (Arriola, 2013; De Mesquita et al., 2005).

The above factors are examples of some of the main variables which leaders may consider when creating or altering their coalition of elites. These factors explain some of the variation in ruling coalitions witnessed in Africa, along with the contradictory arguments over ideal coalition type in the Africanist literature.[14] These variables are in a continual state of flux. A strong regime can become weakened by internal splits or succession crises, which occurred in Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and Senegal's Socialist Party (PS) (Cheeseman, 2010; Arriola, 2013; Kelly, 2018). A booming economy can grind to a halt, as shown by the end of the Ivorian miracle due to declining cocoa prices (Langer, 2005). A previously fragmented opposition can coalesce around a single opposition elite and present a viable threat, as shown in the Tanzanian 2015 election where the regime faced a united opposition coalition for the first time since the start of multiparty competition (Paget, 2017). As the political environment changes so to do the primary threats to the leader's political survival and their calculations concerning the optimal coalition. Martinez-Gallardo (2014) studied the relationship between political and economic 'shocks' and volatility within the cabinet:

> "unexpected events over the course of a government's life will change these conditions and make bargains that were previously "stable" no longer viable. Appointments are an explicit political strategy that presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges. Cabinet changes allow presidents to change policy by changing the individuals in charge of making policy, and can also help presidents adjust their support coalition by giving them a resource they can use in their negotiations with other actors."

This research project will provide a large-N comparative study of how different political contexts and unexpected crises change what is considered a stable power-sharing bargain. This project will provide context and caveats to the competing claims of how African leaders choose to share power, and help

[14] Systems of government – such as parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential – are deemed to affect the leader's autonomy and vulnerability to rivals (Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011; Roberts, 2015). However, in an African context the key features of a powerful presidency and the comparative weakness of the other branches of government endure regardless of institutional system of government (Van Cranenburgh, 2008

bring the literature closer to the level of detail and comparability shown in the extant non-Africanist research.

3.0 Methodology and Data: the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (ACPED)

The ACPED project tracks the presence, position and demographics of ministers within African cabinets for each month from 1997 to 2017. ACPED provides two levels of data: information on individual ministers for each country-month, and aggregated metrics for cabinets at country-month. At the individual level, each minister is associated with several personal, demographic and political identifiers: position held, gender, political affiliation, home region and associated ethnic community. ACPED also records whether ministers are new additions to the cabinet, have been reappointed to another post or have been dismissed from the cabinet. At the aggregate level, ACPED provides metrics on the size of the cabinet, what percentage of a country's relevant ethnic groups are represented within the cabinet and how fairly (with respect to demography) the ministerial posts are allocated among the various groups.

ACPED currently covers Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo[15], Ethiopia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

ACPED codes data on all members of the cabinet who have full ministerial rank. This includes ministers, ministers of state (when the title does not designate a deputy minister), the Prime Minister, Vice Presidents and the President. Consequently, delegate ministers, deputy ministers, the speaker of parliament and secretaries of state are not included in the ACPED data.

3.1 Information Included in ACPED

3.1.1 Name

This column shows the minister's name.

3.1.2 Gender

This column shows a binary variable which is assigned 0 if the minister is male and 1 if the minister is female.

[15] DRC is currently excluded from most analyses in the research project due to many ministers missing relevant information.

3.1.3 Position

This column shows the post in the cabinet occupied by the individual minister for each country by month. ACPED also separates positions into 'inner circle' and 'outer circle' based on their importance. This enables users to evaluate whether ethnic/regional/political inclusion extends to the posts that hold significant administrative power (Lindemann, 2011a; Francois et al., 2015). Posts determined to be part of the inner circle typically involve control over the security forces, control over the state's revenue or sources of revenue and the implementation of law. As a result, the following posts are typically perceived to be part of the inner circle: vice-president or prime minister, finance, foreign affairs, justice, defence, internal security/home affairs and oil/mineral resources (if the country is a major exporter). Outer circle posts are generally more concerned with service delivery or cultural issues such as education, labour, agriculture or culture/heritage.

3.1.4 Political Affiliation

A minister's political affiliation is defined by their membership of a political party. If the minister belongs to a party or an electoral coalition (such as the Jubilee Coalition in Kenya or the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace in Ivory Coast), the party is coded as their political affiliation. Exceptions to this rule are:

- Military figures who are not explicit members of any party. These are simply coded as 'Military'.
- Politicians who have stood for elected office but not on any party ticket are coded as 'Independent'.
- Individuals unaligned with any party and who were previously employed outside the realm of politics (such as business, international institutions or academia) are coded as 'Civil Society'.
- Members of rebel groups who either seize the government or are integrated into the government without forming registered parties are coded according to the name of their rebel group.

The format used is the acronym of the party/coalition/group in the original language with an English translation. So the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* becomes the FPI: Ivorian Popular Front.

3.1.5 Ethnicity and Politically-Relevant Ethnicity

A minister's ethnicity identity is separated into two categories, ethnicity and politically relevant ethnic group. The concept of ethnicity is subject to a lot of academic criticism and debate. Though formerly interpreted as hard unchanging categories, ethnic groups are now generally interpreted as fluid categories whose boundaries soften and harden with political events (Geertz, 1963; Eriksen, 2001;

Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Brubaker, 2002). Furthermore, ethnic categories are often multi-level with supposed 'ethnic groups' consisting of multiple subgroups which can act as a single unit or fracture depending on context (Posner, 2004a; Brubaker, 2002). For example, the Fulani of Nigeria can be further subdivided into Wodaabe and Fulani associated with the historical caliphates of Kano and Sakoto (Scarritt and Mozaffar, 1999). The Dinka and Nuer of South Sudan can be further divided into sub-clans which are sometimes at political odds or in outright conflict with each other (Pendle, 2014).

To deal with these issues, ethnic identity is separated into two categories: Ethnicity and Politically-Relevant Ethnicity. The former refers to the most detailed information we can get on the minister's ethno-linguistic identity. This means that the Ethnicity category can often include very small linguistic groups, sub-groups or dialects. This information is identified by self-declaration, in-country expert opinion and subnational media sources. The second category concerns which politicised ethnic bloc the minister belongs to. Often multiple ethnic groups act in concert and adopt a single identity in order to leverage their position within the political hierarchy. Examples include the 'Kalenjin' category which includes several groups indigenous to the Rift Valley, or the Chewa and Tumbuka who group themselves under 'Easterners' or 'Nyanja' in Zambia but retain their own labels in political competition in Malawi (Posner, 2004b).

Politically relevant groups must be relevant in national politics (as opposed to localised politics). National political relevance can derive from how ethnicity guides voting practices, the formation of factions within the regime or the political rhetoric of regime and opposition elites. Multiple sources link a minister's stated identity to a relevant domestic ethno-political identity group. An ethnic and regional macro-roster for each state is composed from several relevant sources including national experts, the Scarritt and Mozaffar's list (1999), Ethnologue, Ethnic Power Relations and Francois, Trebbi and Rainer lists. National expert opinion is privileged if a discrepancy between source materials arises. A breakdown of primary influence or sources in guiding the categorisation of politically relevant ethnic groups is provided in the appendix.[16]

3.1.6 Regional Background and Administrative Divisions

Ethnicity is the most common proxy for what Posner (2004b) terms 'interest group polarization'. However, regional background is increasingly perceived as another relevant identity in guiding political conflict, coalition formation and the distribution of resources (Østby, 2008; Holder and Raschky, 2014). As with ethnicity, the salience of the relevant identity is frequently dependent on the size of the political goal (Posner, 2004b; Posner, 2007). When competing for local office, elites choose to capitalise on more exclusive identities such as clan or subgroup, but may mobilise a larger

[16] See appendix table 1 for breakdown of groups and populations. Appendix passage 1 and appendix table 2 outline sources/methods used to create macro-groups.

and more inclusive identity bloc when competing in national politics (Posner, 2004b; Carrier et al., 2014).

In some cases, regional identities may be a more expedient identity for elites to use when seeking to build or mobilise their constituencies: diverse African states - such as pre-partition Sudan, Nigeria and Ivory Coast - have been split by political conflicts pitching ‘northerners’ against ‘southerners’. The importance of region as a source of mobilisation is demonstrated by the fact that most parties banned in Sub-Saharan Africa for promoting a particularistic agenda have been regionalist parties (Bogaards et al., 2010).

ACPED uses each country’s primary administrative subdivision to determine the country’s regional categories. Each minister is then applied a regional category based on the administrative subdivision of their birth. Exceptions to this are cases where a minister who was born abroad or in the capital is perceived to come from the region of their parents, in which case ACPED codes their perceived or inherited region rather than their birth region as their background. These cases only occur at the recommendation of local experts.

Administrative divisions are used for several reasons. Firstly, administrative units provide solid boundaries which are easy to categorise compared to imprecise terms such as ‘north’ or ‘south’. Secondly, subnational administrative divisions are engaged in a direct financial relationship with the central government, acting as direct contributors to and beneficiaries from the state’s resources. As a result constituents and representatives from the same region are likely to have aligned interests in terms of resource allocation and development projects (Ukiwo, 2003; Gudina, 2007; Osei and Malang, 2016).

Administrative divisions can be subject to change, as shown by Kenya’s replacement of the old provincial system with the 47 counties in 2010 or the continued redistricting in Uganda or South Sudan. ACPED aims to apply each state’s most recent administrative division categorisation. ACPED also provides each minister’s secondary administrative division of birth (coded as admin2) for a large number, but not all, countries included in the ACPED data. This extra level of information is currently provided for Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan and Zimbabwe.

3.1.7 Change

The change column shows whether each individual minister’s position in the cabinet was subject to change.

Table 3.1 – ACPED Variable Details

Change Category	Explanation
Start	This category is applied to the first cabinet for each country in the data. For all countries except South Sudan, the starting ministers are those who were in the cabinet in December 1996.
Remains	Refers to a cabinet minister retaining his or her position for that particular month. The vast majority of observations, 93.7%, consist of ministers retaining their position.
Reshuffle	Refers to a cabinet minister being shifted from heading one ministry to another. This category can also apply to a minister retaining their previous post but being assigned additional responsibility, either through the merging of ministries or through becoming the acting minister of an additional ministry.
New	Refers to a new appointment to the executive arm of government. If someone is appointed from a lower level of government (e.g. deputy minister, MP, etc.) this is still a new appointment. If a minister resigns, is dismissed or dropped from the cabinet, upon his or her return, s/he is always coded as New, no matter how brief the interim period has been.
Dismissed	Refers to a minister being dropped from the cabinet during a reshuffle, reappointed to a non-ministerial position or overtly fired from office.
Dismissed (Arrested)	Applied when a minister's dismissal is accompanied by his or her arrest.
Resigns	Refers to a minister voluntarily leaving their position of their own volition.
Deceased	Refers to a minister leaving government due to death, both natural and unnatural causes.
Suspended	Refers to a minister being temporarily removed from his or her duties without an overt statement that this state of affairs is permanent. If the government later decides to turn the suspension into a permanent dismissal, then the minister in question is later coded as dismissed.
Returns	Refers to a minister who has been suspended (not dismissed) resuming his or her position.
Removed	This category only applies to leaders or co-leaders (Presidents, Commanders in Chief, de facto rulers, Vice-Presidents, Prime Ministers, etc.) who are removed from their position by force (e.g. military coup, foreign intervention, insurgency or popular uprising).

3.2 Collection Process

The data collection is divided into two phases. The first phase creates a monthly catalogue of the ministerial appointments, reshuffles and dismissals. The three primary resources for this data were Francois, Rainer and Trebbi cabinet data, the Africa South of the Sahara Yearbook, and the monthly periodical Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural series. The Africa South of the Sahara Yearbook was used to construct an annual list of ministers from 2005 onwards. Researchers read through each issue of the Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural series, which provides a list of government appointments at the formation of each new cabinet, to identify when changes in the cabinet occurred exactly. The annual list is used to deduce which ministers were dismissed at the creation of a new cabinet, and to double-check that Africa Research Bulletin has not missed any appointments or dismissals. If the annual list indicates a change in the cabinet that was not covered in the Africa Research Bulletin, Lexis Nexis database searches were used to find when the change occurred.

The second phase involved gaining information on each minister's ethno-linguistic, regional and political affiliations. This process is still ongoing for several countries First a session of secondary research was carried out, using a number of different sources including Wikileaks, the Historical Dictionary series, electoral records, Google books, and Google scholar. Wikipedia was also consulted, but any information gained from Wikipedia was checked against other sources for corroboration.

After all secondary resources were exhausted, academics or local researchers with specialist knowledge of the respective countries were consulted. This often involved local researchers relying on personal knowledge, interviewing personal connections and accessing documents not available outside of the country (e.g. such as parliamentary records). To test for accuracy, researchers were also assigned to find information that was already confirmed through secondary research.

3.3 Created Metrics

Below is a brief overview of some of the metrics which will be used in the remainder of this chapter and in subsequent chapters of the research project. This list is not exhaustive and different chapters will include different and unique metrics.

3.3.1 Cabinet Size

This metric measures the number of individual ministers that make up the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle.

3.3.2 Ethnic/Regional Representation

This metric determines how many relevant groups there are in cabinet. Relevant groups are defined as either all politically relevant ethnic categories (for ethnic representation), or all primary administrative divisions (for regional representation). The number of groups that have at least one representative in cabinet is divided by the total number of groups and multiplied by 100.

If country x has a total of 15 politically relevant ethnic categories, and 12 of these groups have at least one representative in cabinet, then the representation score would be 80 percent. This measure can be applied to the inner circle and outer circle.

3.3.3 Ethnic/Regional Disproportion

This metric determines how equitably posts are divided among the different groups within cabinet. The measure is adapted from Samuels and Snyder's (2001) measurement of vote/constituency malapportionment.

$$\textit{Disproportion} = (1/2)\sum_{i=1}^{n} |x_i - y_i|$$

Where sigma indicates the summation over all relevant groups, x_i is the percentage of all cabinet positions allocated to group *i*, and y_i is the percentage of population belonging to group *i*. Groups not included in cabinet are not considered in the calculation.

For example, if country x had four relevant groups (all included in the cabinet) and the posts are allocated as below:

	Group			
	A	B	C	D
Share of population (%)	40	30	20	10
Share of cabinet (%)	30	10	10	50

Here the disproportion score would be, $\textit{Disproportion} = (1/2)(|30\text{-}40|+|10\text{-}30|+|10\text{-}20|+|50\text{-}10|)$ = 40 percent. This score means that 40 percent of the cabinet posts are allocated to groups that would not receive those positions if posts were allocated in a completely proportional manner.

3.3.4 Representation of Co-Ethnics/Co-Regionalists/Party Members

There are several instances where the research project aims to quantify the degree to which leaders dominate the cabinet with their own 'core constituency'. This can refer to the proportion of

cabinet/inner circle/outer circle posts occupied by ministers from the leader's politically relevant ethnic group, home region or political party. The project also investigates how changes in the political landscape impacts the representation of ethnic groups associated with the opposition (chapter 5) or regions which are deemed hotspots of protest (chapter 6).

3.4 Improvement over Existing Datasets

ACPED's creation follows the academic trend of estimating elite relationships and networks through the distribution of official government positions (Lindemann, 2011b; Wimmer et al., 2009; Langer, 2005; Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015). Currently, two other publicly available academic datasets aim to provide similar information to ACPED: Francois, Rainer and Trebbi's African cabinet data (hereafter FRT); and the Ethnic-Power Relations dataset by Wimmer et al. (hereafter EPR).

3.4.1 Ethnic Power Relations (EPR)

The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset is widely used to assess the position of ethno-political groups within a state's political hierarchy.[17] The relative position of different ethnic groups within the state is based on each group's access to state positions but is estimated through an online survey of country-experts.

> "Version 3.0 of the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR3) identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country of the world from 1946 to 2010. It includes annual data for 157 countries and 758 groups and codes the degree to which their representatives held executive-level state power—from total control of the government to overt political discrimination." (Wimmer et al., 2009)

ACPED relies on objective data concerning representation in senior government rather than expert opinion on the political hierarchy between a state's competing subgroups. This means that ACPED data is likely to capture subtle shifts that orthodox expert opinion may miss. ACPED also does not use EPR's classification system for analysing political power: monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner, discriminated, powerless and irrelevant. These broad categories can obscure subtle trends of regime co-option, exclusion and power sharing.

To examine the crossover between ACPED and EPR, we take each Politically-Relevant Ethnic identity recorded in ACPED, calculate the average number of posts held in the cabinet/inner

[17] Studies include Roessler (2011), Wimmer et al. (2009), Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), Choi and Kim (2018) and Roessler and Ohls (2018).

circle/outer circle for that year, and then fit each bloc into EPR's seven-point categorisation.[18] Figure 3.1 shows that ACPED largely corroborates with EPR, with Senior Partners holding a large number of posts (especially in the inner circle) while powerless/discriminated/irrelevant groups occupy fewer posts.

Figure 3.1 – Ethnic Group Dominance of Cabinet/Inner Circle/Outer Circle by EPR Classifications



Each category in EPR, however, shows a high degree of variation. Dominant groups occupy between zero and 63.64 percent of the cabinet. Discriminated groups, such as the Hutu under Buyoya or the Kikuyu under Moi, can occupy a significant portion of the inner circle posts. These variations can occur due to regime attempts at co-option or due to unity governments aimed at ending civil conflict. EPR's categorical methodology means that these subtleties in regime strategy and the balance of power are not recorded.

[18] Analysis includes all countries apart from DRC, Tanzania, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. North African states are not included due to lack of ethnic diversity. DRC is excluded due to the high presence of missing data on minister ethnic backgrounds. Tanzania is excluded due to difficulties marrying EPR and ACPED coding.

While ACPED largely mirrors EPR's categorisation, examining individual countries shows the advantages of ACPED over EPR. For example, figure 3.2 shows that 'Junior Partners' in Uganda have experienced a decrease in cabinet representation since the middle of the 2000s. Conversely 'Senior Partners' have increased their representation both in the cabinet as a whole and in the inner circle, while 'Powerless' groups are also beginning to occupy more of the cabinet and the outer circle. This pattern is driven by Museveni's side-lining of the Buganda and Basoga, two traditional junior allies in his regime.

Figure 3.2 – ACPED vs EPR Comparison - Uganda



The gradual erosion of the presence of 'Junior Partners' within the Ugandan senior government raises the question of whether EPR's broad categorisation accurately reflects the distribution of power among Uganda's ethnic groups. This demonstrates the improvement ACPED offers over EPR's methodology and ACPED's ability to capture subtle trends others might miss. ACPED also offers significantly more measures of inclusion and representation through its Political Affiliation and Regional Background metrics. The advantage these additional metrics confer in assessing the division of political power is investigated further later in this chapter.

3.4.2 Francois Rainer and Trebbi (FRT)

Francois, Rainer and Trebbi's data (FRT) marks an improvement over EPR due to its use of objective data on cabinet appointments rather than expert opinion and broad categories to class ethnic groups. Though inspired by the FRT data, ACPED offers two important improvements over FRT: providing

multiple identity markers for each minister and listing monthly changes in the cabinet. FRT in contrast focusses only on ethnicity and only offers an annual record of changes in cabinet.

Out of the 3928 ministers listed in ACPED, 753 (19.2%) have a sub-annual tenure, meaning that they would be missed by FRT. Figure 3.3 shows a histogram of ministerial tenures, binned by twelve-month blocs. While most ministers last 12-23 months, a significant portion of ministers have tenures lasting less than a year.

Figure 3.3 – Ministerial Tenure (by month)



Furthermore, the occurrence of sub-annual ministerial tenures is not equally distributed across countries or time periods. Sub-annual tenures tend to occur during crisis periods such as coups, revolutions or short-lived unity governments. Figure 3.4 shows ministers present in the ACPED data not present in FRT covering the period 1997-2004 (where the two datasets overlap). FRT misses most ministers during crisis periods such as the First Congo War (34 ministers missing), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council coup in Sierra Leone (9 ministers missing) and General Guei's coup in Ivory Coast (17 ministers missing).

Figure 3.4 – ACPED Ministers Compared to Annual Cabinet Recording



Figure 3.5 demonstrates that the 23 countries covered by ACPED support this trend. A much higher percentage of ministers have sub-annual tenures in more crisis-prone countries such as CAR, Mali or Tunisia. In contrast, more stable countries, such as Botswana or Tanzania, have few or no ministers with sub-annual tenures.

Figure 3.5 – ACPED: Percent of Ministers with Sub-Annual Tenures by Country



Therefore ACPED represents a considerable advantage over FRT's annual data, which becomes less accurate during periods in which regime or leader strategies of survival are at their most volatile.

3.4.3 Multiple Forms of Identity

ACPED also represents an improvement on existing data through including multiple forms of identity on top of ethnicity, namely regional background and political affiliation. Previous studies have shown that the importance of ethnicity varies across contexts (Bratton et al., 2012; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Wahman, 2017; Basedau et al., 2011). This variation means that other cleavages, such as regional background or political party affiliation, can take precedence in the regime's calculations of which elites to include the government.

Burundi illustrates how different types of cleavage become important over time. The Burundian Civil War (1993-2005) pitted a Tutsi-dominated government and military against a collection of competing Hutu insurgents (Colombo et al., 2019). During this conflict, the international community and reformist Tutsi leaders attempted to end the conflict through incorporating more Hutus into the government (Minorities at Risk, 2003). Nevertheless, the Tutsi community continued to occupy nearly 50 percent of the cabinet in spite of making up only 13.6 percent of the population (see figure 3.6). The war ended in late 2005 when Hutu former-rebel, Pierre Nkurunziza, was elected president by the two chambers of the Burundian parliament. Figure 6 shows a definite increase in Hutu cabinet ministers from 2006 onwards.

Figure 3.6: Burundi Cabinet 1997-2017 Ethnicity



With the movement to multiparty democracy, the Nkurunziza regime faced electoral competition from predominantly Hutu opposition leaders (Colombo et al., 2019). The country was plunged into crisis after Nkuruziza argued that he should stand for a third term in the 2015 elections as his first term had been decided by parliamentary, as opposed to a popular, vote. Many of the figures opposing

Nkurunziza's decision, including a general who launched an attempted coup against the regime, were Hutu (Africa Confidential, 2015).

Figure 3.7: Burundi Cabinet 2006-2017 Hutu Ministers Regional Background



Faced with an increasing level of political agitation from Hutu co-ethnics, Nkurunziza increasingly appointed ministers from his home region of Ngozi, an area of reliable political support (Africa Confidential, 2015a). Figure 3.7 shows the percent of Hutu ministers who come from Nkurunziza's home region. A similar situation occurred in Rwanda where president Habyarimana concentrated power in the *Akazu*, an inner circle of Rwandan elites predominantly from his home region (Human Rights Watch, 1999). This regional aspect of changes in cabinet make-up would not be revealed by the FRT dataset.

Political party affiliation is another form of relevant identity which is overlooked in current datasets. The role of political parties in elite power sharing varies significantly across different countries in Africa. In the post-independence era, many African states were run by autocratic single parties which acted as a means to integrate an ethnically and ideologically varied elite (Van de Walle, 2007). Some of these parties – such as Tanzania's Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) or the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) – have ruled their countries for around half a century. Since the widespread adoption of multiparty elections, some parties – both ruling and opposition - have drawn on specific ethnic and regional clusters, despite many countries imposing bans on parties which promote an ethnic/religious/regionalist agenda (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Wahman, 2017; Bogaards et al., 2010). The alignment between ethnic identity and political support has been prominent in Kenya,

Ghana, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone (Langer, 2005; Posner, 2007; Jockers et al., 2009; Kandeh, 1992). Figure 3.8 illustrates these two different interactions between ethnicity and political party.

Figure 3.8 - Sierra Leone and Tanzania – Intersection of Political Affiliation and Ethnicity



In Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) is perceived as a party representing Mende interests while the All People's Congress (APC) draws support from northern groups such as the Temne and Limba (Kandeh, 1992). Both parties have ruled Sierra Leone at different points covered by the ACPED data.[19] Though neither APC nor SLPP appointed ministers from a single ethnic constituency, 40 percent of the minsters when the SLPP was in charge were Mende although the group accounts for approximately a third of the national population. Similarly, nearly half of the ministers belonging to the APC led regimes are either Temne or Limba compared to 42 percent of the population. Conversely, in Tanzania the ruling CCM functions as a broad-based coalition, drawing from a wide range of ethnic groups without any particular patterns of ethnic dominance.[20] This difference in party composition influences the dynamics of etho-political competition within the two

[19] An SLPP party member occupied Sierra Leone's presidency from 1998 to 2007, while an APC candidate occupied the presidency from 2007 to 2017.
[20] The exception may be the high representation of Zanzibari ministers in the ruling party, perhaps reflecting the fact that the islands have been a consistent stronghold of opposition parties since unification (Myers, 2000).

states. While in Sierra Leone ethno-political competition happens during the main elections between parties, in Tanzania ethnic competition happens within the party during electoral primaries (Egboh and Aniche, 2015; Kandeh, 1992).

The heterogeneity of political parties in the cabinet can also be used to estimate the ruling party's dominance over the political landscape. While Tanzania and Botswana are politically dominated by a single ruling party, states such as Kenya are ruled by multi-party coalitions of convenience liable to internal rupture over differences in policy, questions of leadership and disagreements over the division of power (Lynch, 2006; Arriola, 2013). In highly contested states - such as Central African Republic, Zimbabwe or Sudan - power is divided among regime and opposition parties or armed movements either as externally mandated unity governments or strategic alliances formulated by the leader (Bariagaber, 2013; Cheeseman, 2011).

Current datasets rely purely on ethnicity to approximate regime strategies of elite management, limiting their capacity to examine how regime survival strategies affect multiple dimensions of representation. Consequently, ACPED represents a major improvement on currently available data.

3.4.4 Regime Categorical Data

The ACPED project also seeks to act as a compliment to existing datasets which classify government and regime types. Datasets such as PolityIV and Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) are regularly used in research to analyse how patterns of governmental authority affect other types of social phenomena.[21] The stated aim of these datasets is to measure levels of democratisation in a manner which lends itself to comparative or longitudinal study (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Coppedge et al., 2016). Because democracy is better understood as a collection of different traits which can be ranked by degrees, PolityIV and VDEM use a wide range of different variables to measure institutionalisation, the balance of formal power between different branches of government and the quality of elections (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Coppedge et al., 2016). Other datasets or classificatory methods, such as Schedler (2013) or Wahman et al.'s (2013) Authoritarian Regime Dataset (ARD), aim to provide a means for analysing the comparative political durability of regimes or the rules by which political power is maintained.

In contrast to these existing datasets, ACPED aims to provide a means for assessing how power is shared among different relevant political groupings through the representation of elites. Factors such as regime type, levels of democratisation and normalised avenues of gaining or retaining power will figure within the calculations guiding a leader's power-sharing or elite management strategy. But it is

[21] Examples include Østby's (2008) study on regional inequalities and conflict, Holder and Raschky's (2014) on regional favouritism and Arriola and Johnson's (2014) on women's representation in senior government.

unlikely that these factors alone determine the power sharing strategy. The following section provides a brief analysis of how much of the variance in ACPED measures are explained by the pre-existing datasets of PolityIV , VDEM, Schedler's regime classification and ARD (Marshall et al., 2002; Coppedge et al., 2018; Schedler, 2013; Wahman et al., 2013).

Figure 9 shows ACPED country-month observations divided into democracies, anocracies and autocracies by the Polity Index.[22] The majority of observations are classified as anocracies. Figure 9 shows that all three categories appear to be similar in most ACPED measures and there is much more variance within polity than across categories (see appendix table 3). Figures 10 and 11 classify ACPED observations by ARD or Schedler's classification.

Common themes appear in figures 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. Regimes which fall short of democracy but remain vulnerable (anocracy/limited multiparty/competitive regimes) tend to have cabinets which are larger, less dominated by the leader's party or co-ethnics and highly representative. This pattern conforms with the theory that weaker regimes will need to engage in more extensive strategies of power sharing than stronger regimes (Roberts, 2015; Schedler, 2013). However there is much more variance within these categories than across them. This shows that the classificatory schemes of the PolityIV, ARD and Schedler datasets do not adequately explain the variation of elite power-sharing strategies.

Figure 3.9 - ACPED Metrics by PolityIV Categories



[22] A Polity score of >5 is a democracy, 5:-5 is an anocracy and <-6 is an autocracy.

Figure 3.10 - ACPED Metrics by ARD Categories



Figure 3.11 - ACPED Metrics by Schedler Categories



Figure 3.12 shows ACPED metrics compared against VDEM's ordinal metrics (specifically the Electoral Component Index). In a similar finding to figures 3.9 and 3.10, regimes which fall short of full democratisation but cannot also be classed as autocracies tend to have larger cabinets which are less dominated by co-ethnics.

Figure 3.12 – ACPED Metrics by VDEM Electoral Component Index



The large amount of variation within each category shows that while existing datasets on regime type and level of democratisation go some way to explaining variations in elite-management strategies, these datasets are not substitutes for ACPED. Regime type alone does not dictate elite bargains.

The remaining chapters of this project will examine circumstances which influence leader and regime strategies of political survival, elite management and power sharing.

4.0 Ethnic Arithmetic or Political Calculus? Representation and Accommodation in African Cabinets

African regimes are frequently accused of engaging in exclusive politics through biased policies and distributions of power that mainly benefit the leader's co-ethnic supporters. Several 'consequences', including violence, corruption and illegitimacy have been blamed upon this under-evidenced claim (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2014). Recent studies reinforce the idea that African regimes cultivate corrupt practices but find little evidence that corruption is exclusive or limited to a regime's base (Albrecht, 2015; Arriola, 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015; Goldsmith, 2010; Osei, 2015; Posner and Young, 2007). Far from constituting a homogenous, exclusive bloc, senior elites represent a wide range of particularistic interests: political, military, religious, regional, ethnic or other communities (Owen, 2014). Integrating politicians from different ethnic groups into their coalitions has allowed African leaders to effectively consolidate power (Bayart, 1993; Rothchild, 1995). In modern, socially heterogeneous states, how leaders manage diverse and competing political identities and interests underlies the success or failure of several significant government functions (Langer, 2005; Wimmer, 2012; Burgess et al., 2015; Franck and Rainer, 2012).

But are African governments inclusive? And what is 'inclusive' representation? The perspectives in the existing literature on African political representation can be broadly divided into two camps: those that emphasize 'ethnic arithmetic' based on demography and its consequences; and 'political calculus', concentrating on a leader's strategy, management and accommodation of various interests for regime maintenance. The former discussion is robust in terms of measurement but misses domestic politics in favour of pre-determined, often static relationships. The latter discussion is rich but not systematic across states and governments. A bridge between these two can address three outstanding problems that plague research on representation and power.

The 'Third Wave of Democratization' that swept Africa in the 1990s heralded an end to one-party states and challenged many leaders to integrate a wide array of elites and interests to hold onto power. A dramatic increase in ministerial posts during periods of democratization allowed leaders to redistribute material and symbolic rents from the centre and strengthen ties with their regional and political constituencies (Haass and Ottmann, 2017). Inclusive representation is often framed as an ethnic-demographic balance, as ascribed identity markers of ethnicity, regional affiliation or language often have a strong influence on political support and patronage (Van De Walle, 2003; Bratton and Van De Walle, 1994; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; Posner, 2004a). In politically heterogeneous societies, the best strategy for leaders to secure a majority or plurality is through cross-group inclusive coalition (Muller, 2007). Inclusion politics underlies regime maintenance strategies which guide leaders on minister appointments, dismissals and reshuffles, as demonstrated by studies that focus on

the size and composition of African cabinets (Arriola, 2009; Lindemann, 2011b; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015; Kroeger, 2018).

A 'political calculus' literature suggests that regimes practice strategic, transactional and two-level game of inclusive representation to consolidate power through co-option. Many regimes integrate competitors, opponents, large and small groups. As a result, the general population is represented at senior levels, in line with the proportion they represent. Yet, political elites are engaged in hierarchical contests for influence beyond their group position. The level of power accorded to elites within cabinets is a result of strategic manipulation and change arising from negotiations with leaders. These findings question how representation is conceptualized, measured and practiced.

Existing research lacks a standard measure that considers the political complexity of each state. Relying on ethnic group membership as the determinant of power presumes regimes respond automatically to ethnic demographics and privilege co-ethnics (Chandra, 2007). Though important, ethno-demographic assessments are insufficient at explaining changes in representation over time and the composition of group representatives at the senior level. Several African states where ethnicity is not the direct basis for political participation are removed from consideration. Further, the present literature largely ignores the role of elites as representatives of *group* interests, and how leaders require elites to bridge voting constituencies with senior scales of governance. Within modern African states, elites have multifaceted identities and roles they play in regime maintenance; they manoeuvre and consolidate their power base through a transactional political system. The result is a constant negotiation between elites and leaders and within elite circles.

The strategies for securing and distributing power are poorly understood in the African context at the senior level. It is well acknowledged that the greatest threat to leaders in a 'hybrid' system of competitive autocracy or transitioning democracy is from internal power holders (Quinlivan, 1999; Haber, 2006; Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2005; Egorov and Sonin, 2011), and there are many aspects of political survival and rule which require manipulation at the senior scale (Woldense, 2018). Multiple, concurrent, practices are at play at the senior level to assure leader dominance, regime maintenance, and opponent suppression: strong elites may be integrated but side-lined, cabinet sizes may grow to dilute the effect of strong ministers, multiple ministries for the same issue may occur etc. Common strategies are coup-proofing, cabinet packing, isolating, turnover, buffering and counterbalancing. Coup-proofing is particularly common and involves assigning disproportionate power to 'competitors' (Albrecht, 2015; Roessler, 2016). Leaders may over-represent competitors when they are dependent on the loyalty and co-option of 'rival' elites and groups to secure their hold on power[23]. These elites are

[23] Many governments showcase the outcomes of an inclusive elite accommodation, even where the proportion of power acceded to competing groups is unbalanced. For example, coalitions designed by Nyerere in Tanzania, Kaunda in Zambia and Houphouet-Boigney in Ivory Coast all attest to the dividends of inclusivity and balance (De Waal, 2009; Lindemann, 2011b; Van De Walle, 2007). Additionally, other

instrumental to dealing with internal threats, including coups (Roessler, 2011), negotiations (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004), settlements (Di John and Putzel, 2009), the local consolidation of regime power (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997), seeing off electoral challenges (De Mesquita et al., 2005; Chabal and Daloz, 1999) and quelling violent elite competition against the government and between elites. This is a central tenet of the power sharing literature and underscores that the selective co-option of competing elites requires extensive management by leaders, resulting in significant volatility in individual cabinet positions, group representation and cabinet size.

This article provides a bridge between ethnic arithmetic and political calculus. It introduces and examines the African Cabinet and Political Elite Dataset, hereafter ACPED. ACPED is a new project that tracks the presence, position and demographics of ministers within African cabinets for each month from 1997 to the present. ACPED collects information on all ministers within national cabinets; each minister is associated with several demographic and political identifiers, including home region and associated ethnic community, political party, gender and position within the cabinet at each month.

The article proceeds in reviewing literature on representation and elite accommodation as complementary but distinct interpretations of political inclusion. Using cabinet representation measures, we ask and answer the following questions: Are African governments inclusive of their ethno-regional political communities? Are groups proportionately represented? Does cabinet size and volatility affect representation rates? How stable are elite positions? What does the rate of turnover suggest about elite management and a leader's consolidation strategy? What do different cabinet power distributions suggest about the health and stability of governance across states?

Our examination finds that governments practice strategic inclusion: ethno-regional populations are often represented but without fairness, stability or proportional power. Leaders practice a two-level game, often representing ethno-political groups broadly, while pursuing transactional, volatile and disproportionate distributions of power between elites within the cabinet. Representation of national heterogeneity is markedly stable over time, but accommodation of political elites, and the proportion of powerful positions assigned to representatives widely across states and time periods. Further, elite accommodation and management are central to regime continuity, maintenance and consolidation, rather than general political representation and stability. Elite accommodation and power transactions by regimes are the main engines of change and instability in African states, but widespread representation is a 'good policy' and relatively painless. 'Political calculus' between elites and the leader explains the high rates of change and elite circulation, in contrast to the relatively stable political 'arithmetic'. We suggest that future research into analysis on the character and consequences of

governments demonstrate the importance of including potential competitors, such as in Uganda and Rwanda, where President Kagame formed a unity government by including key figures from the moderate Hutu party, the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR) (Green, 2011).

representation incorporate these data and findings on the composition of regimes and strategies of leaders.

4.1 The Logic of Representation

A large body of research assumes African political systems are exclusive and characterized by active marginalization of groups and disproportional authority to a leader's home group and region (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Rothchild, 1995; Whitaker, 2005; Geschiere, 2009; Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). This discussion often frames representation as a method to quantify exclusion as a proxy for grievance (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). This perspective has stifled inquiry into how representation transcends measures of inclusion and exclusion, and how different manifestations of identity are important in different countries.

Politics in Africa are strongly shaped by ethno-political identities. Ethnic groups provide "a form of minimum winning coalition, large enough to secure benefits in the competition for spoils but also small enough to maximize the per capita value of these benefits" (Bates, 1983). Identity is difficult to modify and acts as a "visual marker" to prevent non-members from participating in the allocation of political goods (Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Fearon, 1999). Because voters support parties that represent interests of their ethnic group and exclude others (Kasara, 2007), leaders, politically active constituency members and elites frame the stakes of political contest in ethnic or regional terms[24] that emphasize reciprocity (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997; Berman, 1998). Ethnic-based calculations, legitimacy of political elites and 'constituent pay off' rests on a mutual ability to conform to communal obligations where the underlying logic is to act cohesively to allow representatives to get sufficient party and government posts. If leaders "do not get sufficient posts, they will not be able to wield sufficient power on your behalf in order to make sure that you [...] get your fair share of the jobs and development funds going" (Szeftel, 2000).[25] Yet, appeals to bloc interests are rarely the sole motivator in political support and vary in effectiveness across different contexts; further, the degree of exchange between representation and patronage allocation is contested: Rainer and Trebbi (2012) stipulate that the presence of an elite from a certain ethnic group in the cabinet does not necessarily guarantee that the minister's co-ethnics will benefit from state patronage. Indeed, resources generally remain in elite hands and do not extend out past a small circle of followers (Van de Walle, 2003). Others find that despite the material benefits, the attachment communities' exhibit toward elites is due to symbolic representation (Van de Walle, 2009; Randall, 2007).

[24] Using survey data from Ghana, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) challenge the concept of voting patterns adhering to obligations of communal reciprocity and patronage.
[25] While ethnicity acts as an important indicator of voting behavior in almost all contexts (Basedau et al., 2011), its importance varies across political arenas, scales, times and institutions.

There is a consensus that identities do matter in guiding political support (Basedau et al., 2011), and are most salient during periods of competition (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010). But ethnic 'arithmetic' approaches to representation overdetermine the processes and outcomes of African political choices and actions. This is in part because ethno-political identity and motivations are neither static nor determined solely by demographic size (Posner, 2004b). African regimes adapt ably to their state's social heterogeneity: the lack of absolute ethnic or regional majorities in many African countries means that leaders could not rely on their own groups for political support to maintain power (Fearon, 2003; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Basedau et al., 2011; Erdmann, 2007, Bratton, 2008). To acquiesce to co-ethnic demographic minorities would place leaders in a weak, vulnerable position (Piombo, 2005). Instead, regimes consolidate power through co-option and integration. As democratic transitions opened the political system to large-scale elite participation and the associated checks and balances, regimes are forced to adapt and extend to survive: many parties, particularly ruling parties, are genuinely multi-ethnic yet feature a dominant group, while a high number of opposition parties are heavily ethnic (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). Inclusive representation is reinforced by institutional arrangements, election alliances and the ability of new elites to participate (Choi and Raleigh, 2015)[26], and elites within alliances expect representation for their support.

4.2 Political Calculus

Representation is not an altruistic act: African governments benefit from extensive and ethno-regionally inclusive representation that stabilizes and reinforces political alliances where power is shared across intermediary elites (Arriola, 2009; Goldsmith, 2001). Leaders accommodate and manage powerful elites and communities who leverage their local influence for rewards and recognition by regimes (Van De Walle, 2007, Goldsmith, 2001; Svolik, 2009) through political bargaining (Benson and Kugler, 1998), 'ethnic balancing' (Arriola, 2009; Lindemann, 2011a) and the 'political marketplace' (De Waal, 2015). Elite management keeps political elites in positions of authority and alliances, where the distribution of resources, rents and power entices and retains clients (Van De Walle, 2003; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). To be 'co-opted', subnational elites must leverage their ethnic, regional, business, financial, religious, international and security associations in their negotiations with leaders (De Waal, 2009; Mozaffar et al., 2003).[27] Consequentially, elites differ in their political weight and regimes must contend with multiple elites of varying power.

The existing literature asks what type and size of coalition is optimal. Arriola (2009) argues that larger coalitions are an effective strategy for facilitating intra-elite accommodation and warding off coups. A

[26] Examples include constitutional terms that require that presidential candidates acquire a share of votes in every province for the assumption to national office.
[27] See Langer's (2005) study of elite exclusion in Ivory Coast; Lindemann's (2011a) study of inclusive elite bargains in Zambia and Uganda; and Arriola's (2009) statistical investigation of the 'politics of the belly'. Also see Bayart (1989; 1993).

narrow ruling coalition with many excluded groups and disaffected elites provides the necessary resources for the opposition to form a coalition capable of displacing the government. De Mesquita et al. (2005) similarly argue that outside threats to incumbent rule–protests, civil wars and revolutions–come from those who are deprived access to the resources of the state. Creating 'oversized' coalitions can mitigate against the threat of defections from within by enabling the ruler to maintain a winning coalition even after some insiders' defect (*ibid*.). A 'minimum winning coalition' may be enlarged as the defection of important elites from within the regime presents a severe threat to incumbents presiding over small coalitions. Creating an inclusive and expansive coalition which can co-opt potential political opponents and their constituents can limit the capabilities of opposition coalitions and further enhance the incumbent's chance of re-election (Gandhi and Buckles, 2016).

Beyond size, the composition of elite coalitions at senior government levels reflects leader negotiations and necessary buy-in. Leaders engage in multiple complex, volatile, unfair and often simultaneous strategies. These include 'coup proofing' which co-opts potential rivals into government with mutually beneficial arrangements (Roessler, 2011), and which are disproportionately advantageous to challengers. The degree of coup-proofing through power sharing is often overstated in research (Albertus, 2012; Quinvilan, 1994). Ruling coalitions in which power is dispersed among senior members, or partners have veto power, can limit the autonomy of the incumbent and lead to political gridlock (Le Van, 2011; Roeder, 2005). Regimes can 'pack' the cabinet, distorting the power of strong, potential challengers by giving positions to elites from many small communities (Arriola, 2011). While there is an insufficient political-demographic reason for these appointments, growing the cabinet specifically through short-term positions for small groups, enhances a leader's senior support base through 'useful' alliances. These appointments reinforce the loyalty principle and allow regimes to appear 'inclusive'. In contrast, 'starving' under-represents rival groups. 'Counterbalancing' creates multiple versions of the same department or positions within government to keep possible competitors weak and disorganized while creating new allied recipients of patronage (Haber, 2006).[28] Finally, cabinet reshuffles suggest concerns over limiting the power of internal rivals, political support and possibly appeasing mass discontent (Kroeger, 2018; Indridason and Kam, 2008; Mietzner, 2017; Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Woldense, 2018).

The arrangements reflect a reality: distorted distributions of elite power emerge as it is strategic for regimes to recognize and reinforce power differentials to their benefit, and to limit power of challengers, or take advantage of intra-elite competition. Cabinets are, therefore, representative of the social heterogeneity of the state and elite interests through disproportionate power distributions. These strategies often result in an inclusive, unbalanced power system where a skewed distribution of positions and material benefits is accrued by the leader and select benefactors. The effect is to stabilize

[28] This may explain why several ministries attending to, for example, 'youth' and 'forests' simultaneously and intermittently appear in African cabinets.

the regime through leverage balancing (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010), promoting and rewarding transactional power politics. Because of a regime's political calculus, there are multiple possibilities for representative and proportional power at any point in time and across cabinets. Countries that are ethnically inclusive may have a highly imbalanced government where one, or a few, ethnic groups have a "disproportionate" share of cabinet positions or an exclusive government that may distribute power well across the few groups within its inner circle. Further, political calculus results in high rates of volatility in persons, positions and overall rates of inclusion and proportional power.

The 'calculus' interpretation of representation finds the 'big tent' model is a political safety net with substantial benefits to anchor elites to the regime. Included elites are wary of jeopardizing their privileged position and rarely push for political reform; even opposition politicians frequently accept offers for inclusion from the regime. The lack of ideological diversity among political factions and positions are frequently seen to enrich oneself and constituents (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1994; Kieh, 2018; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Arriola, 2009; Arriola and Johnson, 2014). These dynamics enable incumbents to create coalitions of convenience to shore up support from multiple elites and constituencies. These coalitions can be created and maintained despite antagonisms.[29]

4.3 Assessing Elite Power and Distributions

Previous attempts to capture African representation have relied on lists of ethnic communities and their demographic size, expert opinion on aggregated group roles in government (see EPR by Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009), linguistic group numbers (Fearon, 2002) and distinctions on the scale of political group identity (Scarritt and Mozaffer, 2003). No data measured representation for a defined scale of formal, dynamic power. Recently, scholars amassed cabinet data for consistent, reliable and transparent representation information as "a cabinet minister in Africa is considered 'a kind of super representative' (Zolberg, 1969, p. 283) who is expected to speak for the interests of co-ethnics, as well as channel resources to them" (Arriola, 2011). Cabinets are also the locus of policy decision-making and patronage opportunities from which the public may gain benefits. Appointments are a public commitment, as a minister's identity is usually open knowledge (Posner, 2004b; Chandra, 2007).

Cabinets are expected to include a collection of constituency representatives deemed necessary for the continuation of the regime (Arriola, 2009). Ministerial positions serve as an important means to forge an intra-elite bargain shaped as the leader determines necessary (Roessler, 2011; Bratton and Van De Walle, 1994; Lindemann, 2011b). Cabinet positions are key strategic 'transactions' (Arriola and Johnson, 2014, 495), and are used by incumbents to co-opt 'big men', the influential politicians who

[29] Examples are alliances between Kenyatta (Kikuyu) and Ruto (Kalenjin) in Kenya's Jubilee Coalition; the coalition between President Ouattara (northerner) and former President Konan Bedie (Baule) in Ivory Coast. During his tenure, Bedie cultivated rhetoric aimed at excluding northerners and Ouattara from the electoral process and fostered anti-northern sentiment (Langer, 2005).

can ‘activate their own networks’ to recruit supporters or deliver votes for the regime (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Diamond, 2008).

In short, cabinet positions are designated by the leader and serve as a direct, identifiable manifestation of accommodation and negotiation politics for elites, who in turn offer a bridge between regimes and group support. The composition, size, balance and volatility of cabinet positions reflect the heterogeneity of the state and a gauge of relationships between leaders, elites and groups. Positions can identify which people and groups acquire inner circle or continuously stable positions, and who are assigned peripheral positions of great volatility.

4.4 ACPED

ACPED tracks the presence, position and demographics of all ministers within African cabinets for each month from 1997 to the present. ACPED’s unit of analysis is the cabinet minister, by month and country. Each minister is associated with identifiers, a gender, home region and associated ethnic community characteristics. Their position, movement and political party membership are recorded for each month[30]. Ministers can change positions and move in and out of cabinet; cabinets can expand and contract through the adding or firing of ministers and positions. All data assume that cabinet officers at the national level who claim a party membership, group and region are representatives of those communities, yet there is no presumed direct effect of ministerial appointments to citizens, nor a guaranteed return for cabinet representation. We contend that cabinet coalitions represent regime interests and strategies of governance, not group interests. By using individuals and tying their presence and position to the locations and groups to which they belong, the level of representation at both group and geographic scales simultaneously and dynamically reflects the proportional power held over time.

[30] Party affiliation indicates the political party or group of a minister; ministers with no political affiliation are recorded as ‘civil society’. Affiliations may vary over the course of tenure.

Table 4.1: ACPED Categories for Ministerial Appointments

	Definition	Example
Name	Cabinet Minister's name	Adolphe Muzito
Date	Month from 1997-present	October 2007
Country	Country of Cabinet	DR-Congo
Status	Whether and which change has occurred between the previous month and the last. Possible and mutually exclusive categories include: New: indicates first month as minister (either new to cabinet positions or after a period of leave) Dismissed: final month of position Reshuffle: month where position is changed Remains: in same position as previous month	October 2007: New
Position	Ministry that minister is responsible for	Minister of Budget
Party Affiliation	Party of minister	PALU: Unified Lumumbist Party
Position Significance	1- Primary; 2- Secondary; 3- Tertiary	Primary
Ethno-regional identity	Ethnic affiliation within political context, expert-based and source assessed	Pende
Ethno-political Ethnicity	Political-ethnicity of minister's stated public association (and size of aggregated group).	Pende-Yaka
Regional Background	Regional background, expert-based and source assessed	Bandundu
Gender	Binary for gender of the minister. 1 – female 0 – male	0

Ethnic identity and region are recorded by self-declaration, in-country expert opinion and subnational media sources. Ethnic and regional identities are separate, as ministers of the same ethnicity often hail from different areas of the country. In turn, each minister has a 'politically relevant ethnicity';

politicians seeking office represent several identities and interests but their ethnic identity for political purposes is often that of the largest community they associate with. For example, if a Nigerian politician vying for a national position is from the Berom community, she is unlikely to solely associate with this very small group's power in a political negotiation. She is more likely to cast herself as a 'Middle Belt' representative (or, if it would increase her leverage, a Christian, Middle Belt representative). The 'Middle Belt' designation is her ethno-political identity, over that of her ethno-regional Berom community (Scarritt and Mozaffer, 1999).

Multiple sources link a minister's stated identity to a relevant politically-relevant identity group. An ethnic and regional macro-roster for each state is composed from several sources including national experts and texts, Scarritt and Mozaffar's list of scaled communities (1999), Ethnologue, Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009) and Francois, Trebbi and Rainer (FRT) (2015) lists. Multiple sources are used to reflect the variety of subnational identities that may be politically relevant in states at different time periods. National expert opinion is privileged if a discrepancy between source materials arises. The aggregated lists include information from sources that do not emphasize 'political relevance' and therefore, identities may differ from typical, aggregated lists commonly used. All possible political identities in each state are assigned a population weight generated from national (e.g. census) or demographic reports. Regional population weights come from national census data. Politically relevant groups are further designated by whether they are 'very small' (less than 5 percent), small (5 to less than 10 percent), significant (10-25 percent), large (25-50 percent) and a plurality/majority (over 50 percent).

ACPED is a supplement to, and significant expansion of, other data, notably the Ethnic Power Relations project (see Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2009), and the African cabinet set by FRT. While the EPR data relies on largely static determinants of aggregated, large ethnic group positioning in government, and intermittently collected expert opinion, no formal or identifiable positions are compared across groups, times or states. As Rainer and Trebbi (2011) note in reference to EPR, 'hard' information on the participation of groups in government is more objective. Further, the 'artificial clustering of data into course subdivisions' such as EPR's seven-point categorical scale, obscures rather than elucidates the role, relationships and variability between political groups. The use and objectivity of formal positions allows for analysis of subtle shifts in elite bargaining, regime consolidation, representation and power sharing.

ACPED and FRT annual cabinet set are similar: they represent a change in several dimensions of identity data, including the primary scale (elite and cabinet, rather than group), the unit of analysis (cabinet minister, rather than group or state, and whole cabinets), the tenure of an individual and the volatility of the cabinet (i.e. whether a minister has a change in position, and cabinet level representation and proportion metrics) and flexible, multiple identity metrics (individual, position, gender, political

party, ethnic group and region). FRT data covers 15 countries from 1960-2004; ACPED covers 23 African states from 1997 to the present. This later period witnessed extreme changes in the structure of African governments, as democratic transitions, elections, new political parties and power-sharing agreements brought widespread elite inclusion and many more groups into competition for power. ACPED's current data covers other notable points of political instability including the 2011 Ivorian Crisis; the 2012 Mali Coup; the 2017 Zimbabwe Coup; the 2008 Guinea Coup; the Tunisian Revolution; the DRC 2016-2018 Constitutional Crisis; the changes in the Ethiopian governments after the Oromo violence (2014 onwards). Further, a total of 98 ministers included in ACPED are missing from the FRT annual data in years and countries during which the projects intersect.

Furthermore, FRT collect cabinet data annually; ACPED is disaggregated to the month. This is a critical improvement because of intra-annual variability: 19.2 percent of ministers have tenures that last twelve months or fewer, and during the year, 10 percent of ministers lose their position. Drastic increases and decreases in cabinet size are typically short-lived and last under a year, and ministries that are added or removed from the cabinet are often short terms.[31] New regimes are characterized by an almost total shift in ministers within a year. For example, in Congo-Brazzaville, President Pascal Lissouba appointed 23 ministers in an attempted unity government in September 1997. These ministers were replaced when former president and rebel leader, Denis Sassou Nguesso, overthrew the Lissouba regime and installed his own cabinet in November 1997. Integrating these crucial sub-annual developments and shifts allows for analysis on dynamics at points where the elite bargain and settlement is breaking down. The comparative totals of each collection therefore differ: FRT have 16,583 minister-years units, while the ACPED 23 state sample here includes 161,402 minister-months and 3,926 individual ministers. The sampled ACPED Africa data are ten times that of the FRT set currently, and will double as the dataset is complete for at least a twenty-year period.

4.5 Cabinet and Group Measures

ACPED creates several aggregated cabinet level measures where identified ministers within the cabinet are merged with their correspondent ethno-political and regional macro-group characteristics. The measures include representation, distortion and malapportionment. All are variations on group inclusion metrics: each group can be assessed by 'how much' they are incorporated (i.e. are cabinets representative of the ethno-political heterogeneity of the state) and how many elites group 'have' in cabinets (i.e. are the positions of those groups represented in cabinet allocated fairly?) Each of these three measures is a disaggregation of ethnic or regional group leverage which can effectively adjudicate

[31] For example, Ivory Coast experienced a high degree of sub-annual ministerial turnover in 2000: 27 ministers were appointed and dismissed in under a year, with the average sub-annual tenure being just 22 weeks. During the twelve-month period, Ivorian junta leader General Robert Guei assembled two separate transitional cabinets and oversaw an election in the latter half of the year. The composition of the Ivorian cabinet– in terms of political identities also changed dramatically during this particularly unstable period.

between an 'arithmetic' strategy of representing groups in various, increasingly formalized, positions; while 'calculus' suggests the measures should change as the leader composes a regime based on balancing, co-option, division, and other strategies to further the fortunes and longevity of those in power.

4.5.1 Representation

Subnational ethnic and regional representation is measured by comparing whether each group in the state's politically ethnic relevant macro-roster has at least one position in cabinet at any given time[32]. Communities who have a representative in one or more cabinet positions, in a given country-month, are recorded as 'represented' for the period of appointment(s). The aggregated monthly share of included group populations[33] is the representation score, summarized by the following notation:

$$Representation_{ct} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_{ict} \qquad (1)$$

where 'Representation' for state *c* at time *t* is computed as the summation across all the represented ethnicities or regional groups *i* of their presence *y*. The Representation index varies between 0 and 1; where values near 0 denote low representation of the state's groups and values near 1 indicate at least one position for all ethno-political or regional groups in the cabinet. For example, Laurent Gbabo's Ivory Coast cabinet during December 2005 represented all of the ethno-political groups in the country, and hence, the ethno-political representation score is '1'. In Zimbabwe, Mugabe's cabinet during February 2009 included a representative from each of the country's regions; therefore, the regional representation score is a '1'.

4.5.2 Distortion

Distortion considers only those ministers and associated groups in cabinet, and notes the number of seats they hold as a proportion of overall cabinet seats. That proportion is compared to that group or region's proportional size in the state's overall demography. The ratio of respective seats to size is the basis for assessing whether a group position(s) is an over or under allocation. For each month, groups are one of the following: 1) High Under Representation (more than -50 percent below expected seats); Under Representation (between -49 to -11 percent below expected seats); Proportional (a range of between -10 to 10 percent); Over Representation (10-25 percent more seats than equitable); and High Over Representation (over 50 percent of proportional levels).

[32] The entire list of macro groups is available upon request from ACPED.
[33] Levels of population are summed through Ethnologue, media sources and national census data, measured in relative size to each other.

4.5.3 Malapportionment

ACPED's malapportionment score measures how power is allocated in the cabinet. The proportional power distribution measure is based on methods from electoral studies (Duncan and Duncan, 1955; Samuels and Snyder, 2001) which employ 'disproportionality' measures to describe deviations between party votes share and party seats share (Gallagher, 1991; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003; Lijphart, 1994; Tageepera and Grofman, 2003; Vatter, 2009). A modified version of the 'disproportion' index popularized by Loosemore and Hanby (1971: 469) and Gallagher (1991)[34] is employed to determine the discrepancy between the shares of cabinet positions and the shares of population held by included ethnic groups. Thus, the formula becomes:

$$AllocatedProportionEth_{ct} = \frac{(\sum_{i=1}^{n} |x_{ict} - y_{ict}|)}{2} \qquad (2)$$

The allocated/proportional power measure for state *c* at time *t* is computed as the summation of absolute values across all the ethnicities or regional groups of the difference between x, which is the share of the cabinet positions allocated to group *i*, and *y*, which is the share of the population of group *i* in the total population. The above index ranges between 0 and 1. 0 denotes highly proportional power, where one or more groups hold the number of positions than their relative demographic weight suggests they should. 1 denotes highly disproportional power, where one or more groups holds more or fewer seats than they should based on relative demographic size.[35.]

[34] In his study on the disproportionality of electoral outcome, Gallagher (1991) use a least squared version of the Loosemore and Hanby index to compare vote received and seat allocated to parties.

[35] This assumption may overlook historically unequal power relations and thus in the robustness section we report a set of alternative definitions, substituting the geographical dimension to the ethnic one or with other alternative measures.

Table 4.2: ACPED Indices

Measure	Description	Metric and Model
Cabinet Representation Index	The size of the ethnic population represented by the cabinet. Repeated for regional representation.	Between 0 and 1;1 indicates highest representation. 0: cabinet has no ethno-political groups or regions. 1: cabinet includes all ethno-political groups or regions
Cabinet Malapportionment Index	The distribution of cabinet seats among group with at least one seat.	Between 0 and 1; 0 indicates perfect correspondence between demographic group weight and number of cabinet positions. 1 recorded when no relationship between cabinet positions and demographic weight of ethno-political group
Group Distortion	The difference between the ethnic population (as a proportion) and their share of cabinet positions. Groups are divided into whether they represent a majority (over 50%); large (25-49%); significant (11-24%); small (5-10%) and very small (1-4%)	Indicates how under-allocated or over allocated the seats are by group. Results are initially recorded as a percentage of under- or over- allocation by each group and then translated into High Under (more than -50%); Under (-49 to -11%); Proportional (-10 to 10%); Over (10-25%); and High Over (over 50%)

4.6 Investigation

A selection of 23 African states and their entire cabinets from 1997-2017 form the ACPED data sample to investigate cabinet size, composition and representation. These states include: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe (Table 4.3). These states have autocratic, transitioning, democratizing, democratic institutions, open and closed participation, varying levels of ethnic heterogeneity, active conflicts, persistent disorder and general peace. This sample exposes similar patterns to other ACPED covered states.

4.6.1 Size

The average size of African cabinets ranges from 24 ministers in 1997 to 34 in 2017 (see Figure 4.1). This is significantly larger than the average cabinet size in the developed world: the US cabinet includes the President, Vice President and 15 department heads; the UK cabinet is composed of the Prime Minister and 21 cabinet positions, but is similar to other developing states (the Indian cabinet is 32 positions). Size and volatility are suggestive of a state's political health: Van de Walle (2001) notes that

"African states have long been notorious for their large cabinets, with ministerial appointments that often have little relevance to policy-making priorities or the size of actual budgets". Further to this point: "cabinet size represents the number of elite clients sustained by a regime's leader, whether a democratically elected president or a coup-installed dictator. An increase in the number of cabinet ministers is interpreted as an attempt to expand the leader's base of political support—for example, buying off critics of the government or bringing in representatives from particular ethno-regional groups" (Arriola, 2011). [36]

Table 4.3: Inclusion and Accommodation Metrics across Sample States

Country	Cabinet Size (Median)	Representation (Average)	Representation (Minimum)	Malapportionment (Average)	Malapportionment (Maximum)
Algeria	32.00	0.97	0.67	21.37	36.72
Botswana	18.00	0.56	0.36	7.71	16.64
Burundi	25.00	0.67	0.67	16.21	33.26
Cameroon	40.00	0.83	0.73	24.15	38.69
Central African Republic	25.00	0.73	0.50	15.40	37.10
Democratic Republic of Co..	40.00	0.64	0.50	25.38	69.13
Ethiopia	31.00	0.66	0.60	12.77	22.50
Guinea	32.00	0.96	0.83	12.72	24.50
Ivory Coast	34.00	0.88	0.78	22.41	42.75
Kenya	30.00	0.54	0.40	11.73	21.16
Liberia	23.00	0.71	0.47	18.12	44.44
Malawi	23.00	0.84	0.71	15.19	32.74
Mali	29.00	0.88	0.44	14.52	34.20
Morocco	24.00	0.70	0.40	9.96	23.42
Nigeria	31.00	0.48	0.37	11.98	23.95
Rwanda	22.00	0.69	0.67	17.51	33.76
Sierra Leone	28.00	0.83	0.67	11.84	18.80
South Africa	31.00	0.88	0.70	14.68	20.92
South Sudan	31.00	0.58	0.08	11.03	17.51
Tanzania	31.00	0.66	0.57	23.05	31.48
Tunisia	30.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Uganda	27.00	0.54	0.38	14.36	23.71
Zimbabwe	38.00	0.80	0.63	15.06	23.52

The calculus and strategies evident in size is clear: governments create dual ministries or distinct ministries when trying to pack a cabinet. While there are common positions (standard ministries such as 'Foreign Affairs', 'Security', 'Finance', 'Health', etc.), often several co-occurring ministries have an agricultural or environmental remit, gender or youth, etc. These additional and esoteric ministries exist for a short time period but display little to no evidence of a bureaucracy behind them, including a budget, staff, agenda, or targets.

[36] Indeed, being included does not suggest great leverage: Le Van and Assenov's (2016) study of the effect of cabinet size on budgetary spending argues that ministers do not have the individual capacity to demand patronage of a significant scale.

Figure 4.1: Size of Cabinets and Number of Ethno-Political Groups in Cabinets



The increase over time has not led to greater representation, which is relatively stable despite significant differences in average size. As expected, the number of distinct groups in cabinet is stable.

4.6.2 Volatility

For each month in ACPED, each minister is recorded as either remaining in position; changing post through reallocation, promotion or demotion; dismissed; or appointed. Promotions and demotions are based on an assessment of the ministerial position's significance (e.g. primary, secondary and tertiary positions). Using just reshuffles and firings, the average rates of change over the twenty-year period across countries is 20 percent by year. Therefore, over a five-year period, every cabinet can expect to have been completely replaced. Significantly, larger rates of change are recorded in Nigeria (33 percent), Central African Republic (39 percent) and DR-Congo (38 percent). All three states are the sites of significant political disorder.

African cabinets are characterized by short, sharp common spikes in ministers indicating that many are hired at once and fired shortly thereafter. These are 'disposable' positions used solely to reward or pack the cabinet for a key vote. It creates a higher number of average positions in the inter-annual cabinet size than the inter-month rate. Figure 4.2 is country comparison of dismissal and reshuffles rates. High rates of dismissal are a sign of high elite instability. High rates of reshuffles in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe indicate a leader destabilizing the power of individual power makers in cabinets.

Dismissals indicate a more serious overhaul to the political equilibrium and are highest in states that are unstable in other ways: Central African Republic, DR-Congo and Nigeria.[37]

Figure 4.2: Volatility rates by Removal and Reshuffling



Figure 4.3: Differences in Cabinet Size across Selected States



[37] The high rate of dismissal in Morocco is explained by attempts to placate a public and release some public motivation for an "Arab Spring" moment.

In figure 4.3, four cases of cabinet size variation by month shows the differences that occur across the twenty-year period. In the case of Mali below, the average inter-month size of a cabinet is 28, while the inter-annual rate is 38 members.

4.6.3 Representation

The more pressing African governance questions concern whether political communities are proportionately represented in regimes. Are African regimes broad-based coalitions which co-opt potential ethnic and political rivals through the allocation of government posts and access to state resources (Dollbaum, 2017; Lindemann, 2011b; Van de Walle, 2007)? Or are African regimes exclusive, favouring their core constituency – such as party supporters or affiliated ethno-regional populations – to the detriment of other citizens especially those groups associated with the political opposition (Langer, 2005; Posner and Young, 2007; Ndegwa, 1997)? Based on formal positions, there is clear and overwhelming evidence of large-scale inclusion across African cabinets. The rate of ethno-political representation across sampled African cabinets from 1997-2017 is 75 percent of a state's total number of relevant groups. Regional representation is 73 percent. On average, three quarters of all politically relevant groups are integrated into the cabinet at any time (see Figure 4.4 and Table 4.3).

Figure 4.4: Levels of Representation and Malapportionment



The rate of overall national representation in cabinet is relatively stable: while some temporary deviations occur, all countries show low overall deviations. Ethno-political inclusion varies by approximately 10 percent (between 70-80 percent) across the twenty-year period. Drastic changes are 'corrected' and mitigated over the course of months, resulting in more stable annual patterns. Much of the concern with the consequences of exclusion is directed towards large groups which can organized against the government (see Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2014). However, when tallied by group, there is no clear or consistent indication of lower representation rates for large group. Majority groups are most consistently represented (at 85 percent), large groups are placed in 80 percent of all cabinets, significant groups 75 percent, small groups 71 percent and very small groups at 68 percent. When Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are removed as mono-ethnic outliers, this distribution is stable as majority groups have a similar presence in cabinet as the other group types (at 68 percent).

4.6.4 Seat Allocation in Cabinet and Distortion across Groups

Perfectly proportional representation occurs when seat allocation levels for groups match the relative size of a group within in politically relevant population census. Cabinets exhibit more misallocation, or imbalance, than exclusion. The average rate of misallocated seats is 16 percent of all cabinet positions: 84 percent of all positions are allocated proportionally based on the group size of representatives. Allocation has a maximum of 69 percent and a minimum of 6 percent, both extremes are present for a minimal number of months. These average measures can suggest many different power arrangements. For example, a country with an 84 percent apportionment rate in cabinet and three groups could have two groups underrepresented with a difference between their share of national population and their share of cabinet positions equal to 8 percent, or a third group could be overrepresented by 16 percent. However, this value could also be obtained by a different distribution of power: overrepresentation could characterize more groups, and the result would be equal. As demonstrated in Figure 4.4, the level of misallocation in cabinets has been above the average consistently since October 2008, and the average malapportionment rate of recent cabinets at 21 percent, and continues to rise.

The annual correlation between cabinet level representation and allocation is limited; overall patterns suggest that when representation is high—and many if not all the politically relevant groups within a country are included—misallocation is neither low nor high. It is shaped by an entirely different logic of internal strategy. The choices that dictate representation are different from the choices that determine allocation of seats.

There are some common types of disproportional power that are evident in this sample of 23 states. In terms of under or over representation, all group sizes experience a range of representation types, across countries and across time within countries. Based on the overall seats that are assigned to political elites from each type of demographic group, large and majority groups are most commonly characterized by proportional or under-allocated seats (see Table 4.4). Significant, small and very small are all

characterized by highly over allocated seats or proportional. Elite representatives of significantly sized groups garner most positions (a total of 787 distinct ministerial positions) and the highest number of minister months across all cabinets (at 32 percent). However, significant groups are not the most common form of politically relevant ethnic group (39 distinct significant group are recorded in this sample). There are 53 distinct 'small' groups and 92 very small groups; both are typically given far more seats for their size. Small groups can be 'kingmakers', cabinet packers, useful for short term appointments, etc. The most egregious disparity is for 'very small' groups which are overwhelmingly given seats that are far more than they should garner for their size. Even a single seat can cause distortions due to the average size of these communities and the limits of possible cabinet seats. But many times, very small groups have more than a single seat (in 2005 Central African Republic, 5 positions were assigned to politicians from the Ngbaka community; in 2007 Nigeria, seven positions were given to politicians from the Ibibio-Efik-Ijaw community).

This indicates that, contrary to perceptions that the 'big three' (large groups, a leader's own community and strong competitors) are over-represented, very small groups can also be politically relevant despite their small size. Governments are much more likely to supress the demographic leverage of majority and large communities, and to emphasize the presence and positions of political elites from significant and smaller ethnic communities. This leads to highly distorted allocations, and allows leaders to accommodate more groups by simply growing the cabinet.

Table 4.4: Level of Group Level Distortion

Group Type and No.	Number of Politicians from Group	Average % of Month-Ministry Seats	High Over	Over	Proportional	Under	High Under
Majority (4)	656	16%			39%	35%	27%
Large (16)	616	14%		19%	17%	34%	30%
Significant (39)	1118	32%	26%	37%	15%	10%	11%
Small (53)	785	18%	43%	32%	8%	8%	9%
Very Small (92)	760	20%	76%	18%	3%	3%	1%

But not only are there clear variations in seat allocation, power distributions and groups that occupy the senior levels of government, there is also considerable change in both the groups, and the group types, that occupy seats. Consider Table 4.5, where each type of group in a country is noted by how frequently, as a percentage of overall monthly seats, it is over or under represented. By breaking down each of the administrations for four periods (January in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017) we mean to illustrate some key attributes of regime calculus: countries like Cameroon show no change in distortion patterns, but also

display a severe unbalanced pattern of high over and high under/under proportion. When examined by the size of group, the distortion is equally distributed amongst significant, small and very small groups.

Table 4.5: Distortion of Group Representation over Time

Country	Politically Relevant Ethnicity	2014	2015	2016	2017
Cameroon	Bamileke	3 High Under	3 High Under	3 High Under	3 High Under
	Bassa-Bakoko-Douala	7 High Over	7 High Over	7 High Over	7 High Over
	Beti	17 High Over	17 High Over	17 High Over	17 High Over
	Far North	1 Over	1 Over	1 Over	1 Over
	Fulani	5 Under	5 Under	5 Under	5 Under
	Kanuri	1 High Over	1 High Over	1 High Over	1 High Over
	Kirdi	4 Over	4 Over	4 Over	4 Over
	North West	1 High Under	1 High Under	1 High Under	1 High Under
	South West	1 High Under	1 High Under	1 High Under	1 High Under
Central African Republic	Banda	7 Under	9 Proportional	9 Proportional	3 High Under
	Fulani	0 Absent	1 High Over	1 High Over	2 High Over
	Gbaya	2 High Under	4 High Under	3 High Under	5 High Under
	Mbaka	0 Absent	1 Under	1 Under	0 Absent
	Mbum	0 Absent	0 Absent	0 Absent	2 Over
	Ngbaka	0 Absent	2 Over	1 Under	3 High Over
	Other	2 High Over	2 High Over	2 High Over	4 High Over
	Riverene/Sango/Banzeri	5 Over	10 High Over	7 High Over	2 Under
	Sara and Northerners	10 High Over	3 Under	3 Proportional	0 Absent
	Yakoma	9 High Over	6 Over	7 High Over	7 High Over
Zimbabwe	Karanga	9 Proportional	6 Under	7 Under	7 Under
	Manyika	5 Proportional	6 Over	7 Over	7 Over
	Ndau	1 Under	2 Over	2 Over	2 Over
	Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)	8 Proportional	9 Over	9 Proportional	10 Over
	Other	2 Over	2 Over	2 Over	2 Over
	Zezuru	16 High Over	13 High Over	14 High Over	13 High Over

When examined by exact group, the Beti, Bassa-Bakoko-Douala alliance, Kanuri and South West are allocated seats far above their normalized weight by demography, while the Kirdi, Fulani, Far North and North West group representatives are under allocated seats (while these communities continue to suffer significant cross border violence during this period). But Central African Republic demonstrates great variation across four years of severe instability: the large Banda and Gbaya communities are allocated seats totals over and under their weight at different periods, as are the Riverene/Sango/Banzeri, Mbaka, Ngbaka, Sara and Northerner community representatives. Only the Fulani and Yakoma (very small groups in CAR) are consistently allocated more seats than they should be, when they are in cabinet. As a reflection of varying dynamics, consider Zimbabwe, where those communities that the President is dependent upon for coalitions are steadily allocated more than proportional seats (Zezuru, and as a distant second, the Ndebele), while the community from where a strong faction is associated was marginalized (Karanga). As the cabinets increase in size, the same number of seats can distort the level of proportional power and leverage each representative has; in this way, leaders can suppress or heighten the influence of any community through relative seat allocation calculus. President Mugabe was removed in late 2017, and the composition of the cabinet subsequently returned to a more balanced state.

This analysis is a view into how leader's co-opt or suppress groups and elites, but also how elite representatives from all types of communities become politically salient. Interpretations of power that rely on group size fail to appreciate the calculations of power distributions that confront regimes and leaders. Further, there are few 'one size fits all' policies when it comes to governing states as different as South Sudan and Zimbabwe. Each period, state and leader balance their collective and individual interests, abilities and capacity relative to those of other political elites. This means that coup-proofing may be useful one month, but dangerous the next. Further, a group's representative elite may be given a very senior post (e.g. Foreign Minister) but be presented with a range of problems that lessens their public appeal. A minister may get a position but no budget, staff or agenda[38]. But these patterns mainly suggest that there should be great volatility–even over short periods of time–in the composition and size of the cabinet if they are evidence of transactional politics.

The general lessons of cabinet representation and allocation is that understanding a regime's choices requires knowledge of the domestic politics of the state, and the threats and opportunities available to leaders and senior elites to leverage their authority. Certainly, large and growing cabinets indicate a leader beholden to more subnational interests over time, often around key junctures like elections. Whether the cabinet size stabilizes is an indication of how consolidated and widespread the overall

[38] See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6260930.stm where Kenyan ministers complained of boredom. We find that several positions, especially those of extremely short-term appointments, have no discernable infrastructure (e.g. Minister of Public Functions, or Zimbabwe's Minister of Psychomotor Activities) or are very closely associated with another ministry that has official standing (e.g. multiple youth related ministries are simultaneously assigned ministers).

influence of the regime is, relative to subnational elites. A large cabinet of decreasing sizes--such as those in Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Tunisia-- indicate some attempts at retaining centralized power after a large-scale political crisis; these can also be due to a crisis that limits the patronage of the leader. Small cabinets with high change rates indicate a leader trying to keep elites in a state of disorder and 'musical chairs' to buy loyalty at low rates, or a country in which leadership is contested and changes hands frequently. Small, stable cabinets are states where the central authority is narrow and consolidated. But the conclusion of volatility, the transactional nature of senior positions, and the tactical advantages sought by counterbalancing, cabinet packing, distorted allocations and division are the main conclusions of disaggregated cabinet data. These cabinets are indicative of health and stability of regimes, and the fault lines present in a state's domestic politics.

4.7 Conclusions

African governments are often understood as appendages of the leader. To that end, they are variably described as "corrupt", "weak", and "failed". But attention is rarely paid to the composition of senior government ranks, and the tactics therein to secure senior regime elites. When researchers do consider senior elites and their positions, they discover that this scale of government is crucial to understanding clientelism, balancing, co-option, leverage (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008), longevity and survival (Magaloni, 2006), stability and security of governments (Laver, 2003; Fischer, Dowding and Dumont, 2012). We argue that research into senior government ranks and relationships has often avoided African investigations, instead concentrating on cabinets in Europe, or senior political scales in Latin America, to name a few. But the conclusions from African-based cabinet research are illuminating.

Here, we argue for greater consideration of two substantial shifts in how African power and governments are conceptualized and measured. We suggest that the political environment within African states has fundamentally shifted as countries began to build and reform institutions which made regimes more open to elite competition. These changes have made the 'ethno-demographic' arithmetic of typical representation measures obsolete in many ways: it is inaccurate as a voting metric or predictor, as a political identity in urban areas, or as reliable club vote. Instead, power distributions across African states are based on regimes and elites seeking to accommodate, co-opt and balance at senior levels of government through inclusivity and manipulation. This 'regime management' demands that researchers know the composition, size and change at senior levels of government to understand how regimes and leaders survive, why senior scales of government are volatile, governance is territorially uneven, and groups emerge is surprising coalitions.

What is the influence of these calculations for the distribution of power? As African regime leaders often stay in power for long periods of time, this indicates that they have often mastered the transactions

necessary for short-term, loyalty exchanges. These dynamics enable incumbents to create coalitions of convenience to shore up support from multiple elites and constituencies. These coalitions can be created and maintained despite historical antagonisms. African political elites rarely push for political reform and corruption investigations because of the calculations of power calculus that leads to co-option or suppression, rather than a viable alternative programmatic appeal.

ACPED underscores how ethno-political and regional group representatives are critical features of the African political environment. Information on the presence, position and demographics of ministers within African cabinets, for each month from 1997 to the present, allows for unique interpretations of political identity at the individual (minister), group and regional scale. When aggregated, they create information on representation, proportional power and unity across a state's government. ACPED collects information on all ministers within national cabinets. Their position, movement and political party membership is recorded for each month and will be extended throughout Africa and updated in near real-time. Initial conclusions from ACPED overturn many preconceptions about African governance and representation. Rather than exclusive and co-ethnic favouritism, African states are inclusive; although the level of representation and balance of power between groups is volatile. As regimes have different priorities and crises to attend to, relying on co-ethnics is a poor strategic choice and may lead to the emergence of 'replacement' politics rather than accommodation options for opponents and competitors.

ACPED data can be used to study how regimes balance or bias in the formation of governments, how levels of representation, proportion, and party unity vary and the role of elite-regime relationships in generating or curtailing economic development, resource distribution and systems of political competition. Metrics can also be employed to see the impact of different balancing strategies on popular areas of study, including leadership survival, devolution or recentralization of political power, voting patterns and political violence. The new public data represents a significant step in moving towards realistic and dynamic information about domestic politics and the role of identity in developing states.

5.0 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility

5.1 Introduction

An enduring theme in African politics is that, in spite of the presence of personalised rule, leaders do not rule alone (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Langer, 2005). Rather leaders retain or extend their political power through the forging of an intra-elite coalition which minimises threats to their continued rule (Arriola, 2009; Van de Walle, 2007). These coalitions are maintained through the distribution of state resources and senior government positions, creating webs of dependence in which patronage is traded for political support, linking African leaders to the elites within the ruling coalition and the communities they represent (*ibid.*). Existing research on the political fortunes of leaders within Africa frequently ties leadership survival or downfall to how rulers compose their ruling coalitions to ward off threats such as civil war, coups or electoral defeat (Lindemann, 2011a; Lindemann, 2011b; Roessler, 2011; Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Arriola, 2009; Choi and Kim, 2018).

However, the existing literature is far from unanimous over what size and composition of ruling coalition is ideal to ensure the leader's political survival. As political competition and conflict within Africa is commonly interpreted as a means through which excluded elites force their inclusion into government or capture power, some scholars have argued that large inclusive coalitions are optimal (Lindemann, 2011b; Arriola, 2009; Wimmer et al., 2009). Conversely, others have argued that sharing power increases the chance of infighting among elites and limits the amount of resources available to nourish the leader's patronage network, raising the risk of the leader being deposed by insiders (LeVan, 2011; Roeder, 2005; De Mesquita et al., 2005). Increasingly, the optimal configuration for the ruling coalition is seen as being dependent on political context with threats minimised by a large, inclusive ruling coalition in some cases and small, exclusive ruling coalitions in others (Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Choi and Kim, 2018; Roberts, 2015). Different ruling configurations such as inclusive 'big-tent' ruling parties, exclusionary military or political regimes, and multi-ethnic coalitions are all examples of different strategies leaders use to counteract threats to their rule. These strategies also reflect the differing levels of power the regime and leader have against external political rivals.

This paper aims to expand upon the current literature by examining how changes in the political environment prompt leaders to re-evaluate the configuration of the ruling coalition and make changes to minimise threats to their rule. This paper theorises that optimal coalitions are decided by the nature of the threats facing the regime and the strength of the regime's hold on political power. This relationship is tested using data on ministerial appointments and reshuffles from eighteen African states between 1997 and 2017. The cabinet is used as a proxy to estimate the size and ethnic composition of the leader's ruling coalition. Cabinet reshuffles are used to approximate the volatility within the ruling

coalition and determine whether leaders make changes to their ruling coalition in response to a change in the political environment. The study will focus specifically on how two threats affect the characteristics of the ruling coalition: upcoming elections and economic downturns. These threats will be assessed for both competitive regimes, which are vulnerable to the political opposition, and hegemonic regimes, which do not face an immediate threat of replacement (Schedler, 2013).

This paper makes two original contributions to the understanding of regime and leadership strategies of survival. Firstly, the characteristics of ruling coalitions are not static but undergo significant change when the regime is facing threat. Enduring claims in academia concerning the large size or ethnic inclusivity/exclusivity of African regimes fail to take into account the high degree of volatility that occurs within the senior levels of government. This paper shows that changes in the ruling coalition can occur outside of political transitions when used as strategies by the incumbent leader to hold onto power.

Secondly, different types of regimes adopt different tactics when facing different threats. The threat posed by opposition parties to competitive regimes means that leaders increase the size and inclusivity of their cabinets in the pre-electoral period, while the irrelevance of the opposition to hegemonic regimes means that they do not engage in this strategy of expansion.

Consequently, ruling coalitions in Africa should not be perceived as static entities with fixed attributes concerning size and composition. Rather, the ruling coalition is a reflection of current threats within the political landscape and the resources or capacity the regime has at its disposal to mitigate these threats.

5.2 Literature review

5.2.1 The benefits of leadership and risks of losing power

Occupying the highest political office in Africa can bring substantial material benefits, while losing control of the presidency can pose significant risks. As a result, leaders in Africa are generally classed as being primarily concerned with political survival and the retention of power (Goldsmith, 2001; Roessler, 2011; Roessler and Ohls, 2018). The ‘imperial’ nature of Africa’s presidencies enables leaders to enjoy significant material gains during their tenure, and many long-time rulers have managed to amass significant fortunes (Kieh, 2018; Prempeh, 2008; Felter, 2017).

Leaders in Africa can lose their incumbency via a number of democratic and non-democratic threats. From independence to 2015, 95 leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa lost power due to a coup executed by state actors, twelve have been removed by rebellions and four by popular protest (Goemans et al., 2009). Since the widespread adoption of multi-party elections in the 1990s, leaders are increasingly losing

power to opposition parties and elites (Cheeseman, 2010; Bell, 2016).[39] To counter these threats to their rule, leaders need to create a ruling coalition which will protect them (De Mesquita et al., 2005).

5.2.2 Political survival and its application within Africa

De Mesquita et al. (2005) identified two key concepts on how the creation of ruling coalitions translates to the political survival of leaders. Coalitions are picked from the 'selectorate' which comprises all individuals who can potentially engage in the decision over who leads the government. The winning coalition is the subset of the selectorate whose support is sufficient to confer political leadership. Within electoral democracies, the winning coalition can vary from a third to half of the voting population, whereas in a military dictatorship, the winning coalition may just include a few senior military officers. Under De Mesquita's theory, leaders lose their position when they fail to create a coalition of the correct size and composition to insulate them from internal and external rivals.

Within Africa, the characteristics of the selectorate and winning coalition are affected by the links between political elites and the populations they represent. Politicians often link their political fortunes to the welfare of their co-ethnics (Langer, 2005; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Berman, 1998; Arriola, 2009; Szeftel, 2000). Groups with co-ethnics included within the senior government benefit disproportionately from government policies, giving voters an incentive to vote along ethnic lines (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Kramon and Posner, 2016; Burgess et al., 2015; Holder and Raschky, 2014). Consequently, political elites can be bought into the ruling coalition as 'bloc leaders' to deliver the support of their co-ethnics (De Mesquita et al., 2005).[40] Another key dynamic of coalition systems in Africa is that political positions are perceived as a means to enrich oneself and one's network of clients (Szeftel, 2000; Van de Walle, 2007). The political system in Africa is noted for its lack of ideological diversity with parties or political movements often functioning as the personal tools of political elites (Carbone, 2007; Mehler, 2007). A system in which 'a seat at the table' is the primary concern of political actors enables leaders to readily co-opt opponents and create coalitions of convenience to shore up support (Kieh, 2018; Chabal and Daloz, 1999).

[39] The loss of leadership also carries considerable risk including assassination, exile or arrest (Goldsmith, 2001). Of the 285 leader exits in post-independence Sub-Saharan Africa, 93 resulted in the exile or imprisonment of the former leader while 27 resulted in execution (Goemans et al., 2009).

[40] There is controversy over the degree to which ethnic considerations guide voting behaviour in Africa. Although appeals to bloc interests are rarely the sole motivator in political support and vary in effectiveness across different contexts, the majority of literature argues that ethnic identities do matter in guiding political support within Africa (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Basedau et al. 2011; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Eifert et al., 2010).

5.2.3 Winning coalitions and strategies of survival

There is ongoing debate and disagreement over what size and composition of coalition is optimal for ensuring political survival and whether strategies of accommodating or excluding potential rivals are more effective. A large body of literature argues that leaders increase the security of their regime through creating a large and inclusive ruling coalition. Rebellion, opposition politics and mass protest can be interpreted as forms of political competition in which excluded elites and constituents try to either take over the government or force their inclusion in the ruling coalition (Choi and Kim, 2018). Consequently, a narrow ruling coalition with a large number of excluded groups and disaffected elites provides the necessary conditions for the opposition to form a coalition capable of displacing the government. Excluded elites can pose a risk to the leader through forming opposition parties, organising protests or openly rebelling against the government (Mehler, 2011; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Raleigh and Dowd, 2018).

Conversely, there are arguments that larger coalitions can increase leaders' vulnerability to rivals from within the ruling coalition. Increasing the size of the ruling coalition limits the amount of spoils available to existing coalition members (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Continually expanding the coalition can encourage existing members to oust the leader in order to create a narrow coalition in which the remaining members are better compensated (Choi and Kim, 2018).[41] Larger ruling coalitions, such as 'big-tent parties' or governments of national unity, are frequently beset with factions which compete over issues of patronage and policy (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Sriram and Zahar, 2009; LeVan, 2011).

The ongoing debate over the ideal ruling coalition raises the possibility that the optimal coalition is conditional on contextual political factors. A growing body of research argues that the optimal coalition is dictated by factors such as the strength of the regime, internal cohesion, strength of the opposition, whether the regime faces a threat to its rule and the nature of that threat (Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Choi and Kim, 2018; Lindemann, 2011a; Roessler, 2011; Raleigh and Dowd, 2018). Consequently, changes in any of these factors will lead to volatility in the ruling coalition as leaders reassess what form of coalition is optimal. Martinez-Gallardo (2014) summaries the process in her paper on shocks and reshuffles in Latin America:

> "Unexpected events over the course of a government's life will change these conditions and make bargains that were previously 'stable' no longer viable. Appointments are an explicit political strategy that presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges."

Two threats are chosen to test this theory: firstly, pre-electoral periods in which the leader's rule is threatened by a democratic opposition; secondly, economic downturns which reduce the resources available for patronage for the coalition and weaken the leader's legitimacy. Both threats have the

[41] Arriola (2009) finds that increasing the size of the coalition up to a point actually reduces the chance of a coup. However, the effect dampens as the coalition expands and eventually expanding the coalition increases the chance of deposition from within.

potential to destabilise the existing intra-elite bargain and to prompt the leader to make changes to their coalition.

In this paper the cabinet is considered a proxy for the leader's coalition. The leader's coalition is approximated by examining volatility within the cabinet and changes in attributes such as size, ethnic inclusivity and the predominance of the leader's co-ethnics. The cabinet and senior government posts are well established as a proxy for which elites and subnational groups are included in the ruling coalition. Arriola (2009) used the size of the cabinet as an approximation for the number of elite clients sustained by the regime, while the ethnic composition of the cabinet has formed the basis of Francois, Rainer and Trebbi's (2015) dataset and been an important guiding factor for the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer et al., 2009). Political appoints and reshuffles are frequently treated as a tool of political survival within the existing literature. Leaders may make changes to the cabinet to limit the power of internal rivals, shore up political support or appease mass discontent (Indridason and Kam, 2008; Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011; Lust-Okar, 2004).

Consequently, this paper hypothesises that as elections or economic crises destabilise formerly stable elite configurations, cabinets experience volatility as leaders reshuffle their senior government to create a new more stable coalition.

Hypothesis 1a: Cabinets will exhibit more volatility in the pre-electoral period

Hypothesis 1b: Cabinets will experience more volatility during times of economic stress

5.2.4 Competitive and hegemonic regimes

Since the third wave of democratisation in the 1990s, elections have become commonplace in Africa.[42] Yet the level of democratisation, in terms of the ability of the political opposition to gain power through elections, varies significantly across the continent. Countries such as Kenya, Ghana or Sierra Leone have witnessed multiple democratic transitions in power with elections won by slim electoral margins, while countries such as Tanzania or Ethiopia have had a single party in power for multiple decades. The former are classed as competitive regimes which face a legitimate threat of replacement from the political opposition, while the latter are considered hegemonic regimes and are deemed unlikely to suffer an electoral loss (Schedler, 2013).[43] This distinction dramatically affects calculations regimes make to retain power. Competitive regimes frequently needing to find ways to outmanoeuvre or bargain with the opposition, while hegemonic regimes are more concerned with preventing defections from

[42] Currently only two countries on the continent, Eritrea and South Sudan, do not hold national elections with the stated aim of selecting the leadership of the country.
[43] Instead hegemonic regimes are at risk of weakening and losing their hegemonic status. Only once this status is lost do the regimes risk replacement by the political opposition. Examples include the PRI in Mexico, KANU in Kenya and PS in Senegal.

within the regime or countering opposing factions within the regime (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011).

The primary factors used to distinguish hegemonic from competitive regimes are control of seats in the legislature and regime-longevity (Morse, 2012; Schedler, 2013; Bogaards, 2004). Control of the legislature indicates the ability of the regime to dictate legislation, the degree of threat posed by the opposition and guide electoral outcomes through legitimate support or manipulation (Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2013). Regime longevity is indicative of its ability to hold on to power and the degree to which the ruling party or leader is perceived as the status quo by the public and elites (Magaloni, 2006; Posner and Young, 2007; Greene, 2007).

5.2.5 The threat of elections

Elections are a source of uncertainty for leaders. Leaders in Africa frequently use their power over the resources of the state to minimise the risk posed by electoral competition (Levitsky and Way, 2002). In spite of the advantages of incumbency, seventeen leaders standing for re-election have been voted out of office between 1990 and 2016, and many more open-seat contests have resulted in the incumbent party losing power (Cheeseman, 2010; Bell, 2016).

Leaders can instigate changes to the ruling coalition to widen its electoral base. Expanding the size of the ruling coalition will reduce the number of excluded elites who could aid the opposition. Pursuing a strategy of co-option through expansion can fragment the opposition and prevent the formation of opposition coalitions (Ash, 2015; Schedler, 2010; Wahman, 2013). Opposition parties in Africa frequently rely on a narrow, often ethnically determined, base of support (Wahman, 2017; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). Ethnicised opposition parties are of little threat electorally, but if they form coalitions with other opposition parties, they can become a severe threat (Arriola 2013; Wahman, 2013). Creating a more ethnically inclusive coalition may widen the regime's electoral base, limit the appeal of ethnically focussed opposition parties and foster splits in the opposition. Existing studies have demonstrated that in the run-up to elections, leaders frequently focus on securing votes from unaligned or 'swing' groups, while co-ethnics are deemed a captured constituency (Hassan, 2017; Baldwin, 2014; Wahman and Boone, 2018).

However, the threat to leaders posed by elections is not equally distributed throughout the continent. The need to create a larger and more inclusive coalition will be heavily dependent on the strength of the regime. Leaders will only need to expand the ruling coalition pre-elections if the regime faces a real threat of replacement.

Many states in Africa have been ruled by a single leader or party for multiple decades[44] who have retained power through mobilisation of the voting public, the lack of viable opposition parties or electoral manipulation and repression (Hassan, 2017; Schedler, 2010; Magaloni, 2006). A defining feature of these hegemonic regimes is that they face no immediate threat from the democratic opposition, and voters face little choice but to vote for the incumbent, the opposition in protest or abstain from voting (Schedler, 2013; Bratton et al., 2012). Any pre-electoral volatility in the cabinets of hegemonic regimes is more likely due to factionalism and intra-party divisions stoked by the primary elections than attempts to counter the democratic opposition (Köllner and Basedau, 2005). Competitive regimes, in contrast, face a real risk of losing to the opposition, even if they engage in electoral manipulation (Schedler, 2013). Consequently, the need to expand the coalition in response to external threats may be limited to competitive regimes, while stronger regimes may not opt to expand the coalition in the run up to elections. This will be reflected by cabinets in competitive regimes being larger and more inclusive in the pre-electoral period than at other times.

Hypothesis 2: Leaders in competitive regimes will increase the size and inclusivity of the cabinet before elections. This relationship will not occur in hegemonic regimes.

5.2.6 Threat of economic downturn

Poor economic performance and low or negative economic growth presents a two-fold threat to the leader: restriction of resources available for patronage for included coalition members and loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Patronage resources are crucial in the formation of an intra-elite bargain and for retaining the support of insiders who secure the leader's incumbency (Arriola, 2009; Van de Walle, 2003; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Lindemann, 2011b). Threats to the supply well of patronage will weaken 'instrumental' support for the regime from elites and stability of the coalition securing the leader (Schedler, 2013).

For voters, economic performance is a key metric used to decide whether or not to support the incumbent regime, and it typically overrides other concerns about ethnicity and patronage (Bratton et al., 2012). Rulers who have lost legitimacy in the eyes of the public are more at risk of being displaced by rivals, as a new regime will likely be welcomed by the public at large (Lindemann, 2011b; Langer, 2005; Alesina et al., 1996; De Mesquita et al., 2005).

The threat posed to leaders by economic crises, like the threat of elections, is affected by the strength of the regime. In hegemonic regimes, longer tenures and the lack of a threatening opposition means that rulers have more opportunity to accumulate 'slack resources' which can be used to maintain their

[44] As of the beginning of 2018, eighteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are run by parties which were in power in the 1990s and nine countries are run by leaders who were in power during the 1990s

coalition during crisis periods (De Mesquita, 2005). In contrast, rulers in competitive regimes have less opportunities to create reserves of resources for patronage (*ibid.*). Schedler (2013) succinctly outlines the contrast between the vulnerability of competitive and hegemonic regimes to economic shocks:

> "Less dependent on their medium-term performance, competitive regimes earn the fruits of current bonanzas and fall victims of present crises. Less dependent on short-term success, hegemonic regimes earn the fruits of past achievements and fall victims of medium-term failure."

In cases where economic crises are an immediate threat to the leader's patronage resources, expanding the coalition can exacerbate the existing problem of reduced patronage to coalition members and increase the chance of defection or rebellion by disenchanted insiders. A narrowing of the ruling coalition can allow the leader to distribute more to those who remain inside of the ruling coalition and enhance their loyalty (De Mesquita et al., 2005). In competitive regimes, this may take the form of leaders jettisoning elites and ethnic groups deemed unnecessary to their political survival from the cabinet while increasing the representation of their co-ethnics in an effort to retain the support of their core-constituency. Conversely, good economic performance should enable leaders in competitive regimes to use the 'bonanza' to create larger and more inclusive coalitions.

Hegemonic regimes, which have a higher capacity to hoard resources, should be able to maintain the size of the coalition. Poor economic performance may encourage insiders to leave the party while capitalising on popular discontent and can precipitate the loss of the regime's hegemonic status (Reuter and Gandhi, 2011; Schedler, 2013). Leaders in hegemonic regimes may counter this threat by creating a larger and more representative cabinet.

Hypothesis 3a: Leaders in competitive regimes will shrink the size and the inclusivity of the cabinet during times of economic stress, compared to periods of high growth. Leaders in competitive regimes will increase the size and inclusivity of the cabinet during times of high economic growth.

Hypothesis 3b: Leaders in hegemonic regimes will maintain or expand the size and inclusivity of their cabinet during times of economic stress.

5.3 Data and methodology

The hypotheses are tested using the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (ACPED), a dataset of cabinet members and positions by month across African states. ACPED's unit of analysis is the cabinet minister by month. Each minister is included with the associated information: gender, political affiliation, ethnicity and regional background. ACPED represents an improvement on existing elite datasets by offering multiple cleavages—party, ethnic and regional—and providing a monthly record of cabinet shifts. Cabinets in Africa routinely experience multiple reshuffles a year. Out of the eighteen countries included in this study, approximately 14 percent of country-years had more than one major

reshuffle and 29 percent had more than one minor change within the cabinet. Similarly, 19.2 percent of ministers recorded in the ACPED data have a tenure lasting less than a year, meaning that these ministers could be missed altogether by an annual recording. Consequently, annual recording of cabinets would miss a large degree of volatility within the cabinet.

ACPED also assigns posts different levels of importance, as certain posts belong to the 'inner circle'. The concept of the inner circle is used in the existing literature to evaluate whether leaders implement a policy of inclusion or exclusion to the posts that hold significant political or administrative power (Lindemann, 2011a; Francois et al., 2015). Posts determined to be part of the inner circle typically involve control over the security forces, the state's revenue or its sources and the implementation of law. As a result, the following posts are typically perceived to be part of the inner circle: vice-president or prime minister, finance, foreign affairs, justice, defence, internal security/home affairs and oil/mineral resources (if the country is a major exporter) (*ibid.*). In contrast the 'outer circle' typically involves portfolios tied to service provision or cultural issues such as education, infrastructure, labour and culture/heritage. These positions are not without influence and can provide important avenues of patronage or enrichment but are less able to constrain or threaten the leader (Indridason and Kam, 2008; Burgess et al., 2015; Thomson, 2010). Separating posts into inner and outer circle allows us to see whether changes and volatility within the cabinet in the run up to elections or during economic downturns affects only the most important posts of the cabinet or is limited to the more cosmetic posts.

Eighteen countries are included in the analysis: Cameroon, Burundi, Botswana, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The unit of analysis is each cabinet-month for each country. The following measures are derived from the ACPED data.

There are a total of 4032 observations. The analyses will exclude observations which take place in the immediate aftermath of a change in leadership or during a unity government. Cabinets formed after changes in leadership are excluded because the focus of this study is on how leaders adapt their ruling coalitions to deal with political threats. Unity governments, which are enforced by internationally brokered peace settlements, typically assign the type and number of ministries occupied by the different parties, meaning that the composition of the cabinet is not entirely dictated by the political calculations of the leaders. This reduces the total number of observations to 3987.

Table 5.1 - Variables derived from ACPED

Variable	Description
Cabinet/Inner Circle/Outer Circle Size	This variable captures the total size of the cabinet, inner circle and outer circle for each month.
Remains/Reshuffled/Entering/Leaving Cabinet	These variables capture the number of ministers who entered the cabinet, left the cabinet, were reshuffled to another post or retained their post during a reshuffle.
Representation	Government 'representation' is assessed by calculating the share of total national ethno-political populations who have an associated elite in the cabinet. The aggregated total for groups and regions in cabinet is divided by the total number of relevant ethno-political groups within the country. The index assumes a value between 0 and 100, where 100 means total representation of all groups in the population. This variable is applied to the whole cabinet, the inner circle and the outer circle.
Disproportion	The disproportion measure calculates whether representatives in a cabinet have a share of the seats that reflects their ethno-political or regional population. The measure is an indication of whether power in a cabinet is balanced between included groups and adapted from studies by Samuels and Snyder (2001).[45] $DIS = (\frac{1}{2}) \sum_{i=1}^{n} \lvert x_i - y_i \rvert$ Sigma indicates the summation over all provinces i, xi is the percentage of all cabinet positions allocated to province i, and yi is the percentage of population living in province i. This measure is applied only to identity groups occupying at least one post within the cabinet
New Ethnic Group/New Ethnic Group Inner Circle	This dummy variable takes a 1 if a new ethnic group is included in the cabinet during a reshuffle and a 0 if no new groups are included. The variable is also applied to the inner circle. Groups can be counted as entering the inner circle from being reshuffled in from the outer circle.
Exit Ethnic Group/Exit Ethnic Group Inner Circle	This dummy variable takes a 1 if a previously included ethnic group is removed from the cabinet during a reshuffle and a 0 if all previously included groups remain after the reshuffle. The variable is also applied to the inner circle. Groups can be counted as exiting the inner circle from being reshuffled to the outer circle.
Leader's Co-Ethnic Representation	Captures the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by ministers from the same ethnic group as the current president.
Major Reshuffle/Minor Reshuffle/Any Reshuffle	Assigns a dummy variable for a cabinet-month in which there is a reshuffle. A major reshuffle is defined as one involving six or more changes in the form of appointments, dismissals or resignations and reappointments. Minor reshuffles involve between one and five such changes. The Any Reshuffle variable assigns a dummy in the case of a major or a minor reshuffle.

[45] A score of 10 would indicate that 10 percent of cabinet posts are allocated to groups that would not receive them if posts were distributed purely on population.

5.3.1 Determining regime strength

Regime strength can be measured through a number of metrics such as repressive capacity, sources of finance or popularity. A common measure for regime strength in countries that run at least nominal elections, as all countries in our sample do, is how many seats in the legislature are occupied by the regime (Morse, 2012; Raleigh and Dowd, 2018; Schedler, 2013).

This study opts to use Schedler's (2013) classification in which a hegemonic regime must hold over two-thirds of the seats in parliament (lower house if bicameral legislature) and have held power for at least 10 years. This classification has two advantages. Firstly, it classifies based on two sources of power: dominance of the legislature and regime longevity. Secondly, many theorists disagree about the thresholds used to define hegemonic regimes with suggested thresholds varying between 50 percent and 75 percent (Morse, 2012; Bogaards, 2004).

Schedler's classification was originally used in a study focussing on 'electoral autocracies' buthas subsequently been imposed upon a range of countries which vary in their level of democratisation. Morse (2012) argues that the application of longevity or electoral dominance thresholds often do not capture whether a regime is democratic or autocratic. A regime that dominates elections and representative institutions may do so through fraud or gerrymandering – as in Cameroon (Ochient'Opalo, 2012) – or through a sufficiently mobilised populace who vote for the incumbent– such as Tanzania's ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi in the mid-2000s (Van de Walle, 2007). Therefore, this thesis argues therefore that categorisations such as democratic/autocratic are generally insufficient to capture regime strength. Instead, longevity shows that a regime is considered the 'status quo' (Green, 2007), while control over the legislature grants the regime the freedom to draft laws to enhance its power (Ochient'Opalo, 2012). This study is concerned how these strengths (or lack thereof) interact with times of political stress, rather than whether the strength derives from democratic or autocratic power.

This classification results in 3097 cabinet-month observations for competitive regimes and 1439 for hegemonic regimes.[46]

[46] When observations taking place after a change in leader or a unity government are excluded, this number is reduced to 2625 observations for competitive regimes and 1362 for hegemonic regimes.

5.3.2 Independent variables

There are two main variables of interest: economic performance and the presence of upcoming elections.

5.3.2.1 Political

Variables indicating the various contexts of the political landscape are implemented as dummy variables attached to the relevant monthly cabinet observations. These dummy variables are explained in table 5.2 below.

Table 5.2 – Political Context Dummy Variables

Dummy Variable	Description
Before parliamentary/presidential/any election	Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the year before an election. Separate dummies for presidential and parliamentary elections.
After parliamentary/presidential/any election	Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after an election, including the month of the election. Separate dummies for presidential and parliamentary elections.
After Election – No Change in Leadership	Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after an election, including the month of the election, in which the incumbent leader retained the presidency.
After Election – Change in Leadership	Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after an election, including the month of the election, in which there was a change in leader. This includes observations in which the incumbent party retains power but is headed by a different leader.
Change in leader	Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after a new person occupies the presidency (or highest executive office). This includes any change in leader including replacement through election, coup, party succession or the implementation of a transitional government.
Democratic Change in Power	Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after a new person occupies the presidency (or highest executive office) through electoral victory. This includes observations in which the ruling party remains the same but with a different individual as president.
Non-Democratic Change in Power	Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after a new person occupies the presidency (or highest executive office) through non-democratic means such as a coup or rebellion.
Unity government	Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after the implementation of a unity government. A unity government is defined as a power-sharing arrangement in which cabinet posts are shared as part of an internationally brokered peace deal. It does not include instances in which the leader decides to incorporate opposition politicians into the cabinet without a peace agreement.

5.3.2.2 Economic

Data on economic performance is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators, specifically the annual GDP growth per capita. Growth is chosen in place of aggregate GDP or GDP per capita, as growth is more commonly used as a measure to indicate the economic health of a country with

recessions and slumps being defined as poor or negative growth rather than low GDP (Thomas and Dimsdale, 2010). The following variables are derived from the economic data.

Table 5.3 – Economic Variables

Variable	Description
GDP Growth	The annual growth in GDP for that year
Low Growth Year	A dummy marking the five lowest years of growth for each country
High Growth Year	A dummy marking the five highest years of growth for each country

Table 5.4 shows the means, standard deviations and standard deviation in country means for the main variables. Cabinets show a high degree of volatility in size varying from 0 when the leader dissolves the cabinet and leaves all posts vacant to 47. This volatility is mainly driven by expansion and contraction within the outer circle. The average cabinet size also varies significantly across the eighteen countries, with Cameroon having an average cabinet size of 37.44 and Liberia an average of 22.04. The mean level of representation in the data is 75.64 with a standard deviation of 15.25, demonstrating that African cabinets generally represent the majority of relevant ethnic categories within the cabinet and exclusionary governments are rare. The inner circle is generally less representative than the outer circle. The leader's co-ethnics typically occupy approximately a quarter of the cabinet. The higher average representation of the leader's co-ethnics within the inner circle reflects the importance of controlling these posts.

The economic data shows a high degree of volatility in terms of GDP growth and changes in growth year on year. There is also a wide variance between countries, with Zimbabwe experiencing an average growth rate of -0.17 percent and Uganda averaging 6.23 percent growth. Economic growth is more volatile in competitive regimes, which have a standard deviation of 7.85 percent, as compared to hegemonic regimes, which have a standard deviation of 3.23 percent. All countries experience positive and negative changes in GDP. Even if certain countries under study escape severe recessions, the volatility in the growth rate means that countries, and their leaders, face varying economic circumstances. Low and high growth years represent a quarter of observations each.

Table 5.4 – Descriptive statistics of main variables

Variable	Mean	Min	Max	Standard Deviation	Variance Across Countries
Total Cabinet Size	26.523	1	47	6.773	5.159
Inner Circle Size	7.168	1	13	2.040	1.762
Outer Circle Size	19.352	0	36	6.444	4.996
Representation	75.640	6.250	100	15.254	13.047
Inner Circle Representation	45.708	6.250	100	19.146	17.299
Outer Circle Representation	68.643	0	100	18.490	16.212
Disproportion Cabinet	24.920	7.850	51.167	7.893	5.637
Disproportion Inner Circle	27.765	1.167	67.933	8.986	5.802
Disproportion Outer Circle	25.610	7.074	100	8.264	5.340
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation	25.947	0	64.706	15.282	13.499
Leader Co-Ethnic Inner Circle Representation	27.102	0	83.333	20.369	15.090
Leader Co-Ethnic Outer Circle Representation	25.547	0	75	16.228	13.507
GDP Growth	4.993	-36.700	106.280	6.667	2.273
Change in GDP Growth	-0.173	-76.072	94.159	7.475	0.630
Low Growth Year	0.213	0	1	0.410	0.042
High Growth Year	0.247	0	1	0.431	0.021
Below Mean Level Growth	0.488	0	1	0.500	0.139
Below Median Level Growth	0.468	0	1	0.499	0.037
Before Any Election	0.238	0	1	0.426	0.044
Before Presidential Election	0.192	0	1	0.394	0.047
Before Parliamentary Election	0.196	0	1	0.397	0.055
Any Reshuffle	0.146	0	1	0.353	0.048
Major Reshuffle	0.056	0	1	0.229	0.019
Minor Reshuffle	0.091	0	1	0.287	0.036

Pre-electoral cabinets represent approximately a quarter of observations but are slightly more common in competitive regimes. General elections, including both parliamentary and presidential elections typically, form 56.72 percent of observations.

Approximately 15 percent of observations involve a major or minor reshuffle, showing that ruling coalitions are reviewed regularly by the leader. Minor reshuffles are more common with major reshuffles occurring less frequently. Competitive regimes engage in minor reshuffles more regularly than hegemonic regimes, perhaps reflecting their greater vulnerability.

5.3.3 Statistical Methodology

The relationships between the ACPED and explanatory variables will be largely explored through a mixture of descriptive statistics, simple regressions and permutation tests. Many of the continuous variables in the data violate the assumption of the normal distribution, equal sample sizes and homogeneity of variance (see appendix table 2). Though Welch's test is deemed robust against these assumptions and recommended as the default test for comparing two samples, permutations offer a more robust method of testing (Kohr and Games, 1974; Erikson et al., 2010). Permutation tests entail taking an observed test statistic, such as a difference in means between two categories, and repeatedly

randomising the allocation of the categories and resampling the statistic. A distribution of test statistics is constructed from the resampling procedure along with the likelihood of getting the observed statistic through random chance.

Permutation tests are a robust method, as the randomisation process accounts for issues arising from clustering or non-normalities in the data (Erikson et al., 2010). Though frequently used in biology and economics, permutation tests are beginning to be used in the humanities to examine elections, regime capacity and parliaments (Erikson et al., 2010; Wilkins, 2012; Eck, 2018). Permutation tests will be run firstly on the difference in means between variables observed during 'crisis periods' and other observations and then rerun using t-statistics derived from Welch's two-sample test (figures 4 to 8 in appendix). The former test shows not just the significance but also the magnitude of the crisis period's effect on cabinet composition. The latter test is less illustrative but more robust (Erikson et al., 2010).

5.4 Results and discussion

5.4.1 Volatility

The first hypothesis tested is whether the chosen crisis periods—pre-electoral periods and periods of low growth—prompt leaders to dramatically reconfigure their ruling coalitions. Table 5.5 shows a series of logistics regressions testing whether reshuffles are more common during the chosen crisis periods, result in a greater turnover of personnel and result in a change in ethnic composition. The models were run using fixed effects on country and time to account for geographical and temporal variance. The independent variables show no evidence of strong correlation (see appendix table 3).

The models 1 and 2 include all observations, and the dependent variable is the occurrence of a major or minor reshuffle. The dependent variable for model 3 restricts the observations to just reshuffles; the dependent variable is the occurrence reshuffles in which under two thirds of the ministers maintain their position (the 25^{th} percentile of all observations containing a reshuffle). This is to capture the volatility of the reshuffles in terms of personnel. Likewise, models 4 to 7 restrict observations to reshuffles, and the dependent variable indicates whether the reshuffle resulted in ethnic groups entering/exiting the cabinet or inner circle.

The models show elections to be a stabilising, rather than destabilising, influence with cabinets experiencing less change in pre-electoral periods. Models 1 and 2 show that cabinets are not significantly more likely to experience a reshuffle during the run up to elections. Model 3 indicates that any reshuffles that do occur before elections involve less change in personnel. Models 4 to 7 show that these reshuffles are not more likely to involve the incorporation of new ethnic groups or the exclusion of previously included ethnic groups. Consequently, there is no support for the hypothesis that the cabinet experiences more volatility in the pre-electoral period.

The reduced volatility in the pre-electoral period may be because leaders opt not to introduce change during periods in which ruling coalition unity is important (Cheeseman, 2010; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992). Ministerial reshuffles create winners and losers which can raise political tensions within the incumbent's support network (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).

Table 5.5 – Volatility by political binaries and economic growth
Full model fixed effects – all regimes

	Dependent variable:						
	Major Reshuffle	Minor Reshuffle	Mass Change in Personnel	New Group	New Group Inner Circle	Exit Group	Exit Group Inner Circle
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Before Any Election	-0.278	-0.007	-0.777**	-0.162	-0.039	-0.116	-0.151
	(0.166)	(0.130)	(0.289)	(0.294)	(0.257)	(0.304)	(0.261)
Growth Category - Low Growth	0.231	0.204	-0.185	0.273	0.536	0.082	0.498
	(0.198)	(0.171)	(0.313)	(0.334)	(0.308)	(0.354)	(0.305)
Growth Category - High Growth	0.145	0.058	0.097	0.119	0.184	0.358	0.091
	(0.164)	(0.139)	(0.268)	(0.298)	(0.267)	(0.304)	(0.266)
After Election – No Change in Leader	0.576***	-0.285	1.570***	1.075***	0.743**	0.879**	0.464
	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.257)	(0.290)	(0.271)	(0.300)	(0.270)
After Election – Change in Leader	0.773***	-0.057	1.506***	1.006**	1.131***	1.280***	1.161***
	(0.220)	(0.226)	(0.330)	(0.351)	(0.318)	(0.348)	(0.317)
Non-Democratic Change in Power	1.450***	0.304	1.892***	1.206*	0.943	1.531**	0.645
	(0.335)	(0.396)	(0.509)	(0.554)	(0.483)	(0.581)	(0.477)
Unity Government	0.599*	-0.342	0.914	0.701	0.573	0.372	0.203
	(0.298)	(0.354)	(0.489)	(0.563)	(0.503)	(0.630)	(0.504)
Months Since Last Reshuffle	0.044***	0.002					
	(0.011)	(0.011)					
Constant	-3.781***	-3.056***	-1.091	-0.929	-0.399	-2.072**	-1.079
	(0.545)	(0.484)	(0.710)	(0.729)	(0.656)	(0.795)	(0.693)
Observations	4,411	4,411	708	712	712	712	712
Log Likelihood	-1,014.117	-1,299.134	-336.153	-286.638	-347.079	-269.339	-345.422
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,120.234	2,690.269	762.307	663.276	784.158	628.677	780.844
Note:	*p**p***p<0.001						

Similarly, low growth does not result in a higher incidence of reshuffles. This is surprising given the wealth of evidence that poor growth weakens an incumbent's hold on power (Alesina et al., 1996; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011). Given the importance of economic performance to African voters and the degree to which government waste figures in opposition rhetoric, it would be expected that poor growth would lead to more regular and volatile change within the ruling coalition as leaders try to mollify

public discontent while minimising internal threats. The models in table 5.5 show that there is little support for H1A or H1B.

Instead, most of the volatility occurs during changes in leadership, either through election or a non-democratic change, or in the aftermath of elections in which the incumbent retained the presidency. It would be expected that changes in leadership result in volatile cabinet reshuffles, but the volatile change that follows an election in which the leader retains power indicates that leaders use electoral results as a signal on how to best change their coalition to ensure political survival (Van De Walle, 2007; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). This effect is present for both competitive and hegemonic regimes and presents an avenue for future research.

5.4.2 Pre-election vs other observations

A comparison of the means between cabinets in the 12 months before an election and other observations suggests that there is support for hypothesis 2 (see table 5.6). The observed differences in means are then compared against 10000 permutations in which the assignment of pre-electoral cabinets is randomised. The resulting histogram of randomised results is then used to determine whether the observed differences in means are significant. These significance levels are shown in table 5.6 while figures 5.1 and 5.2 visualise a portion of the permutation tests. The dotted red line represents the observed test-statistic (in this case the difference in means), while the histogram shows the difference in means across 10000 randomised assignments. The visualisation of all permutation tests described in table 5.6 can be seen in the appendix (figures 1 and 2).

In competitive regimes, cabinets tend to be larger and more proportionate during pre-electoral periods. The differences in means are typically small, but permutation tests show the differences in cabinet size, disproportion and presence of the leader's co-ethnics in the outer circle to be significant.[47] The inner circle, however, becomes significantly less representative suggesting leaders restrict the inner circle to core allies. Overall, the cabinet is not significantly more representative in the run-up to elections, but the leader's co-ethnics have less of a presence in the cabinet. This suggests leaders in competitive regimes may not seek to widen their electoral base by representing more distinct groups but rather foster a more equitable relationship with key allied groups to retain their loyalty. However, the small magnitude of the differences between pre-electoral periods and other observations shows that overall competitive regimes avoid making seismic changes to their ruling coalition in the run-up to elections (supporting the findings in table 5.5).

[47] It is expected that any differences would be small as mass reshuffles are significantly less likely in pre-electoral periods (see table 5.5). This is especially true for competitive regimes (see appendix table 5).

Table 5.6 – Cabinet Variable Means Pre-Election vs Other Observations – Hegemonic and Competitive Observations

Variables	Before Election Competitive Regimes	Other Observations Competitive Regimes	Competitive Regime Permutation Significance	Before Election Hegemonic Regimes	Other Observations Hegemonic Regimes	Hegemonic Regime Permutation Significance
Cabinet Size	26.54	25.83	<.01	27.11	27.64	0.33
Inner Circle Size	7.02	6.85	<0.05	7.51	7.76	0.09
Outer Circle Size	19.52	18.98	<0.05	19.61	19.87	0.09
Representation Cabinet	76.3	76.99	0.305	74.23	73.12	0.281
Representation Inner Circle	44.12	45.96	<0.05	47.49	45.72	0.251
Representation Outer Circle	69.58	70.58	0.224	65.78	65.27	0.669
Disproportion Cabinet	24.53	25.26	<0.05	26.11	24.2	<0.001
Disproportion Inner Circle	27.21	27.88	0.062	30.18	27.21	<0.001
Disproportion Outer Circle	25.13	25.63	0.195	26.12	25.72	0.425
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation	24.93	26.58	<0.05	27.36	25	<0.05
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Inner Circle	27.78	27.22	0.546	28.57	26.05	0.059
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Outer Circle	24.03	26.43	<0.01	26.91	24.46	<0.05

In contrast, leaders in hegemonic regimes do not create larger and more inclusive cabinets during pre-electoral periods. While cabinets do not shift in size, they do become more disproportionate and the leader's co-ethnics appear to gain representation in the inner circle. These changes reflect the lack of immediate threat elections pose to the leader or regime (Schedler, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2002). The lack of viable alternatives to the incumbent leader or regime means that hegemonic regimes do not feel the pressure to entice voters or elites with larger, more inclusive or more balanced cabinets.

The pre-electoral increase in disproportion and leader co-ethnics in the inner circle could reflect the threats leaders in hegemonic regimes face from rival elites or factions within the ruling party (Reuter and Gandhi, 2011; Köllner and Basedau, 2005). Factionalism within the ruling party is frequently heighted during electoral primaries in which regime candidates are chosen (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Lodge, 2005). The increase in leader co-ethnics within the inner circle and the cabinet-wide increase in disproportion in the allocation of posts in the run up to elections could show attempts by leaders to elevate their own network within the regime and to ward off internal rivals. The fact that these differences in means can be quite substantial (with inner circle disproportion increasing by 3 percent and the representation leader's co-ethnics increasing by approximately 2.5 percent) shows that in contrast to competitive regimes, leaders in hegemonic regimes have the latitude to make more dramatic changes pre-election.[48]

[48] Unlike competitive regimes, hegemonic regimes are not less likely to have mass reshuffles in the 12 months before an election.

There is limited support for H2 as competitive regimes, though they do on average have slightly larger and more proportionately allocated cabinets, appear to prioritise stability in pre-electoral periods over drastic changes to the cabinet. Hegemonic regimes, contrary to expectation, appear comparatively more volatile. This volatility, however, is related to within-regime competition rather than attempts to enhance the regime's appeal to outside elites or the electorate.[49]

[49] These findings are identical when the permutation tests are rerun with Welch's t-test (see appendix figures 1 and 2).

Figure 5.1 – Pre-Electoral Permutation Tests Competitive Regimes



Figure 5.2 – Pre-Electoral Permutation Tests Hegemonic Regimes



5.4.3 Economic performance

A cross-country analysis shows that GDP growth has a weak correlation with all cabinet variables (see figure 5.3). Countries with low or negative growth are able to maintain a large or representative cabinet in spite of economic restrictions. Africa is notable for having many long-serving leaders or ruling parties who have managed to retain power and maintain extensive patronage networks in spite of economic constraints and poor economic growth (Green, 2010; Felter, 2017).

Figure 5.3 – Cabinet Variables Against GDP Growth



Though the effect is slight, there is a negative correlation (-.0.02) between cabinet size and GDP growth with poorer economies sustaining larger cabinets. Representation, disproportion and leader co-ethnic representation all have correlations of less than 0.1, showing that economic forces do not guide cabinet composition when examining across countries. In contrast, if economic performance is categorised in relative terms of high and low growth within each country, and observations are split between hegemonic and competitive regimes a clearer pattern emerges. Table 5.7 shows that competitive regimes, in accordance with H3A, create smaller, less representative cabinets during periods of low growth and larger, more inclusive cabinets during periods of high growth. The cabinet contracts on

average by three spaces and experiences a four percent decrease in representation when the economy moves from high to low growth.

Table 5.7 - Cabinet Variable Means by Growth Category

Variables	Low Growth Competitive Regimes	High Growth Competitive Regimes	Competitive Regime Permutation Significance	Low Growth Hegemonic Regimes	High Growth Hegemonic Regimes	Hegemonic Regime Permutation Significance
Cabinet Size	24.53	27.95	<0.001	26.92	26.55	0.811
Inner Circle Size	7.11	7.16	<0.001	7.47	7.93	<0.05
Outer Circle Size	17.43	20.79	<0.001	19.45	18.62	<0.05
Representation Cabinet	74.79	78.96	<0.001	72.77	72.99	0.569
Representation Inner Circle	47.79	46.5	0.992	45.62	44.62	0.977
Representation Outer Circle	65.7	73.72	<0.001	63.23	64.27	0.127
Disproportion Cabinet	25.91	23.25	<0.001	26.92	23.43	<0.001
Disproportion Inner Circle	28.14	27.78	0.08	31.25	25	<0.001
Disproportion Outer Circle	25.15	24.4	<0.05	27.11	26.01	0.126
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation	25.23	28.37	<0.001	26.8	24.27	0.153
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Inner Circle	28	29.43	0.152	29.8	21.42	<0.001
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Outer Circle	23.81	28.22	<0.001	25.99	24.29	0.879

Permutation tests were run, randomly reassigning the categories of low growth years from high growth years and comparing the observed difference in means between high and low growth years against the simulated runs.Visualisations of all tests shown in table 5.7 are in the appendix (figures 3 and 4). Figure 5.4 shows that in competitive regimes, cabinets are significantly smaller, less representative and more disproportionate during low growth years. These differences are largely driven by changes to the outer circle. Politics in competitive regimes is often more polarised around ethnicity, with regimes and parties appealing to a particular selection of ethnic groups (Wahman, 2017; Eifert et al., 2010; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). As a regime can rarely secure an electoral victory by relying on the support of a single group, many regimes are formed as ethnic-congress parties or multi-ethnic coalitions of ethnically-based parties (Carbone, 2007; Arriola, 2013). As a result, leaders in competitive regimes may need to figure which ethnic constituencies within the ruling coalition are not necessary for political survival when patronage resources become scarce. This contraction does not extend to the inner circle, suggesting that leaders do not want to alienate important allied ethnic groups. Conversely, leaders take advantage of the large amount of patronage generated by high growth to expand the ruling coalition by increasing the cabinet's size and ethnic representation while reducing disproportion. This expansion coincides with a significant increase in the leader's co-ethnics in the outer circle, suggesting that high growth enables leaders to expand their network to include new groups and elites while rewarding their co-ethnics.

Figure 5.4 – Economic Performance Permutation Tests Competitive Regimes



Figure 5.5 – Economic Performance Permutation Tests Hegemonic Regimes



In contrast, hegemonic regimes do not significantly change cabinet size or representation during periods of poor economic performance. This provides partial support for H3B, but the cabinet does not significantly increase in terms of size or ethnic representation.[50] Authoritarian regimes frequently rely on 'performance legitimacy' to maintain their control over the state and may avoid further eroding their legitimacy through narrowing their coalition (Schedler, 2013; Morse, 2012). Hegemonic regimes are particularly vulnerable to defections and internal rifts; leaders in hegemonic regimes are incentivised to minimise internal dissatisfaction. If hegemonic regimes are more able to accumulate slack resources necessary to maintain the cabinet without restricting patronage, narrowing the coalition would not be an optimal strategy as former insiders can gain new significance as opposition candidates when economic crisis damages the regime's legitimacy (Reuter and Gandhi, 2011). The reluctance to significantly expand the coalition may reflect that 'oversizing' a ruling coalition can also cause internal disatisfaction (Choi and Kim, 2018; De Mesquita et al., 2005). Table 5.7 shows that hegemonic regimes combine the matinenance of the cabinet with creating unbalanced inner circles dominated by their co-ethnics, rewarding their core supporters without narrowing the coalition.

These findings support the theory that when resources become scarce, leaders opt to narrow the coalition to keep core supporters on side (Choi and Kim, 2018; De Mesquita et al., 2005) but adds the caveat that this dynamic is restricted to competitive regimes where leaders are more dependent on their immediate economic circumstances for legitimacy and resources (Schedler, 2013).[51]

Lastly, this difference may be due to the fact that competitive regimes appear to have more volatile growth rates than hegemonic regimes, with more extreme low and high growth years.[52] As a result, in competitive regimes, years of poor economic performance represent a more drastic cut to the leader's resources and the capacity to maintain the coalition.

5.5 Conclusion

In demonstrating the different changes experienced by the cabinet in differing contexts, this study further adds to the growing pool of research which focusses on the importance of senior government positions in forging an intra-elite bargain (Arriola, 2009; Van de Walle, 2007; Roessler and Ohls, 2018; De Mesquita et al., 2005). The existing understanding is that leaders do not rule alone but rather survive through alliances and networks with other elites. Consequently, it is important to find metrics which can be used to empirically examine leaders' strategies of survival. Yet much of this research is

[50] Although hegemonic regimes are more likely to include a new ethnic group during reshuffles that occur during low growth years (see appendix table 6).
[51] These findings are identical when the permutation tests are rerun with Welch's t-test (see appendix figures 5 to 8).
[52] The mean low and high growth years for competitive regimes are -1.75 and 11.21 percent respectively, compared to 2.82 and 8.54 percent for hegemonic regimes.

synchronic and focuses on concepts of political survival without taking into consideration the variance in regime types and threats leaders face throughout the continent. Increasingly, research is coming to understand that political coalitions are not static but are subject to consistent change (Martinez-Gallardo, 2014). The nature of these changes in turn reflect the nature of the threats facing the leader and the capacity of the ruling regime to ward off these challenges (Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Roberts, 2015; Lindemann, 2011b). This study contributes to this growing body of research through examining how leaders change their coalition in response to two different crises and how these responses vary in accordance with their regime's strength.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the results. Firstly, leaders pursue different strategies in the allocation of cabinet posts depending on the nature of the threat. Leaders may pursue a strategy of co-option in some cases and exclusion in others. Secondly, leaders pursue different strategies based on the strength of the regime vis-à-vis other political actors. Leaders vulnerable to the electoral opposition will need to balance their coalition in a way which does not aid the opposition, while leaders in hegemonic regimes lack the impetus to employ this strategy. Leaders in competitive regimes are more likely to have to make difficult choices about who to oust and retain when the economy slows. Leaders in hegemonic regimes can rely on accumulated resources to maintain the size of the ruling coalition or reward co-ethnics to maintain order and unity when vulnerability is heightened. These findings raise the question about what other contexts cause a divergence in regime survival strategies and power sharing, opening the path to further research.

6.0 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains

6.1 Introduction

The existing literature on African governance holds two contrary positions on how regimes deal with rivals for power and opposition forces. Some theorists describe African regimes as broad-based coalitions which co-opt potential ethnic and political rivals by allocating government posts and access to state resources to survive (Dollbaum, 2017; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Lindemann, 2011b; Van de Walle, 2007). In contrast, others describe African regimes as exclusionary; core constituencies – such as party supporters or affiliated ethno-regional populations – are favoured to the detriment of other citizens, and groups associated with the political opposition are punished (Langer, 2005; Posner, 2007; Ndegwa, 1997). The wealth of literature on co-option, punishment regimes and exclusion demonstrates that these multiple strategies are regularly employed by African regimes, but the contexts in which one strategy is favoured over the other have yet to be examined.

Leaders do not rule alone or enjoy unbridled power. Rather leaders face constraints and threats from on their own support network and opposing elites (De Mesquita et al., 2005). An increasing body of research on electoral autocracies or hybrid regimes is examining how different constraints and threats – typified approximated by different subclasses of regime – result in different strategies of political survival (Schedler, 2013; Morse, 2012; Kroeger, 2018; Lust-Okar, 2004).

A key method for regimes to assess their strength, and that of rivals, is through elections. Incumbent regimes that retain power gain information regarding the regime's popular support, the strength of the opposition and which elites or subnational groups can bolster or challenge the ruling coalition (Miller, 2015; Gandhi and Lust-Oksar, 2009). Previous studies show that regimes use electoral results to guide their strategies in allocating public goods, rewarding loyal voters, punishing areas of opposition support, and seeking to co-opt the opposition's support base (Jablonski, 2014; Magaloni, 2006; Masaki, 2018). This study argues that electoral information can also be used to guide the regime's strategy of elite management and power sharing. In a number of African states, the regime's elite coalition strategy is estimated through changes in the size, political composition and ethnic composition of the executive.

Regimes in Africa vary in terms of strength, popular support and control over institutions. Some states – such as Tanzania, Uganda or Equatorial Guinea – have had sustained rule for multiple decades under a single individual or party which exerts tight control over all organs of the state (Cheeseman, 2010; Van de Walle, 2003; Ochieng'Opalo, 2012). Other states – such as Kenya, Sierra Leone or Senegal – have experienced multiple transitions of power and the executive maintaining tenuous control over other branches of government (Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; D'Arcy and Cornell, 2016; Posner and Young,

2007). These variations in regime strength govern what tactics are available to secure continued rule (Schedler, 2013).

Opposition parties in Africa also exhibit significant variation, ranging from institutionalised, longstanding parties to short-lived 'satellite parties' or coalitions of convenience (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Carbone, 2007; Van de Walle, 2007; Arriola, 2013). Accordingly, the comparative strength and unity of the opposition is considered a key variable in determining the longevity and accountability of the regime and the tactics used to ensure its survival (Arriola, 2013; Ladd, 2013; Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; Roberts, 2015; Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009).

This study fills the gap in the literature on African governance by expanding on regime strategies of survival and exploring how variations in regime and opposition strength influence which strategy is chosen. This paper theorises that variations in the political strength of the regime and the opposition influence whether regimes favour the strategies of co-option, punishment or exclusion post-election.

6.2 Electoral Autocracies; Hegemonic and Competitive Regimes

Since the third wave of democratisation in the 1990s, elections have become commonplace in Africa.[53] In spite of the widespread adoption of elections, the majority of regimes in Africa cannot be considered consolidated democracies. Out of the 262 elections recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2017, 236 contained some evidence of fraud or irregularity (Coppedge et al., 2017). In 87 of these cases, these irregularities significantly affected the outcome of the election (*ibid.*). Instead, the majority of regimes are considered 'electoral autocracies' in which the manipulation of institutions and the electoral process fail to qualify it as a consolidated democracy (Schedler, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2002).

Electoral autocracies can be further subdivided into different classifications based on the regime's longevity and its vulnerability to opposition parties or elites. The most common distinction is between competitive and hegemonic electoral autocracies. In competitive electoral autocracies the outcome of any election is uncertain, while in hegemonic electoral autocracies the victory of a regime is guaranteed (Schedler, 2013). The primary factors used to distinguish hegemonic from competitive electoral autocracies are control of seats in the legislature and the duration of the regime (Morse, 2012; Schedler, 2013; Bogaards, 2004). However, many theorists disagree about the thresholds used to define hegemonic regimes (see table 6.1).

[53] Currently only two countries on the continent, Eritrea and South Sudan, do not hold national elections with the stated aim of selecting the leadership of the country.

Table 6.1: Thresholds on classifying hegemonic regimes[54]

	Magaloni	Levitsky and Way	Howard and Roessler	Brownlee	Schedler
Legislative control	N/A	>70%	>70%	>75%	>66.66%
Duration	20 years	N/A	N/A	N/A	10 years

Control of legislative seats indicates that the regime can dictate the creation of laws without needing to bargain with other parties. Regimes which dominate a pliant legislature are able to draft laws which perpetuate their power, such as changes in constitutionally allowed term limits or electoral laws (Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; Posner and Young, 2007). The longevity of the regime is important in determining the public's perception of the regime as the status quo and the incumbent's invincibility to challengers (Greene, 2007). Schedler (2013) argues that a hegemonic regime's "strength feeds their longevity and their longevity feeds their continual strength." Because the focus of this study is on how regime strength vis-à-vis the opposition impacts post-election coalitions, the primary issue is regime strength rather than whether this strength is derived from democratic support or autocratic fraud/coercion.

The historical record of African regimes shows that regimes require both longevity and dominance of the parliament to be invulnerable to challengers. For example, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and Senegal's Socialist Party (PS) lost hegemonic control over the legislature and the ability to contain the opposition, which weakened throughout the 1990s. Both parties would be further weakened by succession crises which triggered defections from long-standing party elites, which in turn hastened the decline of the regime's hegemony and added to the ranks of the opposition (Cheeseman, 2010; Arriola, 2013; Kelly, 2018). Therefore the primary concern of hegemonic regimes is losing hegemonic status and becoming weakened over time.

Similarly, control of the legislature without longevity does not result in regime hegemony. This is shown by the brief legislative dominance of the Zambian Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in the 1990s after winning power from the former single-party ruler Kenneth Kaunda. The MMD won with a legislative seat share of 83 percent, which increased to 87 percent in 1996 (Ochieng'Opalo, 2012). As a new party, the MMD was not seen as the only potential regime by government elites or voters. By 2001, the MMD's dominance had been eroded by defections – who frequently ran as independents – and the emergence of popular opposition parties to 32.6 percent (*ibid.*). The party eventually lost to the rival Patriotic Front in 2011 after a succession of weak electoral victories. Less established regimes, even those which dominate the legislature, are vulnerable to a quick reversal of electoral fortunes. This difference in electoral vulnerability results in hegemonic and competitive regimes – and their opposition counter parts – engaging in different electoral strategies.

[54] From Morse (2012).

6.3 Hybrid Regimes and Elections in Africa

Since elections became the norm in Sub-Saharan Africa, an increasing number of regimes have lost power to opposition parties through electoral defeat (Goldsmith, 2001). However, not only do elections present a threat to regimes, but also act as a mechanism for the regime (if they retain power) to gain key information about support for opposition parties, the distribution of opposition votes and which subnational groups are loyal to the regime and the opposition, respectively (Cassani, 2017).[55]

Elections in Africa are commonly framed as one of the methods by which elites compete over access to state resources (Choi and Kim, 2018; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Van de Walle, 2007). Elites outside the regime can gain access by getting co-opted into the incumbent regime or replacing it. Consequently, electoral contests in Africa frequently feature 'recycled elites' – long-standing opposition politicians, disgruntled former government insiders or members of previous regimes – which compete for the presidency or leading parliamentary parties (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992). The importance of elites to galvanise support for or against the regime is demonstrated by the key role elite defections have played in the electoral downfall of regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Arriola, 2013; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011).

The political importance of elites in elections is partly due to their role as key representatives of subnational groups, which are either incorporated into or excluded from the regime (De Mesquita et al., 2005). In the immediate post-independence period, many ruling parties were broad-based alliances which governed through accommodating a coalition of elites that represented different subgroups within the country (Van de Walle, 2007). With the emergence of regular elections, regimes have engaged in different strategies of representation regarding the elite representatives of different ethno-regional groups.

Hegemonic regimes that face little threat of electoral loss continue to incorporate a wide array of subnational elites within their structures and draw support from many sections of society (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Carbone, 2007; Wahman, 2017). Examples include Tanzania's Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPDRF). Voters in hegemonic regimes typically have no choice but to vote for the incumbent, protest through voting for an opposition party or abstain (Bratton et al., 2012). In cases where the opposition has no chance to dislodge the regime, nominal opposition parties may act as satellites of the dominant party: non-regime elites may compete in elections to signal potential utility to the regime as vote suppliers in the hope of being co-opted into the government (Magaloni, 2006; Van

[55] This remains the case in spite of regimes frequently attempting to distort the vote. Regimes and leaders are generally unable to create completely fraudulent voting outcomes without suffering a destabilising crisis of legitimacy (Levistky and Way, 2002). The tactics used by regimes to tilt elections in their favour include violating the impartiality of electoral management bodies, gerrymandering, ballot stuffing, repression or the annulment of unfavourable results (Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; Resnick, 2017; Hassan, 2017; Fox, 1997; Ikpe, 2014).

de Walle, 2007; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Mozaffar et al., 2003). Parties and elites not seeking incorporation will be resigned to the role of 'perpetual opposition'[56] and adopt a confrontational stance against the regime without posing a serious political threat.

In cases where the regime faces a real possibility of losing power through elections – such as Ghana, Kenya and Ivory Coast – competing parties typically seek to align their electoral fortunes with a particular constellation of ethnic and regional groups (Langer, 2005; Laakso, 2007; Wahman, 2017). In these competitive political and electoral environments, voters are faced with a real choice and are more likely to vote in ethnic blocs (Posner, 2007; Eifert et al., 2010). Consequently, in competitive regimes, non-regime elites can form parties or coalitions with the intention of replacing the incumbent and granting fellow supporters – voters and elites – 'their turn to eat' (Langer, 2005; Ndegwa, 1997).

A major factor governing the efficacy of the opposition, apart from the status of the regime, is the unity or cohesion of opposition parties and elites. Existing research has shown that opposition coalitions or a monopolised opposition arena significantly increases the probability of a democratic transfer in power (Arriola, 2013; Wahman, 2013; Ladd, 2013). Competitive regimes have managed to retain power through encouraging the fragmentation of the opposition but have fallen when facing a dominant opposition party or coalition.[57] Formerly hegemonic regimes have similarly witnessed their electoral dominance eroded by a strong opposition candidate, and formerly 'perpetual opposition' candidates have come to power after the incumbent regime's status shifted from hegemonic to competitive.[58]

The electoral results enable regimes to estimate whether they can be classed as electorally vulnerable or hegemonic and the cohesion of the opposition. Existing research has demonstrated how the results of elections allow regimes to calibrate policies and the distribution of state resources to reward supporters and sway or punish potential opposition supporters (Magaloni, 2006; Jablonski, 2014; Miller, 2015; Masaki, 2018). However, the study of the relationship between electoral results and regime strategies of survival has not been applied to a leader's strategy of elite power sharing. No leader rules alone but instead relies on a coalition of elites to ensure political survival (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Elections provide a key instance in which leaders and regimes can assess the political threat posed by the opposition and remake the ruling coalition to diffuse threats through co-option, capitalising on opportunities by feeding the regime's core base or deterring opposition through punishment. These

[56] Examples include Kizza Besigye of Uganda, John Fru Ndi of Cameroon and Etienne Tshisekedi of Congo-Kinshasa.
[57] Illustrative of this dynamic is the KANU regime's retention of power in Kenya when facing a divided opposition in 1992 and 1997, only to fall to a coalition of opposition parties in 2002.
[58] Examples include the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front regime (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe, the PS regime in Senegal and the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) in Ivory Coast. Examples of perpetual opposition candidates who subsequently became leaders include Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Alpha Conde of Guinea, Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast and Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria.

various strategies, along with how they would visibly affect the ruling coalition, are outlined below as the politics of co-option, politics of the belly and the politics of punishment.

6.4 Politics of Co-Option, the 'Politics of the Belly' and the Politics of Punishment

Co-option is the process of tying relevant, often opposing, political actors to the regime. It is identified as an important tool by which regimes secure power and mitigate political threats (Gerschewski, 2013; Dollbaum, 2017; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Lindemann, 2011b; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Co-option can target mass voters through the allocation of public funds to opposition areas or increased social spending (Masaki, 2018; Miller, 2015; Jablonski, 2014). On the elite level, co-option can involve multiple strategies, such as allowing opposition parties a presence within state structures, granting regional powers and autonomy or offering non-regime elites positions within the senior government (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Roberts, 2015; Dollbaum, 2017).

The 'politics of the belly' represents the inverse of the politics of co-option, though the use of one strategy does not exclude the use of the other. It refers to the distribution of wealth or benefits by elites to a network of loyal backers which typically includes members of family, party or, in many cases, co-ethnics (Berman, 1998; Jablonski, 2014; Burgess et al., 2015). Studies show that particular groups disproportionately benefit, in terms of infrastructure and public goods, when a co-ethnic or co-regionalist is the president or in the cabinet (Burgess et al., 2015; Franck and Rainer, 2012; Kramon and Posner, 2013). Similarly, leaders may choose to over-represent their co-ethnics in senior government or military positions (Francois et al., 2015; Lindemann, 2011a; Roessler, 2011).

The 'politics of punishment' involves deterring the electorate from voting against the regime and political elites from either defecting from the ruling party or launching opposition parties (Magaloni, 2006; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014). It is frequently examined through a regime's use of repression or violence against opposition voters and elites (Ash, 2015; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; Bhasin and Gandhi, 2013). It can also refer to the exclusion of individuals and groups from benefiting from state patronage. For the population at large, this can manifest as the denial of public services to opposition voters (Magaloni, 2006; Miller, 2015; Horne, 2016). On the elite-level, leaders can exclude elites deemed suspect or those representing groups perceived as disloyal to the regime (Roessler, 2011; Langer, 2005; Boggero, 2009).

If elections act as a 'pricing mechanism' for rival political elites and parties, then variations in electoral outcomes, specifically in terms of opposition and regime strength, should cause different types of elite settlement post-election.

In competitive regimes, leaders face a real threat of replacement and may have to engage in power sharing with non-regime elites and ethnic groups outside of their core constituency (Roberts, 2015).

The degree to which co-option is necessary will depend on the cohesion of non-regime elites and parties. Regimes which already have a tenuous hold on power may have to engage in significant co-option if the election results indicate a potential defeat to a competent opposition in the future. Co-opting elites from the opposition can drive a wedge between hardliners and others, fracturing the opposition movement and reducing its effectiveness (Lust-Okar, 2004). Creating larger and more inclusive ruling coalitions can reduce the appeal of ethnically-based opposition parties, broaden the regime's support base and bring new constituencies or elites into the regime's patronage network (Cheeseman, 2011; Miller, 2015). The logic of using co-option when facing a strong opponent is demonstrated by the prevalence of post-electoral coalitions in closely fought run-off elections (Resnick, 2014). Post-election unity governments are an extreme example of this strategy. After close and violently contested elections, leaders and outside elites form a bargain which allows the incumbent to retain power while offering the opposition a stake in government (LeVan, 2011; Cheeseman, 2011).

In contrast, hegemonic regimes do not face an imminent threat of replacement and the same pressure to co-opt a cohesive opposition (Schedler, 2013). Furthermore, allowing opposition parties or elites to compete with the regime on equal or antagonistic terms brings the regime's hegemonic status into question (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni, 2006; Schedler, 2013).

H1: Competitive regimes will adjust their coalition post-election to engage in co-option if the opposition is cohesive. This will not apply to hegemonic regimes.

Political competition in Africa is frequently described as a case of 'winner takes all' (Langer, 2005; Laakso, 2007). This is particularly true in competitive regimes where certain constituencies or elites believe that they will receive fewer benefits from the state if the regime falls and is then replaced by the opposition, while groups supporting the opposition see regime change as a chance for their group to benefit from state resources (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; D'Arcy and Cornell, 2016). When competitive regimes face a fragmented opposition, there is an incentive to capitalise on the opportunity provided by the lack of an effective electoral rival and tailor the ruling coalition to ensure that closely aligned elites, ethnic groups and core supporters have their 'turn to eat' (Wrong, 2009). For example, during the 1997 Kenyan elections President Moi faced a fragmented opposition with the opposition vote split between the Kikuyu-led Democratic Party and Luo-led National Development Party. Moi won the 1997 elections due to splits in the opposition and used his victory to elevate loyalists and co-ethnics within his regime (Africa Confidential, 20 Feb 1998; Elischer, 2008). The ineffectiveness of the divided opposition allowed gave Moi and KANU the opportunity to reward its core base.

In hegemonic regimes, pro-regime elites or voters are unlikely to lose their 'turn to eat' regardless of opposition strength. Consequently, the leader and the regime do not need to capitalise on opposition fragmentation to feed its constituency. A strategy of elevating co-ethnics or close supporters may endanger the regime and the leader. Hegemonic regimes are more likely to draw elite or mass support

from a large subsection of ethno-regional groups with interethnic competition happening within the regime (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Van de Walle, 2007; Mehler, 2007; Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Egboh and Aniche, 2015). Prioritising certain ethnic groups within the broad-based coalitions could exacerbate factionalism within the regime and the risk of internal party ruptures (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011).

H2: Competitive regimes adjust their coalition post-election to engage in 'politics of the belly' if the opposition is fragmented. This will not apply to hegemonic regimes.

Existing literature shows that hegemonic regimes rely on 'punishment regimes' and punitive actions, rather than co-option, to reduce the threat of the opposition. This can include imprisoning opposition elites, limiting voting in opposition areas or depriving opposition voters of vital public services (Magaloni, 2006; Miller, 2015; Horne, 2016; Ash, 2015; Ochieng'Opalo, 2012). The historical record shows that hegemonic regimes are particularly prone to internal cleavages. Factionalism and defections have proven crucial in stripping regimes of their hegemonic status (Reuter and Gandhi, 2011; Köllner and Basedau, 2005). Accordingly, hegemonic regimes need to convince political elites that allegiance to the regime is preferable to joining the opposition or operating outside the regime. This can be done through repression of opposition elites when the regime's dominance over the political landscape is in question (Schedler, 2013; Ash, 2015; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Similarly, punishment and deterrence can be done through ousting the elite representatives of politically disloyal communities. Within many African countries, the administrative state is the locus of the country's wealth – including money gained from taxation, aid, resources and business licenses – so cutting elites and communities out of the regime's patronage network is a serious deterrent (Prempeh, 2007; De Waal 2009; Szeftel, 2000; Lindemann, 2008).

The behaviour of Tanzania's ruling CCM regime in the aftermath of the 2015 elections – in which the regime won by its narrowest margin against an opposition coalition led by former CCM insider Edward Lowassa – illustrates how hegemonic regimes move to punish cohesive opposition elites rather than accommodate them. Rather than accommodating the opposition, the CCM shrunk the cabinet and refused to integrate any opposition parties in the national government. The regime then used its diminished majority in parliament to pass restrictive measures on public assembly and the press while using government funds to stoke factionalism within the opposition (Paget, 2017). Previous co-option deals struck with the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) – in which the regional government shared posts – also broke down in the aftermath of the polls (Africa Confidential, 2016a; Pallotti, 2017).

H3: Hegemonic regimes will adjust their coalition post-election to become more exclusionary and engage in the politics of punishment if the opposition is cohesive

6.5 Data and Methodology

6.5.1 Data

Even when an incumbent retains power, each election is followed by a reshuffle in the cabinet indicating that the regime is adapting its ruling coalition in response to the electoral results. To measure whether regimes engage in co-option, the politics of the belly or the politics of punishment post-election, this paper examines the composition of the post-election cabinet. Because the research is interested in regime/incumbent strategies, observations are restricted to elections where the regime retained power, resulting in 55 elections across the eighteen countries in the period of 1997-2017.[59]

Information on the cabinet is provided by the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (ACPED), a dataset of cabinet members and positions by month across African states. Each minister is coded with the following information: name, position, gender, political affiliation, ethnicity and regional background. Because ACPED's unit of analysis is the cabinet minister by month, it captures a significant amount of volatility within the cabinet that is missed by annual cabinet lists.[60] Prior studies on cabinet compositions agree that different posts hold different degrees of importance (Lindemann, 2011b; Francois et al., 2015). Consequently posts in the cabinet are further separated into the inner/outer circles.[61] Table 6.2 outlines the metrics for the analysis of post-election cabinets.

[59] Included in the elections are cases where the a party retains power but with a different leader than at the previous election. This occurs generally in hegemonic regimes such as Botswana, South Africa and Tanzania. In both Botswana and South Africa, the new ruling party leader is chosen by internal election months before the general election.

[60] Out of the countries included in this study, approximately 16 percent of country-years had more than one major reshuffle and over a quarter had more than one minor change within the cabinet. Approximately 20 percent of ministers recorded in the ACPED data have a tenure lasting less than a year.

[61] Inner circle posts typically include vice-president or prime minister, finance, foreign affairs, justice, defence, internal security/home affairs and oil/mineral resources (if the country is a major exporter)

Table 6.2 – Description of Variables

Variable	Description
Change in Cabinet/Inner Circle/Outer Circle Size	This variable captures the aggregate change in the total size of the cabinet, inner circle and outer circle for the 12 months following an election.
Change in Representation	Government 'representation' is assessed by calculating the share of total, national ethno-political populations who have an associated elite in the cabinet. The aggregated total for groups and regions in cabinet is divided by the composition of the population at large. The index assumes a value between 0 and 100, where 100 means total representation of all politically relevant ethnic groups in the population. This variable can represent the aggregate change in representation to whole cabinet, the inner circle and the outer circle in the 12 months following an election.
Change in Leader's Co-Ethnic Representation	Captures the aggregate change in percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by ministers from the same ethnic group as the current president in the 12 months following an election. The index takes a value between 0 and 100.
Change in Primary Opposition Leader's Co-Ethnic Representation	Captures the aggregate change in the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by ministers from the same ethnic group as the opposition candidate/opposition party leader who secured the most non-regime votes in the 12 months following an election. The index takes a value between 0 and 100. In the case of general elections, the main opposition candidate is determined by votes secured in the presidential election. In the cases of just parliamentary elections, we use the ethnicity of the leaders of the top opposition party in terms of seats.[62]
Change in Regime Party Representation	Captures the change in the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by ministers belonging to the regime party (the party of the president or most senior executive) in the 12 months following an election. The index takes a value between 0 and 100.
Change in Opposition Party Representation	Captures the change in the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by ministers belonging to opposition parties in the 12 months following an election. To be counted as an opposition party, the party must have fielded a candidate in a presidential election against the regime or competed in legislative elections without belonging to a multi-party coalition with the regime party.

The ACPED data will then be used to examine the post-electoral changes in the cabinet and classify the leader's post-electoral strategy.

1. The following will be considered evidence of politics of the belly: lower ethnic representation, higher representation of leader co-ethnics and the ruling party of the leader.
2. The following will be considered evidence of politics of co-option: higher ethnic representation, higher representation of opposition co-ethnics or opposition parties.
3. Post-electoral settlements which decrease the representation of opposition co-ethnics and parties will be considered as evidence of the regime engaging in the politics of punishment.

[62] Appendix table 1 lists the primary opposition candidate for each election and their ethnic identity (along with sources).

6.5.2 Classifying Elections

This study opts to use Schedler's (2013) regime classification, in which a hegemonic regime must hold over two-thirds of the seats[63] in parliament (lower house if bicameral legislature) and have held power for at least 10 years. The cohesion of the opposition is classified by applying Laakso–Taagepera's (1979) fragmentation index[64] to the share of opposition votes. This index has been used by multiple studies in determining the 'effective number of parties' in a legislature or candidates in an election (Schedler, 2013; Bogaards, 2004). Overall, systems which have a fragmentation score of under 2 are considered dominant party systems, while those with a score of over 2 are considered two-party or multiparty and thus indicative of a divided opposition (Bogaards, 2004). The resulting data covers 55 elections in 17 countries. Over two-thirds of the countries included in the data have elections that fit into more than one category, demonstrating that the political environment varies across with time as well as space. A list of the elections included in the data and their position within the classification scheme is out in table 6.3.

[63] This is typically the amount of seats needed for a constitutional majority (Schedler, 2013).

[64] $1/\sum si^2$ where si is the vote/seat share of the i^{th} candidate/party, depending on whether the election is legislative or presidential. In the case of concurrent presidential and legislative elections, the mean of opposition presidential and legislative fragmentation is used.

Table 6.3 – Classification of Elections

Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition
Botswana 2014 Legislative Election	Cameroon 1997 Legislative Election	Botswana 1999 Legislative Election	Botswana 2009 Legislative Election
Burundi 2015 General Election	CAR 1999 Presidential Election	Botswana 2004 Legislative Election	Cameroon 2004 Presidential Election
CAR 1998 General Election	CAR 2005 General Election	Cameroon 2002 Legislative Election	Cameroon 2007 Legislative Election
CAR 2011 General Election	Guinea 1998 Presidential Election	Ethiopia 2010 Legislative Election	Cameroon 2011 Presidential Election
Ethiopia 2005 Legislative Election	Guinea 2002 Legislative Election	Rwanda 2008 Legislative Election	Cameroon 2013 Legislative Election
Guinea 2003 Presidential Election	Guinea 2013 Legislative Election	Rwanda 2010 Presidential Election	South Africa 2004 Legislative Election
Guinea 2015 Presidential Election	Ivorian 2015 Presidential Election	Rwanda 2013 Legislative Election	South Africa 2009 Legislative Election
Kenya 2007 General Election	Ivorian 2016 Legislative Election	Tanzania 2015 General Election	Uganda 2006 General Election
Mali 2007 General Election	Kenya 1997 General Election	Uganda 2016 General Election	Uganda 2011 General Election
Malawi 1999 General Election	Kenya 2017 General Election	Uganda 2001 Presidential Election	Tanzania 2000 General Election
Malawi 2009 General Election	Nigeria 2011 General Election	Zimbabwe 2013 General Election	Tanzania 2005 General Election
Nigeria 2003 General Election	South Africa 1999 Legislative Election		Tanzania 2010 General Election
Rwanda 2003 General Election	South Africa 2014 Legislative Election		
Sierra Leone 2002 General Election			
Sierra Leone 2012 General Election			
Zimbabwe 2000 Legislative Election			
Zimbabwe 2002 Presidential Election			
Zimbabwe 2005 Legislative Election			
Zimbabwe 2008 General Election			
Total: 19	**Total**: 13	**Total**: 11	**Total**: 12

The above data will be used in the next section to visualise whether different regime-opposition configurations lead to different patterns in post-election reshuffles. The significance of observed patterns will then be tested by using a K-Nearest Neighbour algorithm, which will assess the degree to which post-electoral cabinet changes can predict the regime-opposition configurations outlined in table 6.3.

6.6 Descriptive Statistics and Discussion

6.6.1 Change in Post-Electoral Cabinet Size and Ethnic Representation

On average, regimes of all types tend to increase the size and representation of the cabinet post-election; the cabinet expands by 1.5 places and increases in representation by 2.5 percent on average. Most of this change occurs within the outer circle suggesting that regimes are primarily using the less important posts in the cabinet as a resource in co-opting or leveraging core support.

However, figure 6.1 shows that this trend towards expansion and inclusivity varies across categories. Though competitive regimes tend to increase the size of their cabinets regardless of opposition cohesion, the expansion of the cabinet is greater when the opposition is unified. Competitive regimes also generally increase the representation of the post-election cabinet when facing a united opposition. When competitive regimes face a divided opposition, the increase in the cabinet size is, on average, not accompanied by a boost in representation in the outer circle. Overall, it appears that competitive regimes are more likely to engage in exclusionary behaviour when feeling insulated from the political opposition; this will only affect the less important posts within the cabinet, supporting hypothesis 1 and 2.

Hegemonic regimes, in contrast to competitive regimes, appear to engage in limited co-option when facing a fragmented opposition. The cabinet tends to expand across the inner and outer circle, with both generally experiencing a boost in representation. Given that the hegemonic status of regimes is safest when confronted with a fragmented opposition, regimes would take the opportunity to avoid punitive action which could unite the opposition (Schedler, 2013; Ladd, 2013).

In contrast, some hegemonic regimes which have faced a cohesive opposition engaged in the politics of punishment through cutting the size of the cabinet and the inner circle. This is reflective in the tendency of hegemonic regimes to engage in repression and institute ‘punishment regimes’ when there is a perceived threat to the hegemony under threat (Schedler, 2013; Magaloni, 2006). But, this reaction is not consistent. Hegemonic regimes facing a cohesive opposition frequently increase the representation of the outer circle, and the decrease in cabinet size is biased by outliers, such as the Tanzanian 2015 post-election cabinet.

Figure 6.1 - Cabinet Size and Ethnic Representation Post-Election Change



6.6.2 Change in Post-Electoral Representation of Leader and Opposition Co-Ethnics

There is an academic consensus that leaders commonly use control over state resources to benefit co-ethnics,[65] but there little research on how this phenomenon is tied to regime and opposition status.

In the competitive regimes studied, ethnicity is a strong mobilising factor in electoral contests and many voters decide 'their candidate' based on ethnic identity (Eifert et al., 2010; Posner, 2007; Bratton et al., 2012). Figure 6.2 illustrates that competitive regimes generally forgo satisfying co-ethnics to pursue a strategy of co-option when the opposition is united, supporting H1. In contrast, when the opposition is fragmented, competitive regimes are more likely to appease the 'core constituency' by boosting the representation of the leader's co-ethnics, supporting hypothesis 2. In competitive regimes, the outer circle of the cabinet experiences the largest average increase in leader co-ethnics when facing a fragmented opposition, but the inner circle has the largest decrease in leader co-ethnics when facing a cohesive opposition, indicating that competitive regimes frequently need to extend the strategy of co-option to the important posts.

This relationship is reversed for opposition co-ethnics. On average, there is a decrease in cabinet representation when the opposition is fragmented and an increase in representation when the opposition is cohesive. Opposition parties across Africa often draw support from particular ethno-regional groups (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Wahman, 2017), and incorporating elites from these communities can sap opposition support (Masaki, 2018). This suggests that leaders in competitive regimes generally face a balance between satisfying core support and sapping or co-opting opposition constituencies. The optimal strategy is determined by the electoral strength of the opposition.

In hegemonic regimes, the status of the opposition cohesion appears to result in comparatively marginal differences in the representation of the leader's co-ethnics. This indicates that hegemonic regimes do not use the opportunity of an ineffective opposition to satisfy a core ethnic constituency. This finding could reflect a number of different dynamics. Firstly, it could suggest that hegemonic regimes are generally more likely to draw support from a wide range of groups rather than putting electoral stock within the leader's co-ethnics (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Van de Walle, 2007). This is reflected by the fact that, in our sample, there are cases where the leaders of the regime and the opposition come from the same ethnic group (e.g. Uganda and Botswana). Hegemonic regimes generally win by margins which would be unachievable if they relied on a narrow constellation of ethnic groups for electoral support (Wahman, 2017). Secondly, the lack of effect of opposition cohesion on leader co-ethnics could reflect that 'politics of the belly' within hegemonic regimes is not tied to electoral results but other unobserved crises, such as factional contests and internal struggles within the regime (Köllner and Basedau, 2005).

[65] Existing research has shown that the leader's co-ethnics benefit in terms of public service provisions and are typically overrepresented in the cabinet (Jablonski, 2014; Francois et al., 2015; Franck and Rainer, 2012).

Figure 6.2 – Leader and Opposition Co-Ethnics Post-Election Cabinet Change



In the case of South Africa, factional struggles within the ANC overlap with the electoral calendar. The nomination procedures in the run-up to the 2004 elections exposed rivalry between incumbent Mbeki and deputy president Jacob Zuma (Lodge, 2005). When the ANC won the 2004 elections, Mbeki boosted the representation of his Xhosa co-ethnics. Zuma later succeeded in removing Mbeki via internal ANC structures, putting himself next in line to lead the ANC should it win the national elections. After the ANC won the 2009 election, Zuma heavily increased the presence of his Zulu co-ethnics within the cabinet.

Hegemonic regimes cut the representation of opposition co-ethnics most drastically when facing a cohesive opposition. This provides support for hypothesis 3 and the role of 'punishment regimes' in deterring subnational groups and elites from supporting the opposition (Langer, 2005; Boggero, 2009; Miller, 2015; Jablonski, 2014). This reflects that opposition co-operation poses a serious threat to the incumbent regime's hegemony as compared to fragmented and easily contained 'satellite' opposition parties (Ladd, 2013; Van de Walle, 2007; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). These findings corroborate with Schedler's (2013) argument that hegemonic regimes under pressure resort to more punishing measures pressure, while competitive regimes generally resort to concessions.

6.6.3 Change in Post-Electoral Representation of Regime and Opposition Parties

The inclusion or exclusion of ministers belonging to opposition parties in post-election cabinets appear heavily related to both regime strength and opposition cohesion. When the opposition is cohesive, 58 percent of competitive regimes grant representation to opposition parties. This figure drops to 46 percent when the opposition is fragmented.

Figure 6.3 – Presence of Opposition Party Members in Post-Election Cabinets



Hegemonic regimes show the reverse relationship; when the opposition is cohesive, only 45.5 percent of cabinets have at least one opposition ministers. This figure rises to 58 percent if the opposition is fragmented. This finding supports the theory that hegemonic regimes thrive by incorporating small, volatile 'satellite' parties (Magaloni, 2006; Van de Walle, 2007). A fragmented opposition provides hegemonic regimes with a large pool of prospective clients to be co-opted, while a cohesive opposition set on attaining power is both harder to co-opt and less willing to act as a subordinate to the regime from within (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Schedler, 2013). However, figure 6.4 shows that different regime-opposition configurations do not have a definitive effect on the change in representation of regime and opposition parties, with little variation between configurations.

Figure 6.4 - Regime and Opposition Party Post-Election Cabinet Change



In contrast to expectations, competitive regimes further boost the representation of the ruling party in the post-election when facing a cohesive opposition than a fragmented opposition. The most drastic declines in ruling party presence occur during unity governments (such as Kenya 2007 and Zimbabwe 2008). This finding could reflect that competitive regimes are unwilling to give up control of ministries to other parties unless absolutely necessary and would incorporate ministers from the opposition's ethnic base rather than the opposition party. It is worth noting that the sample covers only incumbent elections, where the regime is generally more likely to hold onto power. Most electoral changes in regime occur in open-seat elections (Cheeseman, 2010). A boost in regime party presence occurs in hegemonic regimes facing a cohesive opposition. This is accompanied with the largest drop in opposition party presence showing that hegemonic regimes resort to defensive measures and forgo co-option when facing a cohesive opposition. This finding supports hypothesis 3 but again is driven by few observations so does not appear robust.

A visual analysis of the data broadly supports hypotheses 1 and 2 but with the caveat that strategies of co-option and politics of the belly mostly appear to occur within the balance of leader and opposition co-ethnics (as opposed to political parties). There is evidence for hypothesis 3, but this generally appears to be limited to the exclusion of opposition co-ethnics. The next section tests whether the variations between configurations visualised in figures 6.1 to 6.4 can be used to accurately predict the type of opposition faced by a competitive or hegemonic regime.

6.7 Predicting Opposition Status by Post-Electoral Elite Change

6.7.1 Methodology

The relationship between post-electoral shifts in the cabinet and the status of the regime and opposition will be explored through a K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN) algorithm. KNN is a conceptually simple method of classification in which a test observation takes the class of the majority of its nearest neighbouring observations from the training dataset. The distance between points is determined by a set of continuous independent variables. Figure 6.5 provides a visual example of how the algorithm works using Fisher's Iris dataset. Using the KNN algorithm, the two black test points would be classed as either Iris Versicolor or Iris Setosa based on their neighbours.

Figure 6.5 – KNN algorithm example



KNN is popular due to its conceptual simplicity and good predictive performance. KNN algorithms have been applied to a variety of classification problems in diverse fields, such as predicting gene functions and the composition of political state organs (Wu et al., 2008; Shih and Lee, 2017).

The post-election data are split into observations containing hegemonic regimes (23 observations) and competitive regimes (32 observations). Firstly, KNN tests are run on the data on competitive and hegemonic regimes using all variables on post-electoral change, with each variable scaled between 0 and 1 to prevent distance measures from being dominated by one of the attributes (Wu et al., 2008). The two top predictors in terms of importance are picked, and then, the tests are run again to assess the predictive accuracy of the model. Under hypotheses 1 and 2, post-electoral changes should be strong predictors for whether a competitive regime faced a cohesive or fragmented opposition party. For hegemonic regimes, the type of opposition faced should be discernible based on whether the regime punished the opposition through cutting co-ethnics or party presence, as per hypothesis 3.

The reliability of the predictive capacity of the KNN model is tested using three different resampling methods: bootstrapping, bootstrapping with Efron's bias correction and repeated k-fold validation. Bootstrapping is often used to calculate confidence intervals around parameters, which in this case is mean accuracy (LaFleur and Greevy, 2009). However, the bootstrap can also give pessimistic estimates, so the test is also using Efron's bias correction (Raschka, 2016). Finally, the tests are run using 4-fold repeated validation in which the datasets are split into four samples, with three folds acting as training data and one fold acting as the test sample. All resampling methods are repeated 1000 times to approximate confidence intervals and significance. All tests are run using the Caret package in R.

6.7.2 Results and Discussion

6.7.2.1 Post-Electoral Cabinet Change

Figures 6.1 to 6.4 show that different configurations of regime and opposition status result in different patterns of volatility - on average - in the post-election cabinet. However, there is also a large amount of variance in each category which raises the following questions. What changes in the post-election cabinet best-fit different configurations of regime and opposition status? Are post-electoral cabinet changes sufficient for out of sample prediction?

Figure 6.6 ranks the importance of different post-electoral cabinet changes in predicting opposition cohesion for both competitive and hegemonic regimes.[66] Table 6.4, shows the predictive accuracy of the models using all post-election changes as predictors and the models with only the two most important variables included, respectively.

Figure 6.6 shows that for competitive regimes, predictors concerning post-electoral changes in leader and opposition co-ethnic representation in the cabinet are the most important, corroborating the findings from the descriptive statistics and visualisations, while changes concerning political party representation, general ethnic representation or cabinet size are less important. When post-electoral changes in leader and opposition co-ethnics are used as the only predictors, the model correctly predicts opposition status between 65 and 78 percent of the time depending on resampling method. This accuracy is a significant improvement over the null model[67] in all three resampling methods. In contrast, the most important predictors for hegemonic regime observations cover the cabinet's size, and even the strongest predictors are less effective at correctly classifying opposition status in hegemonic regimes. These predictors provide a significant improvement in only one of the resampling cases and improve the accuracy over the null model by less than 10 percent (in one case actually making the model less accurate than the null model).

[66] Ranking is done using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves.
[67] The null model always predicts based on the largest proportion of the observed classes. The null rate for competitive regimes is approximately 0.59 and 0.52 for hegemonic regimes.

Figure 6.6 – KNN ranked variable importance



Table 6.4 - KNN Cabinet Change by Regime Type[68]

Regime Type	Resampling Method	All Variable Model Accuracy	Best Predictive Variables	Best Predictive Variables Accuracy	Improvement on Null
Competitive Regimes	Bootstrap	0.511	Change in Leader and Opposition Co-Ethnic Representation	0.653	0.055***
	Bootstrap Efron Correction	0.654		0.780	0.18***
	Repeated Cross Validation	0.562		0.717	0.123***
Hegemonic Regimes	Bootstrap	0.496	Change in Cabinet and Inner Circle Size	0.520	-0. 002
	Bootstrap Efron Correction	0.621		0.626	0.104
	Repeated Cross Validation	0.544		0.573	0.051***

Note: p**p***p<0.001

[68] The results of all KNN test iterations can be found in appendix tables 2 to 4. More information on KNN model accuracy, significance and confusion matrices can be seen in appendix tables 5 to 7.

Figure 6.7 provides an illustration of how post-electoral changes are a better predictor of opposition type for competitive regimes than hegemonic regimes. Please note that the clustering algorithm used in the illustration is an unsupervised K-Means algorithm which differs from the KNN algorithm used in the tests. However, K-Means clustering is much better suited to visualisation. Though there is significant overlap between competitive regimes, the clustering algorithm does a better job of separation than for hegemonic regimes.

Figure 6.7 – KNN best predictor k-means



The results support hypotheses 1 and 2. Competitive regimes alter cabinets in response to the threat posed by the opposition, engaging in the politics of the belly when in a comparative position of strength and co-opting when operating from a position of weakness. Figure 6.6 and table 6.4 show that these two strategies are primarily implemented through rewarding leader co-ethnics or integrating opposition co-ethnics. This finding conforms to De Waal's (2009) concept of the 'political marketplace' in which politics functions as a marketplace of loyalties between the regime, outside elites and the general population. When the opposition is fragmented and weak, the party and its ethnic constituency command a lower price and may not be able to secure a place in the post-electoral settlement, while a strong opposition can demand concessions from the regime. When facing a strong

opposition, competitive regimes are incentivised to offer 'defensive concessions' rather than rely on manipulation, repression or exclusion (Schedler, 2013).

In contrast, the strongest predictors of opposition status in hegemonic regimes are less accurate, and post-electoral cabinet volatility provides less information on the type of opposition faced for hegemonic regimes. Though this could partly reflect a smaller sample size for hegemonic regimes, this finding supports a common assertion in the literature that hegemonic regimes do not face an immediate threat from the opposition nor do they need to instantly restructure their ruling coalition to counter the opposition (Schedler, 2013). The main threats to leaders in hegemonic regimes come from within the ruling coalition with the democratic opposition presenting a secondary concern. Some hegemonic regime configurations, particularly party-based hegemonic regimes, place explicit limits on the ability of the leader to restructure the ruling coalition as the party functions on the basis of elite power sharing (Kroeger, 2018). In other hegemonic configurations, such as personalist or military regimes, demoting key allies carries a serious risk of stoking factionalism or provoking a coup (Roessler, 2011; Kroeger, 2018).

This finding also weakens hypothesis 3 as post-electoral changes in the presence opposition parties or co-ethnics do not function as good predictors of the type of opposition faced by hegemonic regimes. In spite of the wealth of evidence of hegemonic regimes ensuring voter and elite compliance through 'punishment regimes' (Magaloni, 2006; Miller, 2015; Arriola and Lyons, 2015), hegemonic regimes do not seem to apply this strategy to the post-election cabinet reliably.

6.7.2.2 Post-Electoral Cabinet Status

Although post-electoral reshuffles in hegemonic regimes do not provide reliable information on opposition cohesion, the composition of hegemonic post-electoral cabinets does show evidence of regimes pursuing different strategies in response to opposition status. The KNN tests were rerun looking at the general cabinet traits (size, representation, etc.) at the end of the 12 months after an election, as opposed to the change which occurred over the same period. Though hegemonic regimes may not significantly alter opposition co-ethnic presence after facing a cohesive electoral opposition, it tends to have a much higher presence in the cabinet.[69] Appendix figures 1 to 3 show that hegemonic regimes also have more representative cabinets and inner circles which are less dominated by the ruling party when facing a cohesive opposition. This finding further weakens hypothesis 3 and suggests that hegemonic regimes do engage in co-option when facing a strong opposition, but this strategy is not demonstrated by immediate change in the cabinet post-election. Instead, this co-option

[69] This could be an artefact of the data as the leader and primary opposition candidate share the same ethnicity in nearly half of the observations for hegemonic regimes facing a cohesive opposition.

is revealed by inclusive cabinets of hegemonic regimes when facing cohesive opposition outside of the post-electoral period (in spite of the slight decrease in opposition co-ethnics shown in figure 6.2).

When the KNN tests are run on the general traits of the post-election cabinet, as opposed to the change they undergo, another key difference between hegemonic and competitive regimes is revealed. Table 6.5 shows that the predictive accuracy of post-election cabinet status is much stronger than that of the post-election cabinet change for hegemonic regimes. Meanwhile, for competitive regimes post-cabinet change is a slightly stronger predictor.[70] This shows that while competitive regimes change coalition strategies in direct response to elections, hegemonic regimes – whilst engaging in different survival strategies – do not immediately reformulate their survival strategy in response to electoral results.

Table 6.5 - KNN Cabinet Status by Regime Type

Regime Type	Resampling Method	Best Predictive Variables	Best Predictive Variables Accuracy	Improvement on Null
Competitive Regimes	Bootstrap	Cabinet Representation of Leader Co-Ethnics and Inner Circle Representation of Opposition Co-Ethnics	0.636	0.043***
	Bootstrap Efron Correction		0.722	0.130
	Repeated Cross Validation		0.728	0.134***
Hegemonic Regimes	Bootstrap	Cabinet Representation of Opposition Co-Ethnics and Leader Party Inner Circle Presence[71]	0.712	0.193***
	Bootstrap Efron Correction		0.783	0.26***
	Repeated Cross Validation		0.796	0.274***

Note: p**p***p<0.001

In analysing the different responses to economic shocks, Schedler (2013) argues that competitive regimes fall victim to short-term crises or earn the fruits of short-term opportunities, while hegemonic regimes are more vulnerable to medium-term threats. The results of the KNN tests suggest the same

[70] Appendix figure 4 shows that when all variables – post cabinet change and post-cabinet status – are included as predictors, competitive regimes have more post-electoral changes as strong predictors and hegemonic regimes have more post-electoral cabinet status variables as strong predictors.

[71] Leader Party Inner Circle Presence is the second most important variable that is not strongly correlated with the Opposition Co-Ethnics Cabinet Representation, the most important variable. See a full breakdown of predictor correlations in appendix tables 7 to 10.

is true with the crises posed by the political opposition, with competitive regimes instigating dramatic changes to the cabinet to reap the opportunity posed by a weak opposition or mitigate the threat of a unified opposition. Hegemonic regimes adopt long-term strategies but also appear more accommodative when facing a cohesive opposition, perhaps with the aim of fragmenting it and ensuring the regime's future hegemony, and less accommodative when facing a fragmented opposition.

This finding adds a notable caveat to hypothesis 1 and 2 by showing that hegemonic regimes do engage in strategies of co-option and the politics of the belly but on different timescales. A hegemonic regime which immediately attempts co-option after ceding votes to a cohesive opposition could endanger the regime's image of invulnerability, a prime asset in retaining its hegemony (Schedler, 2013; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). This finding also counters the literature on hegemonic punishment regimes and hypothesis 3. In spite of figure 6.2 showing evidence of hegemonic regimes engaging in the politics of punishment by excluding opposition co-ethnics in post-election reshuffles, the threat posed by a united opposition needs to be addressed with a (more long-term) strategy of co-option. This corroborates with the literature on the role co-option has on fostering a 'loyal opposition' and fragmenting threats to the regime (Magaloni, 2006; Arriola and Lyons, 2015; Dollbaum, 2017; Lust-Okar, 2004). Nevertheless, hegemonic regimes do not drastically change the cabinet to adopt different survival strategies in the post-electoral period.

6.8 Conclusion

This study has sought to address a gap in current African literature which describes African regimes often in contradictory terms: co-optative, broad-based, exclusionary or based on ethnic and familial ties. Though existing research shows that these strategies are frequently used, sometimes concurrently by various regimes within Africa, it has yet to systematically investigate the contexts in which different strategies are used. This study explains the variations in regime strategy through examining changes in the cabinet in the post-electoral period, a unique situation in which the regime is granted an estimation of its political strength along with the threat posed by the democratic opposition.

Descriptive statistics and repeated out-of-sample, non-parametric tests shows that competitive and hegemonic regimes react differently when facing a weak or strong opposition. Competitive regimes, with reduced control over the political sphere and increased vulnerability, have to instantly negotiate with a cohesive opposition or co-opt its ethnic base. Conversely, this vulnerability means that leaders have to capitalise on the opportunity presented by a fragmented, weak opposition to reward their base. Hegemonic regimes have comparatively high security and perceive a united opposition as a long-term or nascent threat. Consequently, hegemonic regimes do not engage in dramatically different strategies

in post-election reshuffles regardless of opposition status. Rather, they share more power with opposition co-ethnics and parties when facing a united opposition, but this is not reflected in the immediate volatility in the post-electoral cabinet which suggests that hegemonic regimes can engage in long-term strategies of opposition containment. The findings from this study broadly support the conclusions of the existing literature on political bargaining, the marketplace of loyalties and power sharing in hybrid regimes (De Waal, 2009; Roberts, 2015; LeVan, 2011; Cheeseman, 2011; Schedler, 2013). The various strategies of co-option and exclusion witnessed across African regimes are a function of comparative strength between competing elites within and outside the state.

7.0 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa

7.1 Introduction

Cabinets are the locus of government policy decision-making and state patronage opportunities, and cabinet changes are an important tool for sharing power and managing competing elites, groups and interests (Francois et al., 2015; Quiroz-Flores and Smith, 2011). An increasing body of literature interprets the appointment, reshuffling and dismissal of senior government officials as a tool of political survival (Kroeger, 2018; Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Arriola, 2009; Quiroz-Flores and Smith, 2011; Francois et al., 2015).

However, this logic is often focused only on internal machinations within the regime and party. But events – such as political crises, disasters or elections – can mean previously effective elite power-sharing strategies become ineffective at ensuring political survival. Regimes and leaders across the world find themselves in positions where the composition of the elite within the government becomes unstable and threatens the political survival of either the leader or the regime. Governments in western democracies frequently fall due to internal competition between parties or rival figures within the government, and leaders may apply drastic changes to their governments to retain the confidence of either the public or their party (Saalfeld, 2008; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; Indridadson and Kam, 2008). Other studies in non-western contexts have examined how volatility in the ruling elite has emerged from political crises such as scandals, intra-elite conflict, drops in popularity and economic stress (Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Roessler, 2011).

This study introduces the notion of 'crisis cabinets', defined as instances in which regimes drastically reorganises ruling coalition in response to political crises, outside of the routine cabinet changes caused by elections or democratic regime change. This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature that explores the composition and functioning of executives within and across African states, as well as their interaction with political crises. Existing studies which examine how regimes alter their coalitions in response to crises focus on European and Latin American governments (Saalfeld, 2008; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; Indridadson and Kam, 2008; Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). This study examines crisis cabinets in African states.

Specifically, this study examines the effect of a specific form of crisis that is occurring more frequently across Africa. Recent events such as the 2011 Arab Spring means that there is growing international interest in mass protest movements as a force for change, echoing the academic interest which followed the Third Wave of Democratisation in Africa and former Soviet Republics in the 1990s (Carothers and Youngs, 2015). Protest movements involving large parts of the civilian population for an extended period of time, occur in part because the participants believe that these actions can affect

the composition and direction of national, senior government. We investigate the effects and efficacy of protest movements on the formation of crisis cabinets, and specifically inquire how regimes change the composition of ruling elites to address the threat posed by mass protests.

Recent events in Africa have increased this interest and suggested protest movements do impact senior, national government composition. April 2019 saw the toppling of two of Africa's longest serving autocrats – Algeria's Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Sudan's Omar al-Bashir – following weeks of sweeping popular protests that brought millions of people to the streets (Kushkush, 2019). Both leaders attempted to placate protesters through the mass dismissal of senior government officials, including cabinet ministers and local governors but were ultimately unsuccessful in securing their own leadership (Africa Confidential, 2019a; Abdelaziz, 2019). Subsequently, segments of the wider regime elite debated and competed over what form a successor government should take to address the crisis (Africa Confidential, 2019a; Africa Confidential, 2019b).

Examples like these may seem to suggest that protest movements do cause changes within the elite, but there is little firm evidence about whether this is the exception or the norm, and what kind of changes protests force on the regime. While there have been studies examining mass protests in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Carey, 2002) and others analysing cabinet instability (Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015; Kroeger, 2018), existing studies have not examined the relationship between the two. Cross-national studies of African protests have tended to focus on the composition of collective movements (De Waal and Ibreck, 2013), the urban-rural divide (Isaacman, 1990) or the links between different forms of contestation (Branch and Mampilly, 2015), but have failed to systematically account for the impact of protest movements on cabinet instability, government composition and the regime's use of elite accommodation strategies. Through an exploratory study of a selected number of African executives, this study aims to provide a better understanding of how regimes tailor their ruling coalitions to mitigate political crises and try to ensure their survival.

This study proceeds by reviewing the literature on cabinets as tools of coalition building and mitigation mechanisms for political crises. Using quantitative data on African cabinets and protests, we examine whether there is a strong correlation between public protest and cabinet volatility, and whether protests are a common trigger for 'crisis cabinets'. We then investigate whether protest-motivated crisis cabinets differ from other forms of crisis cabinet and, if so, what unique features they possess. Finally, we examine how the protests studied succeeded in forcing the regime to significantly change their coalition and how the cabinet changed in response to protester demands.

Overall the study finds that protests are not robustly correlated with cabinet volatility and are responsible for only a sixth of the crisis cabinets studied. It does suggest however that when, in rare cases, protests do spur the creation of crisis cabinets, regimes create cabinets specifically designed to mollify and address protester demands. The cases where protests are influential in prompting crisis

cabinets are those where the nature of the protests causes a split within the ruling elite, making the leader vulnerable to internal threats and the regime liable to disintegration.

7.2 Cabinets as coalition building and crisis mitigation

Existing literature describes the process of cabinet formation and ministerial appointment as transactional. Studies on cabinet composition in Western democracies highlight that leaders appoint ministers who can provide loyalty or ideological cohesion to strengthen cohesion of their governments, or expertise to improve performance (Indridason and Kam 2008). In other cases, ministers from outside parties can be brought into the government to allow the leader to form a viable government (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008).

In Africa, cabinet appointments are often explained as key positions in the regime's web of patronage. Ministerial appointments are used strategically to counter external threats by bringing political elites and 'big men' into the regime's patronage network, while the newly incorporated elites deliver votes or political support from their network (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015). The composition of the cabinet therefore provides insight into which groups and constituencies the regime considers integral to their coalition and political survival.

The composition of the cabinet also reflects the threat posed by potential allies within the ruling coalition. Included elites can use the state's resources to cultivate a base to rival the leader or can try to depose the leader (Choi and Kim, 2018). Consequently, African leaders attempt to coup-proof their regimes by creating arrangements that raise the costs of elite coordination and hinder elite threats (Casper and Tyson, 2014). Examples include purges (violent and non-violent) and the rotation of elites among different positions to prevent the cultivation of separate powerbases (Jackson and Rosberg, 1992; Roessler, 2011; Albertus, 2012; Geddes, 2003; Powell, 2012; Woldense, 2018).

Elite volatility within the cabinet which happens outside 'expected periods', such as post-electoral cabinet changes or democratic alternations in power, is therefore indicative of the regime reconfiguring itself to mitigate against internal and external threats. Political crises or upheavals will necessitate changes to the ruling coalition when changes in the demands and political strength of different subgroups or elites cause changes to what constitutes a 'stable bargain'. Former allies may begin to become a threat to the leader, necessitating their removal (Roessler, 2011). Rent-seeking elites, ideological movements at odds with the regime and dissatisfied ethno-regional communities may engage in protests or political violence to coerce the regime into granting them more state resources or more positions in government (Roessler, 2011; De Waal, 2009). A drop in public support may weaken the leader's legitimacy, making them vulnerable to being ousted by either the opposition or rivals within government (Alesina et al., 1996; De Mesquita et al., 2005). In her study on the effects of economic crises and falling regime popularity on ministerial stability in Latin America, Martinez-

Gallardo describes the relationship between senior government composition and the political environment outlining how:

> "[u]nexpected events over the course of a government's life will change these conditions and make bargains that were previously "stable" no longer viable. Appointments are an explicit political strategy that presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges." (Martinez-Gallardo 2014: 5).

Economic crises, scandals, internal factionalism or mass protest all exert pressure on regimes to redistribute the balance of power among elites inside and outside of government (Martinez-Gallardo 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Köllner and Basedau, 2005). Leaders managing divided or unruly governments, or who are under siege from opposition forces and widespread popular disapproval, are more likely to dismiss ministers who pose an obstacle to their hegemony, making changes to the ruling coalition to secure their political survival (Martinez-Gallardo, 2014). Regimes which have become fractured or lost public confidence may need to implement a 'changing of the guard' to demonstrate a willingness to reform (Rivera, 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Albertus, 2012)

The notion of 'crisis cabinets' developed here identifies those instances in which leaders or regimes which are confronted with an existential political crisis are forced to operate non-routine cabinet reshuffles involving mass ministerial turnover. Crisis cabinets occur outside periods in which a large-scale change in personnel would be instituted as a formal government procedure, such as the resignation of the cabinet during electoral periods or the democratic transition from one regime to the next.

7.2.1 The dangers of protests

Politics in Africa is frequently portrayed as a process of continual bargaining between the leader and rival elites within and outside the government (Bagayoko et al, 2016; Francois et al., 2015; De Waal, 2009). In contrast, the non-elite masses are ascribed secondary importance as resources to be mobilised by elites hoping to enhance their place within the political hierarchy (Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011; Langer, 2005; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997). However, demonstrations of discontent among a large section of the non-elite can damage a regime's legitimacy and can embolden rival elites. Historically large-scale protests have provided elites within the government the opportunity to use the regime's weakened legitimacy to launch a coup or extract concessions (Casper and Tyson, 2014; Volpe, 2013). During the early 1990s, opposition politicians or former insiders returning from exile sought to co-opt the pro-democracy movements that spread across the continent against the existing autocratic regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992).

It is well established in the literature that regimes rarely rely on repression or force alone to quash protests as these strategies may in fact cause escalation (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Josua and Edel, 2015; Sambanis and Zinn, 2006). As a result, regimes employ a range of accommodation strategies when dealing with threatening protests, including national dialogues, constitutional changes or important changes to the senior elite through crisis cabinets (Josua and Edel, 2015; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Thurston 2018).

The recent large-scale cabinet reshuffles in Sudan and Algeria are both examples of the regime instituting crisis cabinets to mollify popular discontent. In Algeria, President Bouteflika dissolved his cabinet in March in a last effort to contain the protests, and appointed a technocratic and inclusive caretaker government (Africa Confidential, 2019a). Similarly, President Al-Bashir of Sudan fired his government and all his regional governors after declaring a one-year state emergency in February, two months after demonstrations against the rising cost of bread had erupted across the country (Abdelaziz, 2019). After the two leaders fell, a faction within their respective regimes tried to reorganise the ruling coalition into a stable bargain which would ensure at least part of the regime's political survival. In Algeria Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid Salah, previously a Deputy Minister of Defence, became the main power and ousted Bouteflika's *le pouvoir* faction while retaining key allies in the old guard (Africa Confidential, 2019a; Africa Confidential, 2019c). In Sudan, a segment of the military ousted most political elements loyal to Al-Bashir, including members of his National Congress Party, and eventually agreed to a transition timetable with the protesters (Africa Confidential, 2019a; Africa Confidential, 2019d). Other examples include Mubarak dismissing claims that his son would succeed him and firing the government led by long-standing Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif in an attempt to appease the Tahrir Square protester, or King Hassan of Morocco's dismissal of his unpopular Prime Minister as a concession to opposition parties (Josua and Edel 2015; Lust-Okar 2004).

These examples show that regime's will offer change in the senior government and turnover in the elite as a concession in return for peace. Existing large-N studies have attempted to approximate regime accommodation strategies through conciliatory rhetoric (Bhasin and Gandhi, 2013; Carey, 2006), while country-specific investigations have looked at how individual regimes have attempted to mollify protest through legal reform, policies and a change in the elite (Josua and Edel 2015; Lust-Okar 2004; Bogaert, 2015; Volpi, 2013). But there are no comparative studies examining the relationship between public unrest and volatility within the ruling elite.

We aim to address this gap in the research through isolating 'crisis cabinets' and determining which are preceded by popular protests. Through this process, we aim to determine whether protests are a common cause of crisis cabinets, and whether these crisis cabinets are distinctly tailored to address protester grievances.

7.3 Crisis cabinets in Africa, 2007-2018

7.3.1. Protest, Cabinet Volatility and Crisis Cabinets

The above section ties the concept of 'crisis cabinets' to both the level of turnover in the cabinet, and the non-routine nature of the reshuffle. We therefore define a crisis cabinet as any reshuffle which results in the dismissal of over half of the cabinet and occurs outside of the post-electoral period (where large-scale reshuffles are routine).

The first step is to assess whether protest is related to ministerial volatility. To explore this proposed relationship, we use the African Cabinet and Political Elite Dataset, hereafter ACPED (Raleigh, Wigmore-Shepherd and Maggio, 2018). ACPED includes a monthly list of cabinet ministers in 22 African states from 1997-2018. Each entry includes every minister's name, position, ethnicity, home region and affiliated political party, along with their respective status in the cabinet. This is compared against protest data provided by the Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset, hereafter ACLED (Raleigh et al. 2010). ACLED records disaggregated information on conflict and protest events across Africa, with data available from 1997 to the present. Available information includes the precise geographical coordinates of the event, the identity of actors and the type of event, and the outcome of the conflict. These features are ideal for the study, enabling accurate analysis of the geography of the protests.

ACLED data are used to create multiple metrics to assess the intensity and geography of protest. There are multiple ways in which a regime may interpret protests to constitute a 'crisis'. Regimes may be most concerned by the escalation in protest – and the potential 'snowball' effect than aggregate protest numbers (Yin, 1998). Alternatively, regimes may be more concerned with protester deaths due to their potential to cause a crisis of domestic and international legitimacy (Josua and Edel, 2015). Consequently, we use multiple metrics to capture these various methods by which a regime may assess whether protests represent a serious threat.

1. The number of demonstrations in the previous six months
2. The number of fatalities arising from the protests
3. The percent change in the number of protests
4. The percentage of demonstrations involving state forces
5. The percentage of all conflict events demonstrations account for
6. The number of distinct geographical clusters of protest[72]

[72] A more detailed explanation of each variable is included in Appendix Table 1.

Combining these two datasets, we surveyed cabinet changes in 20 African states between 2007 and 2018.[73] Figure 7.1 shows the relationship between change in the cabinet (calculated as the number of dropped ministers as a percentage of the previous cabinet's size) against ACLED's various protest measures. Figure 7.1 also highlights crisis in blue.

Figure 7.1: Protest Correlated against Ministerial Volatility



Overall, there is a weak correlation in all measures apart from percent change in the number of protests and the number of protest-related fatalities, where a seemingly strong relationship is driven by only a few extreme observations. Reshuffles which occur within a context of intense, escalating or geographically dispersed protest are not guaranteed to involve more turnover in personnel. Furthermore, crisis cabinets are frequently created during times of low-protest.

Overall, the data suggests that regimes do not reliably engage in a drastic reshaping of the cabinet when facing large-scale protests. Although this finding seems to contradict recent events in Algeria

[73] Rwanda is excluded due to the high percentage of ministers who were born in Uganda and so have no home region, while South Sudan is excluded due to gaining independence mid-way through the period under study. Despite the data covering a larger timespan, the period of 2007 to 2017 is used to control biases due to the wider coverage of protest events in later years.

and Sudan, both countries had weathered previous large-scale protests – Algeria in 2011 and Sudan in 2013 – through a mixture of repression, bolstering the loyalty of regime elites and enacting superficial reforms (Volpe, 2013; Berridge, 2019). Figure 7.1 shows that events such as the recent protests in Algeria and Sudan or the crisis cabinets during the Arab Spring are the exception rather than the norm.

These exceptional events are studied by isolating episodes of severe elite volatility. This will allow us to examine what factors led to the success of the protests in these select instances, how regimes implement crisis cabinets to mitigate the unrest and how the changes witnessed in protest-motivated crisis cabinets differ from other types of crisis cabinet.

7.3.2 Variations in Crises and Crisis Cabinets

A total of eighteen cabinet reshuffles were found which matched the criteria for a crisis cabinet. The details of the sixteen crisis cabinets are laid out in the appendix table 2. However a cursory look at some of the cabinets shows that a large range of crises can lead to drastic changes in the ruling coalition.

There are cases where a victorious faction emerges from an internal struggle within the regime, and purges the government of their internal rivals. One example is Joyce Banda ascending to the presidency of Malawi after the death of President Mutharika. Banda had fallen out of favour with Mutharika's party but gained the presidency in accordance with the constitution. She used the opportunity to expel all ministers loyal to Mutharika from the cabinet (Dionne and Dulani, 2013; Cammack, 2012). There are cases where mass changes to the cabinet are used to integrate a threatening opposition. Examples include Bozize's attempt to create a unity government with the Seleka rebel coalition in early 2013 in the Central African Republic, to try to deter their march towards Bangui (Bradshaw and Fandos-Ruis, 2016). The crisis cabinets also include three coups – Zimbabwe 2017, Mali 2012 and Guinea 2009 – which cause significant volatility as the new regime tries to consolidate power and undermine elites associated with the old regime.

This raises a serious issue of how to accurately, and without bias, select which crisis cabinets were created as a direct reaction to protests by the regime or leader. To address this problem we rely on the Worldwide Integrated Crisis Warning System (ICEWS). The ICEWS is an event dataset which consists of coded interactions between socio-political actors (Boschee et al., 2015). The main advantage of ICEWS is that the dataset records a large array of non-violent political interactions between actors such as criticisms and denunciations, attempts at mediation and diplomatic or material cooperation. The dataset is also considered to be more reliable and have fewer false positives than GDELT, the other main political interaction dataset (Ward et al., 2013).

To assess which crisis cabinets were likely to be created in response to protest, we isolated instances in which the government explicitly yielded to or cooperated or negotiated with protests in the six months prior to the formation of the crisis cabinet. Appendix table 3 provides a full list of the different government to protester interactions which take place prior to crisis cabinet formation, along with the interactions we consider indicative of a 'protest-motivated crisis cabinet'. Using this classificatory mechanism only three out of the sixteen crisis cabinets, just under a fifth, were motivated by protest. They are:

1. Guinea 2007
2. Tunisia 2011
3. Ethiopia April 2018

The fact that only three crisis cabinets, a sixth of all isolated crisis cabinets, can be convincingly tied to demonstrations shows that popular protest is not a common cause of crisis cabinet formation. This supports the finding in figure 7.1 that high protest – defined by either aggregate protest events, fatalities or geographic dispersion – is not normally correlated with elite volatility within the cabinet.

There are also crisis cabinets which are formed in high protest environments yet the formation appears to be due to other political factors. Appendix Table 3 breaks down all crisis cabinets by ACLED protest metrics. For example protest is high in the six months before the crisis cabinets which accompany the Zimbabwe 2017 coup or Goodluck Jonathan's purge of the Nigerian cabinet in 2010.

This raises the questions of what features and strategies define protest-motivated crisis cabinets, and what factors cause protests to be successful in forcing crisis cabinets. These questions are addressed in the next two sections through comparing patterns of cabinet change in the protest-related crisis cabinets to those in the remaining fifteen crisis cabinets, and through a qualitative investigation of the events preceding the three protest-motivated crisis cabinets and how the cabinet changes were specifically tailored to address protester grievance.

7.3.3 Comparing Crisis Cabinets

The crisis cabinets are compared using a number of metrics derived from the ACPED data to measure the degree of change and volatility. These metrics measure the following:

1. Change in personnel in the cabinet
2. Change in personnel in the 'inner circle', the most important posts in the cabinet[74]

[74] The concept of the inner circle is borrowed from Lindemann (2011) and Francois et al. (2015). The inner circle typically consists of posts such as

3. Change in the regional representation of the cabinet and inner circle
4. Change in how proportionally cabinet and inner circle posts are allocated among a country's regions
5. The average length of time served by ministers dropped from the cabinet.[75]

Table 7.1 shows the comparison between crisis cabinets formed in response to protest and those formed in response to other crises. The average metrics for all cabinet reshuffles[76] are also included for reference.

Table 7.1 – Cabinet volatility in Crisis Cabinets

	Crisis Cabinets in Direct Response to Protest N = 3	Other Crisis Cabinets N = 18	All Reshuffles N = 417
Percent Change in Personnel	87.65	69.72	16.21
Percent Change in Inner Circle	79.76	70.12	19.12
Change in Representation	-3.31	-0.50	0.09
Change in Inner Circle Representation	6.25	4.19	0.19
Change in Disproportion	-1.22	3.19	0.00
Change in Inner Circle Disproportion	0.59	0.49	-0.06
Mean Tenure of Dropped Ministers	61.98	24.87	35.84
Regime Legislative Seats at Previous Election	75.23	65.31	56.82
VDEM Score of Democracy	0.18	0.40	0.51

Crisis cabinets, by our definition, have a much higher turnover of personnel than most reshuffles. But crisis cabinets motivated by protest have a higher turnover of personnel in both the cabinet at large and the inner circle than other types of crisis cabinet. The mean the tenure of dismissed ministers is much higher for protest-motivated crisis cabinets than other types of crisis cabinet and the average cabinet reshuffle.

Due to the rarity of protest-motivated crisis cabinets and the low number of observations, it is impossible to draw statistical conclusions. However, this finding does corroborate with the argument that protesters often seek a visible change in the ruling elite. This can include a widespread changing of the guard or the dismissal of key ministers deemed emblematic of the regime's failures or excesses (Lust-Okar, 2004; Josua and Edel, 2014; Africa Confidential, 2019a). The interests of embedded regime elites frequently rely on the maintenance of the status quo and as a result are seen as obstacles to reform or change within the regime (Albertus, 2012; Rivera, 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle,

[75] A more detailed explanation of the variables is outlined in Appendix Table 4.
[76] Includes all reshuffles, including crisis cabinets and post-electoral reshuffles.

1992). Therefore, the jettisoning of longstanding elites is an effective strategy for the regime to signal that it is willing to engage in substantial reform and trade major concessions – in the form of key allies – for peace.

All types of crisis cabinet involve larger shifts in regional representation and disproportion than the average reshuffle, suggesting that crisis cabinets frequently involve a recalibration in the regime's regional power sharing strategy. Feelings of regional disenfranchisement have driven protests, rebellions, coups and internal struggles (Amin and Takougang, 2018; Langer, 2005; Lindemann, 2011a; Boggero, 2009), all of which are potential triggers for crisis cabinets. Regional representation declines for crisis cabinets created in response to protest, while the inner circle becomes only marginally more inclusive compared to other types of crisis cabinet. These differences are less dramatic than those seen in ministerial turnover or the tenure of dropped ministers. This could show that issues of representation are less important in protest-motivated crisis cabinets compared to the widespread dismissal of enduring elites. However, further analysis in the next section shows that although overall regional representation does not drastically change, protest hotspots do appear to reap a boost in representation in the crisis cabinet.

The final major difference is in the electoral quality of the regime overseeing the crisis cabinet. Electoral quality is measured by the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) electoral component index, an ordinal variable (0-1) which measures the "responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections" (Coppedge et al., 2017). Crisis cabinets in general on average occur in regimes with a lower VDEM score. This finding corroborates with the existing literature on anocracies and autocracies which describes elite rotation as part of the ruler's 'toolkit' to ensure political survival (Albertus, 2012; Woldense, 2018; Roessler, 2011). However, crisis cabinets made in response to protest occur in drastically less democratic environments than other crisis cabinets. Appendix figures 1 and 2 show that the correlation between ministerial volatility and ACLED protest metrics is stronger in more autocratic or electorally dominant regimes.

Less democratic regimes are generally understood to be more vulnerable to protest. In more democratic or competitive regimes, the legitimacy of government and leader is continually critiqued and protests against government actions are perceived as 'politics as usual' (Schedler, 2013). In these settings, the political opposition has a greater chance of either gaining the leadership through elections or capturing a significant amount of power through the legislature and so have an incentive not to support protests calling for radical change (Trejo, 2014; Lust-Okar, 2004). In contrast, in more autocratic regimes, the public's perception that the regime is invulnerable is a major political asset. This perception is fed through supermajorities in elections, repression or popular mobilisation

(Schedler, 2013; Arriola and Lyons, 2016; Levitsky and Way, 2002).[77] Accordingly, protest-motivated crisis cabinets occur in settings where the regime dominates parliament, occupying on average over three quarters of the lower house.

Within these settings, public protest can inform would-be dissenters that dissatisfaction with the regime is widespread and could encourage cascading protests against a weakened and delegitimised government (Kricheli et al., 2011). Major protests in authoritarian regimes provide useful information for rival elites, showing that public loyalty to the government is low, reducing the cost of launching a coup (Magaloni and Wallace, 2008; Caspar and Tyson, 2014). In short, large-scale protests form a more severe political threat to the regime in autocratic governments, necessitating drastic changes in the elite coalition to mitigate the political threat and satisfy the public's demand for change.

The dramatic changes seen in protest crisis cabinets can be interpreted as a pre-emptive revolution, in which widespread changes to the elite coalition are implemented, albeit under the stewardship of the regime. Out of the three protest crisis cabinets, only in Guinea did the incumbent retain power. In Ethiopia the ruling party remained in charge but under a new leader, while the leader and party was replaced by an interim government in Tunisia.

In the following section, the three protest-motivated crisis cabinets are qualitatively investigated to show how the protests caused a fissure within the ruling elite, leading to dramatic change in the ruling coalition; and secondly, how the resulting crisis cabinets were specifically tailored to address protester grievances.

7.4 The politics of crisis cabinets after mass protests

7.4.1 Ethiopia

In Ethiopia, a number of cabinets were created between 2016 and 2018 by the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) to address the widespread protests and violence that had occurred since late 2015. The protests were concentrated in the Oromia region in response to the Addis Ababa Master Plan which would expand the boundary of the capital into farms in the surrounding area, leading to fears amongst Oromo farmers that they would lose their land (Fisher and Gebrewahd, 2018). The EPRDF's use of repression and coercion during the previous elections in 2005, 2010 and 2015 had demonstrated that the regime could not be removed at the ballot box (Arriola, 2013; Arriola and Lyons, 2016). The government reacted to the protests with repression, a tactic used

[77] For example during the 2010 Egyptian Parliamentary elections, President Mubarak's National Democratic Party increased its share of seats to occupy 81% of parliament. In Burkina Faso, President Blaise Compaoré won 80% of the presidential vote in 2010 and 55% of the parliamentary vote in 2012. Both Mubarak and Compaoré would be ousted through mass protests within the next few years.

during previous post-election protests (*ibid.*). The crackdown led to a widespread loss of life while a state of emergency led to a restriction of rights and civilians being arrested for social media posts.

The government also sought to assuage protester demands by suspending then scrapping the Master Plan in early 2016. In spite of this gesture, other regions harboured grievances against the EPRDF and the perceived Tigray domination of the supposedly multi-ethnic ruling coalition (Fisher and Gebrewahd, 2018). As a result, the protests spread to the Amhara region and the Southern Nations and Peoples region. Though these protests were largely rooted in ethno-regionalist grievances, protesters from different regions began to associate their struggles with each other (*ibid.*). The regime then engaged in a reshuffle in late 2016 in which the number of Oromo ministers increased, but longstanding party loyalists retained important posts in Defence, Telecommunications and the Deputy Premiership, while Tigrayans continued to dominate the senior military and intelligence sectors (Africa Confidential, 2016b). These changes were perceived as token or cosmetic by the opposition.

The government crackdown on Oromo and Amhara protesters eventually created a split within the EPRDF regime. The Oromo People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) – members of the ruling EPRDF coalition – eventually openly criticised the government in order to retain some connection with their protesting constituents (Fisher and Gebrewahd, 2018). Furthermore, the EPRDF's use of repression was condemned by the US through a bipartisan bill in the House of Representatives (Jeffrey, 2018). Internal factionalism and external condemnation of the regime eventually led to leader Hailemariam Desalegn resigning under pressure from his own party as the regime tried to restore its legitimacy with a new power configuration.

Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo, was elected the new leader of the EPRDF at the start of 2018 in an internal election which was marred by open conflict between the coalition's constituent parties (Africa Confidential, 2018a). Abiy was presented by the regime as a reformist who could placate the protester's demands for renewal. Abiy announced his inaugural cabinet in April 2018.

Abiy's cabinet showed a high degree of 'renewal', representing the largest turnover in cabinet personnel in an Ethiopian reshuffle outside elections recorded in ACPED (52.5 percent, against a previous average of 7.9 percent). Many of the ministers who were dismissed were longstanding stalwarts of the now discredited regime. Out of the 21 dismissed minister, three had been in cabinet since the 1990s and ten had been in cabinet before 2012, when Meles Zenawi was in power. Zenawi was seen as the architect of both Tigray domination within the EPRDF and the 'developmental state' system which prioritised economic development over political consensus and deprived people of their land (Zahorik, 2017). It was also during the latter part of the Zenawi era that repression became the method by which the regime held onto power (Arriola and Lyons, 2016).

Another major change was a regional rebalancing of the cabinet. The protests had been stirred by largely regionalised grievances against the state, though the complaints of the different groups – primarily Oromo and Amhara – resonated with other groups critical of the regime. Figure 7.2 shows that the crisis cabinet regionally rebalanced the allocation of posts to mollify these two restive regions. The Amhara region saw its representation in the cabinet at large increase from 23 to 30 percent. The crisis cabinet also allocated more than half of the important inner circle posts to the Oromo region. Outside of the more visible executive, Abiy Ahmed also reduced Tigray influence in the security sector which the protesters held responsible for the government atrocities during the crackdown (Africa Confidential, 4 May 2018).

Figure 7.2 - Regional Changes in Representation - Ethiopia



In short, the Abiy's crisis cabinet (and the EPRDF's appointment of Abiy as the party's leader) was tailored to address the demands of the protesters. The dismissal of long-term ministers and the appointment of a new leader satisfied the protesters demands for significant change, short of the replacement of the EPRDF regime, from a government that was perceived to be both unwilling to cede power and unwilling to consult its citizens or constituent parties. The rebalancing of the cabinet

and inner circle towards more Oromo and Amhara representation addressed the repeated accusations that the EPRDF was merely an extension of its Tigray faction, and did not represent the interests of all Ethiopians.

7.4.2 Guinea

In Guinea a crisis cabinet was appointed after a year of highly organised strikes and protest against the regime lead by a coalition of two large trade unions, the *Union syndicale des travailleurs de Guinée* (USTG) and the *Confédération nationale des travailleurs de Guinée* (CNTG). The regime of long-time president Lassana Conte had lost much of its popularity due to decreasing wages and rampant inflation during the 2000s. Since the introduction of elections in the 1990s, the opposition had failed to present a credible alternative to the Conte regime and most opposition parties boycotted elections. The different opposition parties were overwhelmingly believed to represent particularistic ethnic or subnational interests (Engeler, 2008). In contrast, trade unions retained a national identity due to their role in the independence struggle and managed to encourage passive strikes in early 2006 which were observed by the population at large (McGovern, 2007).

Following these strikes, two relatives close to Conte were convicted of embezzling $22 million from the treasury, prompting Conte to overtly intervene on their behalf and break any pretence of separation of powers within his government. This prompted the USTG and CNTG to launch a strike in January 2007 which lasted nineteen days and was widely supported by the Guinean population. Protests in Conakry were violently repressed by the military and Conte declared a state of emergency which imposed martial law (*ibid*.). Conte tried to placate union demands for new leadership by returning substantial powers to the post of Prime Minister. However, he appointed Eugene Camara, a close ally, as the new Prime Minister (Africa Confidential, 2007). This half-hearted attempt at negotiation led to the unions renewing their protest while the National Assembly – previously a rubber stamp parliament – reasserted its independence by refusing to prolong the state of emergency (McGovern, 2007; Engeler, 2008). This signified a break within the regime elite and the increasing political isolation of Conte.

No longer able to rely on the regime elite and facing pressure from the strong Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to resolve the issue, Conte capitulated and selected the unions' preferred candidate, Lansana Kouyate, as the new Prime Minister and a new cabinet with much of the old guard purged (Africa Confidential, 2007). The new cabinet, appointed by Kouyate, was constructed to project the impression of renewal, efficiency and integrity. The number of ministers was cut from 28 in December 2006 to 21 in March 2007.

Nearly all former ministers tied to Conte were dropped, resulting in the highest turnover of personnel in the cabinet and inner circle – 88.9 and 85.7 percent respectively – recorded (in ACPED) during Conte's reign. This changing of the guard included a candidate to be Conte's successor, Minister-Secretary General to Presidency, Fodé Bangoura (Africa Confidential, 2006).

The Guinea case differs from Abiy's crisis cabinet in that the dropped ministers did not have particularly long tenures, averaging a tenure of just over two years. This is because Conte pursued a personalist strategy of repeatedly rotating elites to prevent independent bases of power from forming (Kroeger, 2018; Roessler, 2011).[78] Nevertheless, the dismissal of his possible successor showed that Conte was willing to replace core members of his elite circle to placate the protesters.

The main complaints against Conte's regime were corruption and ineffectiveness at rectifying the country's economic problems, as opposed to ethnic or regional complaints. Nevertheless, Kouyate's cabinet expanded regional representation within the inner circle (see figure 7.3). The opening of the political space was also demonstrated by the political backgrounds of the new ministers. The majority were technocratic professionals who were unconnected to Conte's clique, the ruling party or the opposition. These technocrats occupied the key ministries of Finance and Justice (Wikileaks, 2007). Ministers associated with the unions secured the positions of Financial Oversight and Transparency, Labour and Administrative Reform, and Education. However, the military and security apparatus managed to gain the Defence and Internal Security portfolios.

[78] In the previous ten years Conte had enacted eight large-scale reshuffles outside of the post-election period.

Figure 7.3 - Regional Changes in Representation - Guinea



All these factors meant Kouyate's cabinet was interpreted as a "victory for the people over a totally discredited power – a real revolution" (Engeler, 2008). Kouyate's crisis cabinet was designed to address the grievances that had driven the protest. The turnover of most of the cabinet including Conte's potential successor signalled government would no longer be stuffed by loyalists. The appointment of technocrats and union officials demonstrated that the new government would be staffed by those who could fix Guinea's economic issues and effectively represent the populace. Finally, by ceding a large amount of power Conte had held onto the presidency and the ability to get the regime back under his control.[79]

[79] Just over a year later Conte fired Kouyate and packed the cabinet once again with loyalists (Africa Confidential, 6 June 2008). Kouyate's new government had failed to resolve the cost of living issue while soldiers and police rioted over salary arrears (Engeler, 2008). Furthermore, Kouyate had launched an independent audit into embezzlement by the president's relatives (Africa Confidential, 2008). Conte and the old guard reacted as soon as Kouyate's support among the general public and unions was waning, enabling Conte to retain control until his death at the end of 2008.

7.4.3 Tunisia

In Tunisia, the appointment of two crisis cabinets in January and February 2011 was a direct consequence of the protests that spread across the country starting in December 2010, when a street vendor set himself on fire in the city of Sidi Bouzid. Demonstrations were held in several cities, quickly coalescing into a large protest movement against Tunisia's long-time ruler Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The response to the sweeping unrest consisted of a mix of repression and accommodation.

While security forces were responsible for killing dozens of people between December 20 and January 14, Ben Ali also attempted to mollify the demonstrators by firing ministers and local governors in late December, announcing job creation plans and pledging to hold legislative elections and step down in 2014. The reshuffle announced on December 29 involved changes to minor cabinet portfolios, including the communications, trade, religious affairs and youth ministers, which ultimately failed to placate the protesters who continued to mobilise well beyond the autocrat's departure on January 14.

Furthermore, the protests caused a splinter in the regime. Both the Minister of the Interior and Chief of Presidential Security chose to mutiny against the regime, and some security service units mobilised to arrest members of the Ben Ali family (Holmes and Koehler, 2018). Ben Ali subsequently fled to Jeddah. Three days after Ben Ali left the country, the long-time technocratic Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi announced a crisis cabinet composed of members of the dissolved ruling party, technocrats and opposition figures, many of whom resigned before taking office to express their unhappiness about the continued presence of associates of the former regime. Although only five ministers from the previous regime were reappointed and the most unpopular figures had left the government, demonstrations continued unabated for over a month with protesters denouncing the continuity of the interim government and demanding more radical changes. On February 27, Ghannouchi announced his resignation, leaving the post of Prime Minister to Béji Caid Essebsi, a former ambassador and minister in the 1970s who formed a caretaker government consisting entirely of non-party ministers (Bin Aschour, 2016).

In the months between December 2010 and March 2011, widespread, persistent unrest pressured Tunisian elites to make significant changes to the government and to increase its overall representation. By March 2011, all ministers associated with the Ben Ali regime had been purged from the cabinet, representing an unprecedented level of turnover. Previous reshuffles outside of elections resulted in an average 8.5 percent change in personnel. The first attempt at a crisis cabinet in January 2011 resulted in the dismissal of three quarters of the cabinet, and the subsequent reshuffle in February 2011 resulted in half of the new cabinet being dropped.

Some of Ben Ali's closest associates, including members of his extended family, the head of presidential security Ali Seriati and the former Interior Minister Rafik Belhaj Kacem, were arrested and faced judicial charges for their role in the crackdown of the uprisings.

The continuation of the protests following Ben Ali's departure contributed significantly to the ongoing changes in the cabinet (Boubekeur, 2018). Despite Prime Minister Ghannouchi expelling Ben Ali's loyalists from the executive's inner circle and his own technocratic profile, he was himself still tainted by his association with the former regime, and demonstrators accused him of retaining some of Ben Ali's ministers to water down the outcomes of the revolution. As a result, popular pressure mounted between January and February 2011 to also expel ministers that, despite their alleged technocratic profile, had served under Ben Ali, in some cases for more than a decade. The role played by the protests during the interim period therefore explains the high rate of observed ministerial turnover, as well as the relatively long average tenure – five and a half years – of the dismissed ministers.

At the same time, the protests also contributed towards modifying the cabinet's geographical representation. Under Ben Ali, ministerial positions were disproportionately distributed among elites from Tunisia's coastal areas, and particularly from his home region of Sousse (Camau and Geisser, 2003). In December 2010, the Prime Minister, as well as the Defence, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture ministers, were all from Ben Ali's region.

By contrast Tunisia's inner regions, which had been a hotbed of protest, had often been marginalised, sparking highly contentious popular grievances. Among these regions, Zaghouan and Kebili never enjoyed ministerial representation, while Le Kef, Sidi Bouzid and Tataouine had only one minister each in twenty-three years.

It is therefore not surprising that one of the main goals of the protest movement was to ensure more equitable political representation. The cabinet appointed by Essebsi in March 2011 was more geographically diverse, in spite of the number of available ministerial posts being reduced by one third and the technocratic profile of many of its ministers, who typically came from the capital and the largest urban centres. The government's inner circle, comprising ministers appointed to the most influential portfolios, also became more representative as a consequence of the expulsion of Ben Ali's Sousse clan which had traditionally monopolised these positions.

Figure 7.4 - Regional Changes in Representation - Tunisia



In sum, the appointment of two consecutive crisis cabinets in Tunisia was a consequence of the protest movement that led to Ben Ali's ousting in January 2011. The pressure exerted by popular protests pressured transitional elites into appointing more inclusive governments and breaking with the authoritarian past by dismissing ministers that had been part of Ben Ali's cabinets. At the same time, hostility to Ben Ali's former prime minister heading the transitional government led several opposition figures to resign from Mohammed Ghannouchi's government in January 2011, and to cease any collaboration with former regime members, who were eventually banned from running in the subsequent elections.

In Tunisia, as in the other two cases, the protests caused a split in the ruling elite when members of the regime recognised that peace was unattainable while Ben Ali remained in power and that the old regime was unsustainable. In Ethiopia, the protests and the violence of the government crackdown forced internal elites to confront the regime on the behalf of their constituents while providing disgruntled factions in the regime with the opportunity to become dominant. In Guinea, the protests enabled a previously pliant legislature to start imposing its authority on the leader and demanding that the regime negotiate with external elites to end the violence.

7.5 Conclusion

This study illustrates how regimes react to existential challenges through the appointment of crisis cabinets, using the example of mass protest. The cabinet constitutes one of the main arenas where democratic and non-democratic leaders renegotiate the bargains that sustain their regimes, and are therefore vitally important during times of political stress. It investigated how non-routine mass cabinet reshuffles enable regimes to increase their chances of survival during periods of acute crisis.

This study adds to the literature on political survival strategies through focussing on how actions external to the regime elite can drive change. Much of the current literature on leadership transitions and elite volatility emphasises the role of elite decisions and internal rivalries (Albertus, 2012; Albertus and Menaldo, 2012; Roessler, 2011; Lindemann, 2011a). Yet how external events, such episodes of popular unrest, inform elite decisions is rarely studied.

Protests have the potential to exacerbate internal splits within the government, weakening the perceived strength of the leader and the regime. External elites can then pressure a fractured regime for concessions, as shown in Guinea. Factions within the regime can capitalise on public discontent to improve their position in the political hierarchy, as shown in Ethiopia. Mass protest can convince regime elites that the existing order is destined to fall and can encourage insiders to steward a managed transition, as shown in Tunisia. This study demonstrates that, although crisis cabinets in Africa are rarely made in response to protests, the occasions where protests do result in substantial cabinet turnover is when the unrest changes the political calculations and strategies of elites both inside and outside of the regime.

Existing literature on protests and government response has typically focussed on the timing and the geography of repression[80], but has often failed to account for strategies of regime accommodation or co-option. When accommodation has been examined, the lack of data on political appointments means that researchers have had to use regime/opposition rhetoric to approximate for concessions (Bhasin and Gandhi, 2013; Carey, 2006). Protest-motivated crisis cabinets, albeit rare, are influential and display high rates of ministerial turnover, the removal of long-tenure ministers and increased representation of regional centres of unrest. These substantial changes represent a dramatic shift in the distribution of political power. This in turn signals to the protesters that the regime is changing the status quo and is willing to engage in significant reform.

Because of the limited sample used for this study, this analysis cannot infer causal claims about the origin of cabinet volatility in Africa, but should be best viewed as a theory-building exercise to generate hypotheses. More stringent statistical studies covering a wider sample of country/year cases

[80] See Arriola 2013 and Pierskalla 2010

could test the theories outlined in this paper to better assess the impact of protests on cabinet composition in the medium and long term.

8.0 Inclusion, Volatility and Political Violence across African Regimes

8.1 Introduction

African leaders do not rule alone: they are dependent on mutually beneficial political alliances made with subnational elites. Through an inclusion process, many political elites are granted preferential access to political and economic organs of the state, in exchange for regime support and limiting violent competition with the state. These practices increase regime consolidation and limit the risk of civil war (Rothchild, 1997), and other anti-state violence. Further, by offering competitors state positions and access to patronage networks, leaders 'coup-proof' their regimes (Roessler, 2011).

Clientelism and patronage are often presented as centralized, pre-determined, narrow political systems (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) where African leaders bestow power to co-ethno-regional groups. But these are futile and risky arrangements in democratizing societies, and rarely does a country's demographics support this choice. Rather than exclusive political arrangements and marginalization, African leaders are more likely to engage in inclusive representation to distribute some formal power to politically relevant groups. Across most African states in the post-Cold War period, elites negotiate and exchange loyalty and community alliances for political positions, state rents, and influence. Patronage is the vehicle of the 'politics of survival' (Migdal, 1988), the 'political marketplace' (De Waal, 2015) and 'militarized ethnic bargaining' (Roessler, 2011). The distribution of power in society and across elites emerges from bargaining "among contending elites" (Di John and Putzel, 2009) with an outcome that is mutually compatible and sustainable for the purposes of economic and political viability (Khan, 2010). These practices are not static, stable, or without conflict. Political bargaining allows regimes to adapt to different pressures, crises, and political developments, and reflect changing power hierarchies, leverage, and the needs of the regime and populations. As a result, many developing African states suffer from high levels of instability at senior levels of government, including the cabinet, but these same regimes are often characterized by longevity.

The distribution of power in developing states is a volatile process, and even inclusive regimes experience high rates of political violence. This violence is often between militias competing on behalf of elites who are included in regimes and groups that are represented in government (Raleigh, 2016). This paradox of representation and violence is a result of 'competitive clientelism' that emerges between elites for relative positions within the political hierarchy of the state. Because ongoing political negotiations lead to different rates of elite representation and accommodation within even short periods of time, volatile negotiations lead to violence to secure or challenge those decisions over elected or appointed office (Arriola and Johnson, 2014). Violence is an effective tool of competition, political manipulation, and intra-elite negotiation (De Mesquita et al., 2004). Consequently, in many

African states, political violence is increasingly used by and for included elites and ethnic groups to alter or increase their power share, rather than a resort of excluded groups. This article explores how regimes accommodate competing elites, and under which competitive conditions and changing contexts political violence emerges. It finds that conflict arises from a contest for power, not its vacuum. Further, the inequality of power between included elites, rather than exclusion from central government, is closely associated with political violence.

Conflict research has generally concentrated on exclusive and biased political settlements and institutional arrangements as necessary and sufficient precursors for conflict. Political exclusion specifically increases the risk of regime replacement or civil war (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010; Roessler, 2011; Arriola, 2011) and is robustly associated with horizontal and vertical inequalities in representation (Lindemann, 2011a; Langer, 2005; Østby 2008; Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød, 2008). Yet, civil wars have declined precipitously across Africa, largely in line with the adoption of democratic and participatory institutions (Boix, 2003). However, almost all African states characterized as semi-democracies, one-party electoral democracies, or hybrid regimes experience some form of sustained political violence. The link between power distributions and modern political violence becomes more complicated in regimes and states which practice widespread inclusion. The "elite bargain" provides an important context to explain conflict, but it cannot explain the modality of violence and changing levels of conflict risk across states.

This article analyses the governance of African states with a two-level approach. Leaders choose who to represent and at what level. At the national level, African political systems consist of rival political groups who are competing for their access to state power and resources. We estimate the degree of "representation," or the share of ethno-political groups represented in senior central government relative to the total population, every month for twenty years. At the elite level, we investigate how power is distributed between included groups in the executive branch of government for the same period. We do so by measuring the level of "malapportionment," or the degree to which included groups are overrepresented or underrepresented in government. Finally, we assess the rate of "volatility" in cabinet size and position allocation using a new dataset on the position, tenure, and demographics of individual cabinet ministers, by month, in 15 African countries from 1997 to 2016.

With respect to ethno-political management, African regimes are more often inclusive than exclusive: about 85 percent of ethno-political communities are represented in the national cabinet. Furthermore, the number of seats occupied by elites from particular groups often matches the demographic weight of the communities they represent: about one quarter of seats are malapportioned. Yet, inclusive political settlements do experience political conflict. Excluding large, internally coordinated ethnic groups from the state power increases the risk of civil war, but these cases are increasingly rare. The

likelihood of political violence is highest when senior government positions (e.g., cabinet ministers) are malapportioned. Those included groups assigned a number of seats or positions that they deem insufficient are more likely to engage in violence against the state. Finally, cabinet positions are volatile, and short-term changes in cabinet positions have a positive impact on conflict. We find that a large-scale cabinet reshuffle over a short period of time can generate more political violence by increasing the likelihood of elite infighting.

Our findings reflect pragmatic political calculations: even in states with high levels of ethnic inclusion, if strong elites who represent large or wealthy communities fail to acquire a due share of ministerial positions, higher levels of political violence are expected. Similarly, if small communities acquire too much power relative to their size, higher levels of political violence are also expected. These findings suggest that political inclusion of ethnic groups does not necessarily bring about a peaceful society. Violence is used by included groups and elites to assert their control of the state, and this reinforces that groups in power, large and small, have significant influence on levels of peace or conflict in developing countries. Beyond the knowledge that excluded groups are more likely to rebel, those with state power must be considered when explaining political violence.

Our conclusions have implications for conflict studies and wider disciplines. The domestic politics of developing states have often been overlooked in the study political violence. Yet, politics generates the motivation, agents, forms, and dynamics of political violence. It shapes the agenda of those who use it, elevates the authority and legitimacy of those who benefit from it, and ultimately, reproduces itself in part through the use and threat of violence. As political institutions have changed across Africa, the strategic calculations of leaders and subnational elites have changed to reflect the political contests in new institutions. In turn, conflict has adapted, changing form to fit into the present power contest.

8.2 Leaders Make Choices, Choices have Consequences

Leaders across the developing world extend and consolidate their regimes by co-opting elites and their constituencies. Consequently, leaders endanger their regimes if they do not integrate other powerful domestic agents to secure continued power and extend authority across the state (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). The logic of inclusion and ‘rent-sharing’ is expanded upon in Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), and Boix (2003), who noted that transitions to democratic institutions required inclusive regime management of subnational powers and resources. Because democratic transitions required a greatly increased number of participating elites and selective inclusion, African leaders changed practices from exclusive and co-ethnic dominance in government towards inclusive and multi-ethnic accommodation. As inclusive strategies became central to democratizing states, the composition and

politics of subnational elites became a key factor in the survival and instability of African leaders (Svolik, 2009).

Leaders 'manage' association, loyalty, and alliances in processes detailed by Goldsmith (2001) and Svolik (2009), described as 'political bargaining' by Benson and Kugler (1998), 'ethnic balancing' by Lindemann (2011), and the 'political marketplace' by De Waal (2015). Each detail how leaders accommodate powerful elites and communities who in turn leverage their local influence for rewards and recognition by regimes. 'Limited access orders' or 'closed' systems and 'political settlements' (Khan 2010; Di John and Putzel, 2009) summarize the political environment that emerges as leaders integrate powerful elites from institutional, military, ethnic, and social backgrounds.

These different conceptions of developing world governance suggest that regimes manage subnational elites using the tools of accommodation, and this results in flexible, volatile, and competitive bargaining. Accommodation is in the terms of the patronage bargain between the leader and elite. Patronage – or more accurately for this purpose, clientelism – involves the cultivation and co-option of elites as a means to distribute power where offices effectively become private property (Clapham, 1985; Erdmann and Engel, 2007). Relationships of loyalty and dependence are incentivized through rents, allocation of funds, the creation of public sector jobs in strategic constituencies, and the distribution of government posts among certain ethnic communities (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 458; Lindemann 2011b). This system allows for regimes and subnational elites to build and supply their own networks to consolidate power. Whereas the immediate objective is to purchase loyalty and deflect challenge, the larger purpose of patronage in Africa is to "facilitate intra-elite accommodation in young, multi-ethnic and poorly integrated political systems" (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 15). Essentially, this practice means to tie together strong, subnational elites in order to consolidate regime power. As such, African governments benefit from extensive and ethnically inclusive representation that stabilizes and reinforces political alliances where power is shared across intermediary elites (Arriola 2009; Goldsmith 2001; Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015).

Leaders seek accommodation and alliance with powerful elites, including ministers, security sector leaders, governors, and select customary authorities because it is essential for order and regime continuity. This is especially true where non-regime elites, or elites outside of the regime's typical support base, have significant national or regional power. Accommodation results in configurations of national power highly dependent on the incentives and power of subnational actors to oppose, limit, or support it (Green, 2010). These practices are designed to accommodate many potential subnational centers of strength regardless of ethno-regional affiliation. In selecting representatives, leaders demonstrate their biases towards communities, identify the beneficiaries of their power, limit the means and power of competitors, and indicate where they exert control and have support. By limiting

access to patronage and state rents, leaders create loyalty amongst those who gain access and competition with those who have little or insufficient access.

African leaders have several representation strategies to build inclusive coalitions that are neither fair nor balanced. These strategies may disproportionately benefit co-ethnics by prioritizing the allocation of key government positions (Arriola, 2008) or may limit co-ethnic power because of the guaranteed support of a leader's constituency (Kasara, 2007). Leaders may also exclude ethnic rivals from state power and limit the size of the groups who dominate in government. Examples of discriminatory regimes who exclude some sizeable proportions of their society include Micombero's Burundi (1966-1976) and Amin's Uganda (1972-1979). These systems are profoundly unstable. In contrast, regimes practice 'coup-proofing' when potential challengers are co-opted into government with mutually beneficial arrangements (Roessler, 2011). Local elites with significant power may exchange influence for loyalty to the regime (De Mesquita et al., 2003); this loyalty norm is based on fear of losing access to state resources if the new leader comes to power. Relying on the loyalty principle, those benefitting from power may be less likely to upset it. Yet regimes may also distort the power of strong, potential challengers by packing the government with groups from smaller communities (Arriola, 2011). 'Cabinet packing' creates alliances among small but locally useful constituencies and allows regimes to appear 'inclusive'. 'Counterbalancing' creates multiple versions of the same department or positions within government to keep possible competitors weak and disorganized while creating new allied recipients of patronage. These practices can result in the skewed distribution of material benefits to a combination of groups (Arriola, 2009; Bayart, 1993; Van de Walle, 2006). Finally, regimes further bias representation by letting positions accrue to powerful elites representing locally strong and possibly independent communities. The support of these elites and groups is more important to capture than weaker constituencies.

These calculations often produce an inclusive but unbalanced power system that favours strong elite groups. These arrangements reflect a reality: subnational elites leverage their ethnic, regional, financial or religious associations in their negotiations with leaders. Consequentially, elites differ in their political weight compared to each other. Distorted distributions of elite power emerge when it is strategic for leaders to recognize and reinforce power differentials to their benefit, to limit power or take advantage of intra-elite competition.

Constricting the number of elite benefactors does not always create exclusive regimes. The inclusion of social groups and the distribution of government jobs between included groups are distinct measures of political settlements and have separate but inter-related consequences. In practice, African states practice highly inclusive but volatile representation (Raleigh, Wigmore-Shepherd and Maggio, 2018; Francois et al., 2015; Goldsmith, 2001). As a result of a regime's political calculus, there are multiple possibilities for ethno-political configurations. For example, countries that are

ethnically inclusive may have a highly malapportioned government where one, or a few ethnic groups have a 'disproportionate' share of cabinet positions, or an exclusive regime may distribute power equally across the few included groups. Consider the example of Tanzania, which is a multi-ethnic country with more than 120 distinct ethno-regional groups. Although Tanzania has built ethnically inclusive governance in which diverse ethnic groups are represented in government, in some periods, members of Chagga and Hehe groups have taken up together almost half of cabinet ministers.

Figure 8.1 is a graphical illustration of two hypothetical configurations of a state with multiple ethnic groups of relatively equal size. Figure 8.1A represents an ethnically inclusive regime where most ethnic groups except one (Group 6) are included within government. Yet this regime has a malapportioned cabinet where Group 1 holds dominant power. By contrast, figure 8.1B represents an ethnically exclusive regime where Groups 4-7 are excluded from participation in central government. It has a well-apportioned cabinet where three included ethnic groups equally divide executive power. Both are common results of different accommodation strategies practiced between regimes and elites. Both scenarios suggest a more complex representation calculus underlying African political systems.

Figure 8.1: Ethno-political configurations of the state[81]

A: High Representation Regime, Malapportioned Cabinet

B: Low Representation Regime, Well-apportioned Cabinet



Much of the recent literature on civil wars placed the inclusion-exclusion dimension at the centre of their analysis. They argue that groups excluded from senior positions for sufficient periods foster grievances and have little leverage outside the use of violence. It follows that high and stable rates of representation create a context of relative peace. Cederman et al. (2010) argue that ethnic groups excluded from central executive power are about three times more likely to rebel than are included groups. Further, relatively wealthy or poor excluded groups are more likely to engage in armed conflict than are those of average wealth (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch, 2011). Rebel violence is most likely to occur in non-democratic systems with small ruling coalitions (Choi and Kim, 2018), as with little opportunity to politically engage, armed rebellion presents as a legitimate and necessary strategy to overthrow regimes. Despite the cost of increasing the risk of rebellion in Africa, governments pursue these policies because ethnic exclusion reduces the risk of coup d'état (Roessler, 2011). Taken together, these studies indicate that ethnic exclusion increases the likelihood of violent conflict. By taking advantage of a grievance motivation, excluded groups mobilize to challenge the

[81] Solid circle represents the territorial boundary of the state. Shaded circle represents the boundary and size of political representation. Each segment within the shaded circle represents the proportion of cabinet positions held by an ethnic group.

incumbent and ultimately redress their political status. This leads to the first hypothesis:

H1: Higher levels of ethnic exclusion from central government will increase the risk of anti-state violence by rebels.

Indeed, as regimes have expanded through inclusion, the rate of civil war occurrence has decreased across Africa. Research on exclusive regimes suggests that civil wars are the option of choice by marginalized communities seeking to overthrow the state (Buhaug, 2006). However, since the decline of civil wars, multiple other forms of political violence occur with a persistently high rate across many African states. But it is unknown how inclusive regimes generate or affect political violence. Further, regimes and leaders persist, despite violent disorder and mass volatility. How is the composition of government both generating conflict and serving as a negotiation tactic between elites and leaders?

African political leaders face both internal and external threats to their tenure as leaders (Quiroz-Flores and Smith 2011). The cause and the solution to these threats are the same: when leaders incorporate an elite into a senior government position, they do so realizing that these elites are also competitors. Yet, leaving out strong elites can create conditions for anti-state violence. Inclusion is, therefore, the more risk averse choice.

Explanations for internal conflict against the state suggest that strong elites are likely to engage in coup-like actions towards leaders and aim to overtake the leader's position. But coups are rare, while the integration of strong elites into government is common. Further, elites can contest positions in government without contesting the legitimacy and position of the leader. De Waal (2009), Raleigh (2016) and several others suggest that elites challenge the government to extract greater rents, but not to replace the leader. The practices of negotiation between elites and leaders can be intermittently violent, but the threat and risk of defection is enough leverage for a leader to strategically integrate or improve the position of elites.

Governments in many developing states are beset by 'competitive clientelism'. Inter-elite contestation is the most likely outcome of a competitive political process, especially since leaders are fortified—therefore difficult to deal with directly—and they are eager to incorporate strong elites with significant leverage in exchange for government positions and mutual dependence. Elites compete to position themselves as the one to be negotiated with. Elite competition is acknowledged at key periods (e.g. elections) and through parties, but there are several other, common moments of elite competition, contests for subnational elite replacement; territorial/boundary disputes; voter, wealth, and position competition etc. where subnational elites will engage in violence against an opponent, often within the same political party or identity group. They may also target state agents to influence their

bargaining position (De Waal, 2015). In short, representation and accommodation create unique types of competition. Competition creates anti-state violence by elites. This violence, often engaging political militias, increases with 'imbalance' across senior government positions where one, or a few ethnic groups are dominant enough to secure state power and resources. In such cases, underrepresented groups (i.e., groups whose share of cabinet positions is less than their population) may challenge the state through personal armies to secure greater access to government or starts a round of bargaining with the incumbent, or over-represented groups may use violence to reinforce their favoured positions. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

H2: Higher levels of ethnic imbalance in senior government positions will increase the risk of anti-state violence by political militias.

Levels of representation and power distribution are in constant flux in African politics. While overall community representation may be generally stable, elites shift in and out of power due to promotions, demotions, and reshuffles. African leaders often reshuffle senior positions (Quiroz-Flores and Smith, 2011), and recent evidence suggests a 10 percent rate of inter-annual change in ministry positions (Francois et al., 2015) and a 20 percent rate of intra-annual change (i.e., 20 percent of ministry positions last less than one year) (Raleigh et al., 2018). The average tenure of a cabinet member's combined total service across administrations is 44 months or approximately 3.5 years. The average duration of a cabinet ministry is 5.3 years or 64 months. There is significant volatility in the people and positions across African cabinets.

Volatility in representation is due to changes in regime alliance needs as leaders determine the timing, frequency, and extent of change in cabinet positions. A leader may choose to alter the cabinet to correct an appointment in a merit-based system (Huber and Gallardo, 2008; Dewan and Myatt, 2010), to improve electoral prospects, or to reflect coalition dynamics (Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999). Regimes are surrounded by numerous, volatile satellite elites and parties who represent identity groups and seek to demonstrate sufficient electoral support for entry into a ruling coalition and access to patronage (Van De Walle, 2007; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, 2003). As regimes selectively accommodate or expand their co-option, more subnational elites bargain, compete, and fragment alliances over access to state resources and power (Lijphart, 1977; Brancati, 2007; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bratton and Chang, 2006; Raleigh, 2016). Within systems where political office has redistributive implications (Schedler, 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Arriola and Johnson, 2014), included elites have incentives to design forms of violence to assure continued access to power. This is assumed to be heightened during periods of volatility. Thus, changes in ethnic representation and apportionment may generate or perpetuate conflict as existing elites seek to secure a dominant share

of posts within the ruling coalition. But leaders are strategic in their timing, and highly volatile periods can be interpreted as the regime's response to elite grievances and representation. Therefore, elites are unlikely to engage in anti-state violence during that period, and more likely to compete with each other at the subnational level.

Volatile access to state resources is likely to generate intense competition between elites as changes in government composition provide them with the opportunity to renegotiate and reposition themselves vis-à-vis other elites. This is another side of the loyalty principle: changing the power distribution may increase the loyalty of beneficiaries to the incumbent leader, but those who end up with reduced or challenges to positions and power may attempt to redress their position through violence with other elites. In short, conflict is a feature of political competition, rather than an indication of its breakdown.

H3: Higher levels of cabinet volatility increases competitive violence amongst non-state actors.

To understand the links between elites, leaders, and violence, consider two cases of where political manipulation on both the regional and national level has increased competition between elites, who, in turn, employed violence. In the first case, the regime of President Goodluck Jonathan in Nigeria (2010-2015) sought to divide the influence of a strong Southern region by counterbalancing and splitting positions. This restricted the organizing power of the regional elites and secured regime and leader strength. In 2009, the Nigerian government was engaged in a peace negotiation with the Niger Delta militants and during that year, no representatives of Delta state were awarded a position in cabinet. After a successful peace deal, two previous Delta cabinet members (Peter Godsday Orubebe and Ngozi Okonjo Iweala) were reinstalled and retained positions for several years. But the government sought to limit the powers of any particular Delta elite. 'Delta' representation can be counted in several ways: those from Delta state; the extended region (including Delta, Balaysa, and Rivers states); and the new region which was extended by the Obasanjo regime to include Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Cross Rivers, Edo, Imo, and Ondo states. The extended region contains 23 percent of Nigeria's population, while the 'new' extended Delta includes approximately 33 million people at approximately 25 percent of Nigeria's population. In 2010, President Jonathan gave far more cabinet positions to elites from small and less populated states in the new extension than to those from larger states (Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers). As a result, there was a high degree of competition within the Delta for regional and national positions. Nigerian elections, in particular, took a violent turn between strongmen "who armed youths in the Delta, deploying them as saboteurs and storm troopers against their political rivals" (Schultze-Kraft, 2017). Niger Delta representation is manipulated by the central

regime to deliver its internal goals, and this, in turn, created violent competition within the Delta for political access.

The same process of competition is found in DR-Congo, where "the most influential politicians come from…an armed group background" (Perera, 2017) and are willing to use armed conflict to continue their power by offering financial support to militants for control over communities, or challenge existing authority, or gain new political leverage (Perera, 2017). As Sterns et al. (2013) notes, politicians use violence to get electoral support and to maintain influence. In turn, elite representation in Congo's violent regions is highly volatile, including annual extreme changes for South Kivu and Katangan politicians (now Tanganyika, Haut-Lomami, Lualaba and Haut-Katanga). The duration of any individual elite in cabinet is lowest for South Kivu, Bas Congo and Kasai Occidental. Violence is highest in areas of internal political volatility amongst the elites.

8.3 Methodology

8.3.1 Operational Data

Despite their importance, there are few measures of government composition and representation practices. In many states, cabinets are the locus of policy decision-making and patronage opportunities. Further, "a cabinet minister in Africa is considered 'a kind of super representative' (Zolberg, 1969) who is expected to speak for the interests of co-ethnics, as well as channel resources to them" (Arriola, 2011). Ministers influence where to allocate public resources and can supplement their personal incomes by offering contracts and jobs in exchange for other favours.

Cabinet ministers are examples of both ethnic representation and balance, as ministerial positions serve as an important means through which to forge an intra-elite bargain (Roessler, 2011; Bratton and Van De Walle, 1994; Lindemann, 2011b; Rothchild, 1995; Arriola, 2009). Rather than being the result of voting outcomes, a cabinet is selected by the President or Prime Minister. The composition of the cabinet therefore offers insight into the strategic balancing that the regime engages in to manage the cleavages, competitors, and identities within a state. Consequentially, cabinet composition, change, and size represent "elite clients sustained by a regime's leader, whether a democratically elected president or a coup-installed dictator. An increase in the number of cabinet ministers is interpreted as an attempt to expand the leader's base of political support" (Arriola, 2011). Cabinets must include a collection of constituency representatives who are deemed necessary for the continuation of the regime (Arriola, 2009) within the context of judicious inclusion and exclusion of certain groups. Therefore, the creation of a cabinet and the balance of elites, groups and power is a deliberate and volatile process linked to the demands of the patronage process and elite leverage.

The African Cabinet and Political Elite Data (hereafter ACPED) is a project that tracks the presence, position, and demographics of ministers within African cabinets for each month from 1997 to the present (Raleigh et al., 2018). ACPED collects information on all ministers within national cabinets; each minister is associated with several demographic and political identifiers, including home region and associated ethnic community, political party, gender, and position within the cabinet at each month. Ministers can move positions, move in and out of cabinet, and cabinets can expand and retract through adding or firing ministers and positions. A monthly assessment captures the variation in this activity. Information is sourced from published cabinet lists and in-country experts[82].

By tracking individual ministers and aggregating multiple ministers as the composition of the executive branch, these data generate a dynamic and salient approximation of national ethnic representation and intra-elite power balance. These data allow for distinct measures of country level, including the degree of ethno-regional representation, power distribution amongst elites, the scope and depth of dominant party infiltration, and the volatility in cabinet size and position allocation.

ACPED is a supplement and expansion of other data, notably the Ethnic Power Relations project (Wimmer et al., 2009), and the African cabinet set by Francois et al. (2015). While the EPR data relies on experts' assessment of aggregated ethnic positioning in government, no formal or identifiable positions are compared across groups, times or states. As Francois et al. (2015) note in reference to EPR, 'hard' information on the participation of groups in government is more objective. Further, the artificial clustering of groups into EPR's seven-point categories obscures rather than elucidates the role, relationships and variability between ethnic groups. ACPED uses objective information on formal positions rather than expert opinions, enabling the measurement of subtle changes in elite bargaining, representation and power-sharing.

Relatedly, ACPED is more up-to-date than Francois et al. (2015)'s cabinet data, which ranges from 1960-2004. The period covered by ACPED (1997 to the present) witnessed extreme changes in the structure of African governments, as democratic transitions, new political parties and power-sharing agreements brought widespread elite inclusion and competition for power. ACPED accurately tracks these developments through formal cabinet positions, by month, across Africa and into real time. Furthermore, while Francois et al. (2015) collect annual data, ACPED is disaggregated to the monthly level. About 19 percent of African ministers under study have tenures shorter than 12 months; these shortened tenures are most common during periods of crisis. Not integrating these crucial short-term developments limits a researcher's ability to analyse dynamics at points where the elite bargain and

[82] African Research Bulletin publishes information on the composition and changes in cabinets, and this is supplemented by additional, country-specific sources.

settlement is breaking down. In sum, ACPED is a disaggregated, updated, and expanded set of cabinet ministers, representing the heterogeneous political environments developing across African states. It is public and all data are openly available.

8.3.2 Measure of Representation

The extent of subnational ethnic representation is measured by the presence or absence of a cabinet minister at a given time and comparing the aggregated elite composition in cabinet to the ethnic composition of the state[83]. To operationalize this measure, the ethno-political groups are identified in an ethnic macro-roster for each state. These rosters are composed from several relevant sources, including Scarritt and Mozaffar's (1999) Ethnologue, Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) lists, as well as national experts. Multiple sources reflect the variety of subnational identities that may be politically relevant in states at different time periods. Expert opinion is privileged if a discrepancy between source materials arises.

For each month, we assess whether assembled cabinet ministers represent one of the ethno-political groups. Communities who have a representative through one or more cabinet positions in a given country-month are recorded as 'represented' for the period of appointment(s). The aggregated monthly share of included group populations[84] is the representation score, summarized by the following notation:

$$Representation_{ct} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_{ict} \qquad (1)$$

where 'Representation' for state *c* at time *t* is the combined population share (*y*) of represented ethnic groups *i*. The Representation index varies between 0 and 1; values near 0 denote high exclusivity and values near to 1 indicate all ethno-political groups are represented in the cabinet. In addition, the demographic size of each group is used as a 'weight' when determining the relative size. Population weights are computed at ethnic level from Ethnologue and checked within geospatial population measures, and at district level (ADM2), as reported by states' statistical office.

8.3.3 Measure of Malapportionment

ACPED generates a measure of malapportionment in the national cabinet based on previously established methods (Duncan and Duncan 1955; Samuels and Snyder 2001). This measure defines how cabinet appointments are distributed across represented ethnic groups. To create this measure,

[83] The entire list of macro groups is available upon request from ACPED.
[84] Levels of population are summed through Ethnologue, media sources, and national census data and are measured in relative size to each other.

all the identified ethnic groups represented by ministers within the cabinet-month are merged with their correspondent ethno-political characteristics. The malapportionment index is calculated using only the represented groups in a given state-month, and therefore, it describes how power is distributed across cabinet members.

Studies on the electoral system have employed 'disproportionality' measures for describing the deviations resulting from the difference between party votes share and party seats share and other contexts (Gallagher, 1991; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003; Lijphart, 1994). ACPED's malapportionment score measures a similar characteristic. A modified version of the 'disproportion' index, popularized by Loosemore and Hanby (1971) and Gallagher (1991)[85], is employed as a means to determine the discrepancy between the shares of cabinet positions and the shares of population held by included ethnic groups. Thus, the formula becomes:

$$MalapportionmentEth_{ct} = 1 - \frac{(\sum_{i=1}^{n} |x_{ict} - y_{ict}|)}{2} \qquad (2)$$

The malapportionment measure for state *c* at time *t* is computed as the summation across all ethnic groups of the difference between *x*, which is the share of the cabinet positions allocated to group *i*, and *y*, which is the share of the population of group *i* in the total population. The above index ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 denotes a perfectly-apportioned cabinet where the demographic weight of an ethnic group is matched to held seats out of the total size in cabinet, and 1 denotes a highly malapportioned case as one or more groups hold many more positions than their relative demographic weight suggests they should.

8.3.4 Measure of Volatility

ACPED's monthly tracking of senior government activity confirms that African cabinets can be extremely volatile, with several reshuffles and alterations occurring within a single year. Consequently, who and where is included and excluded within a cabinet can shift dramatically over a short period of time. In select cases, the values of ethnic representation and/or malapportionment increased or declined sharply following a large-scale cabinet reshuffle, such as the negative change in representation between October and November 1997 in Nigeria (-64 percent). We estimate the effects of volatile cabinet in the following way: for each country and month, we calculate the deviation of cabinet size, defined as the number of ministers, from the long-term average (1997–2016) and divide this score by the standard deviation of cabinet size. The variable *Volatility* takes the value of 1 if the

[85] In his study on the disproportionality of electoral outcome, Gallagher (1991) uses a least squared version of the Loosemore and Hanby index to compare vote received and seat allocated to parties.

number of ministers is considerably above or below average (greater than two standard deviations above or below the long-term mean), and 0 otherwise.[86]

8.3.5 African Political Settlements

Table 8.1 offers descriptive statistics for *Representation*, *Malapportionment*, and *Volatility* variables. The mean level of representation is 85.5%, providing robust affirmation that African governments generally represent their populations. Yet, representation is volatile and varying. For example, the lowest level of representation is registered for Mali during April 2012 (8 percent) and April 2011 (15 percent), which preceded the onset of the civil war that affected the north of the country in 2012. The mean level of malapportionment in African cabinets is equal to 25 percent, indicating that, on average, 25 percent of a country's represented ethno-political population are over or underrepresented. The highest malapportionment value (50 percent) of the sample is in Tanzania during August 1998. The Pearson Correlation coefficient between *Representation* and *Malapportionment* is not high (-0.163), suggesting that these measures do not capture a dual latent dimension or collinearity. On the other hand, the mean value of *Volatility* is 0.025; a total of 86 country-months within the sample had a volatile cabinet whose size is significantly reduced or enlarged relative to the long-term average.

Table 8.1: Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
$Representation_{t-1}$	0.855	0.121	0.230	1.000
$Malapportionment_{t-1}$	0.247	0.076	0.047	0.498
$Volatility_{t-1}$	0.025	0.157	0.000	1.000

Figure 8.2 offers a more detailed picture of the cross-country variation of representation and malapportionment scores by state. Observations located in the bottom-right part of the graph include states characterized by high levels of inclusion and well-apportioned cabinets (low malapportionment). These cases are a contrast to those in the upper left quadrant (e.g., Uganda and Liberia), which exclude some segments of their ethnic population and have higher levels of malapportionment. Moving towards the upper right are states with both high representation and malapportionment levels. States such as Tanzania, Cameroon, and Ivory Coast include most ethno-political groups but distort elite power through allocating more positions to some group representatives over others. For example, in Tanzania, the Chagga group is the most overrepresented

[86] We tested whether our results are sensitive to the change in the operationalization of volatile cabinet. The results of all *robustness tests are reported in* the online Appendix.

group in the cabinet. This was pronounced during President Mpaka's rule (who was not a Chagga), while President Kikwete's Hehe group are often given more positions than their demographic weight during his tenure. Most African states are in the bottom right-hand position indicating that they are inclusive and allocate power proportionally across elites. Yet, there is significant variation over time even within these relatively inclusive, balanced cases.

Figure 8.2: Ethnic measures of Representation and Malapportionment[87]



8.3.6 Research Design

This study uses country-months as the unit of analysis. The conflict data came from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010) whose political conflict data are distinguished by event characteristics and group(s) participating, with geographical location and date. The dependent variables are the number of conflict events for three distinct types of violence: 1) rebels against the state; 2) political militias against the state; and 3) political militias against non-state armed groups (rebels and political militias). ACLED is the sole conflict data project which allows for these types of interaction in political violence to be measured during and outside of typical 'civil war' periods in a systematic way.

[87] Figure 8.2 displays the average levels of ethnic representation and malapportionment indexes at state level computed using ACPED. All the values are computed for the period 1997-2016, except for South Sudan (2011-2016).

These aggregations of conflict events are chosen so as to reflect how African conflict has shifted significantly in recent years. Rather than being characterized by civil wars fought by rebels and states, African political violence is now primarily clashes and attacks perpetrated by political and communal militias. These groups seek to influence the political trajectory of the state, rather than to replace it. As table 8.2 reports, about 35 percent of the state-month observations used in this study experience a civil war. In its place, the manifestation of political competition is in the use of militias as personal armies for politicians (e.g., Somali regional militias) to challenge voters or oppose candidates during election periods (e.g., Mungiki in Kenya), employing militias to challenge co-ethnics and possible intra-party competitors (e.g., Nigeria and South Africa), and the splintering of regime militias to challenge internal competitors (e.g., Zimbabwe ZANU-PF activity). For this reason, the conflicts considered here are focused on common agents and forms of political violence but allows for a wide consideration through using all acts involving state forces.

Explanatory variables include measures of ethnic *Representation,* cabinet *Malapportionment,* and *Volatility* derived from ACPED. All of these variables are lagged by one month to reduce endogeneity bias, that is, to ensure that they are political traits preceding the occurrence of violent events. Cabinet data from 1997-2016 are included for the following states: Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.[88] This sample of 15 African states represents a range of regions, violence rates and types and institutional structures, and ultimately, the continent at large. Our argument stipulates that African governance challenges have arisen across institutional forms (e.g., complete autocracies, competitive autocracies, hybrid and democratizing states); the variation in both the type and scale of inclusion, and the absence or presence of conflict make this sample of states a robust test of the hypotheses.

We include several control variables to capture factors that are known to influence conflicts through other channels. We control for the number of ministers (*Cabinet Size*) and discrete ethnicities represented within the cabinets (*Ethnicities in Cabinet*). According to Arriola (2009), a larger number of cabinet ministers is expected to lower the risk of internal revolt (e.g., coup d'état) by making the incumbent less dependent on the loyalty of any single elite group. We also expect that the number of ethnicities in cabinet may correlate with violence independently from power distributions (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007). Their inclusion allows an identification of the effect of the main explanatory variables of power distribution, while fixing the number of politicians or ethnic groups in the central

[88] When computing the ethnic measure, we exclude observations for Tunisia and Morocco from our panel, as these states have almost no variation in the ethnic composition of its government.

government. The *Democracy* variable captures the quality of democracy in African states and has been found to influence the onset and degree of armed conflicts in previous research (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Lacina, 2006). To measure the level of democracy, we utilize the Polity IV's democracy index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011).

We also include the natural log of *GDP per capita* and *Population* as proxies for socioeconomic development and demographic conditions of the conflict state. *Economic Growth* is measured by dividing the current year's GDP by the previous year's GDP; this variable has been found to be a significant predictor of armed conflict, with increases in economic growth resulting in decreases in the risk of civil war (Alesina et al., 1996; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Choi and Kim, 2016).[89] These variables are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017). Lastly, a dichotomous variable, *Civil War,* is included as this event creates large increases in violence independently from power distribution explanations. *Civil War* equals 1 if the country is engaged in a civil war that reaches at least 25 battle-related deaths within a given year based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Table 8.2 provides summary statistics for control variables.

Table 8.2: Summary Statistics for Control Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Cabinet Size	29.566	6.246	1.000	48.000
Ethnicities in Cabinet	8.954	3.139	1.000	18.000
Democracy	1.422	3.926	-6.000	9.000
Log(GDP per capita)	6.367	0.781	4.631	8.624
Economic Growth	4.187	9.373	-46.082	106.280
Log(Population)	16.734	1.012	14.674	19.015
Civil War	0.352	0.478	0.000	1.000

Model. A negative binomial model with fixed effects tests the hypotheses and accounts for the discrete nature of the conflict variables.[90] By adding country fixed effects, the benchmark model accounts for state invariant, unobserved characteristics that are likely to influence the average level of conflict

[89] Information on *Population*, *GDP per capita,* and *Economic Growth* are available as national, annual totals and interpolated for monthly periods.

[90] Following Allison and Waterman (2002)'s advice, we utilized an unconditional negative binomial regression by including 14 dummy variables for countries to directly estimate the fixed effects. They show that the conditional negative binomial regression for panel data is "not a true fixed-effects method" and does not "control for all stable covariates" (Allison and Waterman 2002, 247).

within a state, such as historical grievances and geographic characteristics (e.g., mountainous terrain, natural resource endowments). We estimate models with bootstrap standard errors based on 1,000 replications and country-level resampling clusters.

8.4 Results: Allocation of Power and Conflict

Table 8.3 presents coefficients and standard errors from the empirical tests of conflict events for three distinct types of violence: rebels against the state (models 1a/b/c), militias against the state (model 2a/b/c), and militias against non-state armed actors (model 3a/b). In model 1a, the impact of ethnic representation on rebel violence is found insignificant, and with an unexpected positive sign. This result runs contrary to a common view among policy makers and academics that ethnicity based exclusion from state power is a principal source of civil war (H1) (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer 2013). In model 1b, which contains a full set of explanatory variables, we find that cabinet malapportionment is a significant and strong predictor of rebel violence against the state. When the score of *Malapportionment* increases from 0 to .5, the level of anti-state violence by rebels is expected to increase by about 400 percent, holding other variables constant. Given that African states generally practice inclusive representation today, the main factor in cross-national variation of rebel violence is not ethnic exclusion but distorted distribution of elite power. Meanwhile, increases in cabinet volatility are not associated with rebel violence.

Figure 8.3: Expected number of rebel violence against the state[91]



[91] Includes 95% confidence intervals, all other variables are held at their means.

Table 8.3: Impact of Representation, Malapportionment and Volatility on different types of violence

	1a	1b	1c	2a	2b	2c	3a	3b
Variables	*Rebels vs. Government*			*Militias vs. Government*			*Militias vs. Non-state actors*	
$Representation_{t-1}$	1.413	-0.209	8.394		1.593	-2.399		-1.329
	(0.962)	(0.937)	(2.284)***		(0.588)***	(1.776)		(0.976)
$Malapportionment_{t-1}$		8.184	38.374	2.020	1.794	-13.220		3.685
		(0.982)***	(7.125)***	(0.798)**	(0.848)**	(6.775)*		(1.203)***
$Volatility_{t-1}$		0.022	-0.351		-0.106	0.019	1.714	1.568
		(0.405)	(0.461)		(0.513)	(0.547)	(0.363)***	(0.351)***
Representation x Malapportionment			-34.144			16.344		
			(8.103)***			(7.490)**		
Cabinet Size	0.008	0.021	0.004	0.023	0.021	0.025	-0.019	-0.014
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.009)**	(0.010)**	(0.010)**	(0.012)	(0.012)
Ethnicities in Cabinet	-0.213	-0.143	-0.119	-0.040	-0.073	-0.065	0.117	0.145
	(0.046)***	(0.045)***	(0.048)**	(0.037)	(0.034)**	(0.037)*	(0.047)**	(0.044)***
Democracy	-0.323	-0.305	-0.279	-0.044	-0.049	-0.047	-0.124	-0.116
	(0.030)***	(0.031)***	(0.030)***	(0.019)**	(0.019)**	(0.019)**	(0.029)***	(0.028)***
Log(GDP per capita)	1.046	0.984	0.857	0.303	0.307	0.323	-0.880	-0.836
	(0.225)***	(0.218)***	(0.229)***	(0.129)**	(0.126)**	(0.134)**	(0.205)***	(0.204)***
Economic Growth	-0.025	-0.015	-0.017	0.003	0.001	-0.000	0.022	0.023
	(0.006)***	(0.006)**	(0.007)**	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.013)*	(0.011)**
Log(Population)	1.480	1.806	2.152	2.633	2.567	2.524	3.638	3.866
	(0.683)**	(0.661)***	(0.682)***	(0.598)***	(0.586)***	(0.607)***	(0.746)***	(0.743)***
Civil War				0.861	0.827	0.827	0.939	0.913
				(0.162)***	(0.160)***	(0.160)***	(0.147)***	(0.151)***
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-29.137	-35.697	-48.041	-47.500	-47.377	-43.336	-56.606	-60.659
	(10.026)***	(9.867)***	(10.659)***	(9.220)***	(9.014)***	(9.468)***	(11.169)***	(11.067)***
Akaike information criterion	8619.38	8537.83	8514.73	7349.02	7344.96	7339.39	4758.73	4749.23
Number of Countries	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Number of Observations	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409

Model 1c repeats the second model but tests for an interaction between *Malapportionment* and *Representation* by including the multiplicative term of the two variables. The coefficient on *Malapportionment* × *Representation* is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that the effect of cabinet malapportionment on rebel violence is maximized when the degree of ethnic representation is low. Figure 8.3, which is based on Model 1c, plots the predicted number of rebel events based on two sets of explanatory variables, holding other variables at their means. Overall, higher levels of ethnic representation serve as a moderating channel to alleviate the effects of malapportioned cabinet on rebel violence.

Figure 8.4: Expected number of militia violence against the state



Model 2a shows that an increase in intra-cabinet malapportionment is associated with an increase in militia violent events against the state, lending support to H2. When *Malapportionment* changes from 0 to .5, the number of anti-state militia violence increases by about 100%, holding other variables constant. This is consistent with our expectation that anti-state violence by militias will increase as a result of elite competition or in response to the rising level of ethnic imbalance in senior government positions. In model 2b, the coefficient on *Representation* is also positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that high levels of ethnic representation create more fertile breeding grounds for competing elites to challenge the state. Further, model 2c shows a significant interaction between *Malapportionment* and *Representation*, which indicates that the positive effect of cabinet malapportionment on militia violence is most pronounced in countries with high representation of

ethnic groups. Figure 8.4 displays the predicted number of militia violence against the state as a function of two explanatory variables, holding other variables at their means. We observe an effect of ethnic imbalance in high representation regimes (*Representation* = 1); as malapportionment gets higher, so does the risk of anti-state violence by militias.

Figure 8.5: Expected number of militia violence against non-state actors



In model 3a, the coefficient for *Volatility* is statistically significant for militia violence against non-state actors ($p < .01$), providing support for H3. In model 3b, higher levels of *Malapportionment* have a strong, positive influence on violence among non-state actors, while *Representation* fails to exhibit any substantive effect. This shows that an alternative modality of political violence ─ violent competition among non-state actors ─ tend to increase in African states that have ethnically inclusive but malapportioned government. Figure 8.5, which is based on model 3b, shows that a unit change in *Volatility* is expected to increase the number of militia violence against non-state actors by more than four times, holding other variables at their mean values. How can these findings be explained? When regimes include more varied groups and elites within senior levels of government, existing elites encounter increased competition and enjoy less secure leverage. In such cases, the strongest elites fight over the spoils, competing for more power to secure positions from large sectors of population who have new access. This is the reason for a close association between increasing cabinet volatility and non-state infighting, as has been confirmed in other studies of militia conflict (Raleigh 2016; Choi and Raleigh 2014). Overall, a regime's accommodation strategy does not necessarily bring about peaceful

elite co-existence: such a volatile policy is prone to multiple upsets between the regime and the growing number of elites to negotiate and deal with.

The control variables provide additional insights. Larger *Cabinet Size* significantly increases the number of militia violence against the state. Higher numbers of ethnic groups in cabinet (*Ethnicities in Cabinet*) significantly decrease anti-state violence by rebels but increase violence among non-state actors. In addition, African countries with higher levels of *Democracy* are less likely to experience all types of violence. Higher levels of *GDP per capita* have significant, positive effects on anti-state violence by rebels or militias, while having a negative impact on violence between non-state groups. *Economic Growth* is negative and significant in model 1, implying that better economic performance and job growth decrease the number of rebel violence. Both types of militia violence - anti-state and inter-militia – tend to increase in times of *Civil War* where political militias often function as supplementary agents of violence for government or rebels. Lastly, larger *Population* increases the number of all conflict events.

Our main findings are as follows: in African polities, higher levels of ethnic representation fail to prevent civil wars, but rather increase the risk of anti-state violence by political militias. The effect of ethnic representation on rebel violence is constrained by how cabinet positions are distributed across represented ethnic groups. Second, the inequality of power between included groups is a better predictor of which countries are at risk for political violence than is ethnic exclusion. This includes a malapportioned cabinet where one, or a few, select ethnic groups have dominant influence. Third, the risk of infighting among non-state actors increases in malapportioned regimes, especially following a large-scale cabinet reshuffle where the distribution of elite power shifts dramatically over a short period of time.

8.5 Discussion

Institutional changes from the early 1990s across Africa led to the decline of one party, autocratic governments and opened the political environment to competition. New elites entered government and the size of cabinets expanded significantly. But despite these changes, very few leaders have been removed through the ballot. The regime survival paradox is explained by the cohort surrounding leaders (De Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller, 1992; De Mesquita and Siverson ,1995; Goemans 2000a, 2000b; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). However, the composition of elites in democratizing African states, and the survival of large and unwieldy governments who fail to deliver basic services, has received limited attention in literature on instability.

Here we argue that the link between conflict and representation has been unduly limited to exclusion and civil wars. But other modalities of political violence have increased while political inclusion has risen. How can this be explained through the framework on 'exclusive violence'? We find that political violence is widespread across democratizing states because of 'competitive clientelism': where elites are vying for senior positions, and leaders are seeking to accommodate minimum winning coalitions, violence becomes a strategy of negotiation. Organized violence is, most commonly, a strategy of elites to increase power; it is directed against regimes and other elites. It is also mainly a practice amongst those who already have power through senior positions in government.

These findings suggest that power politics, or 'realpolitik' principles, are apt representations of elite competition across African states. Leaders, and their regimes by extension, are engaged in a two-level game: leaders will appoint elites to the cabinet from a large swathe of the population, maximizing 'representation' and 'inclusivity', and providing enough rents and positions to potential spoilers. This is necessary for legitimacy, consolidation of authority and influence across the state. However, there are consistent levels of malapportionment in the cabinet, and higher levels of imbalance in elite representation increase the risk of violence against the state. This suggests that 'dissatisfied' elites may engage in anti-state violence for greater access to state power and resources. Therefore, ethnic imbalance creates conflict, but rarely challenges leaders.

Mal-apportioned cabinet may result from leaders' strategy to reward electorally pivotal groups (or swing groups). In Africa's emerging democracies, electoral competition exists alongside *clientelistic exchanges* (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013). Leaders in these new democracies can buy political support by distributing more resources to 'swing' groups than to 'loyal' or 'opposition' ones.[92] Loyal groups (e.g., regime co-ethnics) have limited influence to press the regime to offer more as their loyal support is guaranteed rather than used as effective leverage. Opposition groups (e.g., separatists or those with a history of armed rebellion against the government) may require unacceptable levels of accommodation or be unresponsive to redistributions of welfare; hence they should receive few benefits. On the other hand, swing groups are most likely to won over by clientelistic goods. These elites contest the regime to signal a negotiation, but also contest between each other to vie for greater local authority and power to leverage against the regime. These elites benefit the most from political bargaining within patronage systems.

Zimbabwe's new cabinet after the 2018 election offers a good example of malapportionment (Raleigh and Morris, 2018). Although the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)

[92] A number of studies in the patronage literatures — for example, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1996), and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) — argue that leaders can purchase votes by allocating clientelistic goods primarily to groups or regions with large numbers of swing voters.

secured a two-thirds majority in the house of assembly, margins of victory were not large in most districts. Especially, three of the ZANU-PF's traditional heartlands — Manicaland, Mashonaland East and West — turned into swing provinces. Since these areas are crucial for the consolidation of power, President Emmerson Mnangagwa allocated key cabinet posts to elites from swing provinces, and the distribution was markedly different from the last Mugabe government. For example, Manicaland elites secured several high value appointments, including Defence and War Veterans Affairs Minister, Home Affairs Minister, Minister of Information, and Deputy Minister for Information Technology and Courier Services. Elites from Mashonaland East and West secured positions in the ministries of Agriculture, Energy, Transport, Justice, Tourism and Mines. Despite being densely populated, both Bulawayo and Harare elites have little representation in the new cabinet.

To conclude, a leader is closely dependent on the correct balance of co-opted subnational elites. But a leader's correct balance is not necessarily one that is fair. Strategies employed to generate a compliant coalition and cabinet are not likely to be stable or peaceful. Regimes across African states have managed to include great numbers of ethno-political communities, expand and retract cabinets frequently, and withstand variable levels and modalities of political violence, both against the state and between elites. These factors underscore that competitive clientelism is a core feature of African politics, despite violence or mis-representation. Further, it reinforces the importance of subnational elites as critical political figures within African politics and as objects of study amongst scholars seeking to understand the changing dynamics of violence across the continent.

To that end, this expanded understanding of domestic politics in African states – and the strategies of power accumulation across politically relevant groups and elites – differs considerably from the 'ethnic exclusion' model that is frequently referenced in conflict literature. As conflict has changed to reveal increasing state violence, militias, and elite manipulation of violent agents, investigations of how domestic politics promotes these trends are compelling: subnational elites are flexible in their associations with leaders and regimes, often crossing ethnic and regional lines. The result is often a coalition that is pragmatic, rather than limited by identity politics. However, the leverage of elites is constantly in flux relative to other elites and the leader. This, in turn, affects their ability to negotiate their relevance with the regime. The regime is subject to constant political recalibration of which violence is a strategy, rather than an indication of government breakdown.

In competitive clientelism, violent strategies are closely associated with included elites, rather than marginalized communities. Pursuing armed, organized violence is a strategy of those with the means and ability to generate significant pressure on the regime; smaller and excluded groups are limited in their capacity to pursue this option. The contest for control and authority is between the strongest groups

and coalitions. To that end, conflict is not due to a breakdown in competitive clientelism; it is often a feature of it.

9.0 Conclusion

9.1 Project Aim, Question and Sub Questions

The aim of this thesis is to address the following question:

Does the composition of the senior government represent the distribution of political power in African states?

This overarching question is broken down into several sub-questions.

9.1.1 How to Measure Representation in the Senior Government?

This question covers the decision over which branches of senior government to investigate and what metrics of representation to employ.

This research project opted to focus on the executive branch of government, due to the concentration of political power within the executive in Africa (Prempeh, 2007; Francois et al., 2015; McKie and Van de Walle, 2010), but also because the cabinet members are directly appointed rather than elected, providing insight into the leader's decision making process on elite power-sharing. A large existing body of literature uses cabinet as an approximation of the regime's clientelist network, ethnic representation and power brokers (Arriola, 2009; Lindemann, 2011a; Lindemann, 2011b; Kroeger, 2018; Francois et al., 2015). This research project built upon these works by creating a more detailed and disaggregated dataset on cabinet ministers.

The research project investigates changes in cabinet composition over time using several metrics including size, ethnic composition, regional composition and party composition. Given the centrality that ethnicity is ascribed in African politics (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) and the role of elites as ethnic 'super-representatives' (Arriola, 2009; De Mesquita et al., 2005), the ethnic composition of the cabinet took a central role in many of the chapters of this research project.

9.1.2 What Factors Effect the Distribution of Power?

To examine how cabinets reflect the distribution of power, factors which affect the distribution of power need to be isolated. The research project identified external factors and events which the existing literature argues should alter the power sharing calculations of the leader and the political decisions of the elite to investigate if these showed any correlation with changes in the composition of cabinets. The selected factors were ethnic demography, economic performance, regime strength, opposition strength, elections and public unrest.

9.1.3 Do These Factors Explain Variance in Senior Government Patterns of Representation?

The historical record shows that coalitions are not static: many African regimes experience regular changes in the elite through standard reshuffles, purges, transitory coalitions of convenience and rebellions. Africa includes a broad range of regimes spanning dominant party systems, military junta, personalist dictators and highly competitive systems with multiple viable coalitions (Marshall et al., 2002; Coppedge et al., 2018; Schedler, 2013; Wahman et al., 2013). This project demonstrates that the variance in elite power-sharing strategies is at least partly explained by different distributions of political power. This is achieved through using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods to show how cabinets vary according to ethnic demography, economic performance, regime strength, opposition strength, elections and public unrest.

A review of the findings in the previous chapters demonstrates how different factors within countries contribute to the diversity in political arrangements witnessed across the continent and how the composition of cabinets reflect varying political stresses and opportunities. While the composition of cabinets cannot provide information on all aspects of elite politics, this project has demonstrated that it does provide a good representation of the distribution of power within an African state. Given the level of detail and extensive coverage in the ACPED data, it is one of the best estimators of the distribution of political power across Africa during a period of significant change in regime characteristics and institutional forms.

9.2 Chapters

9.2.1 Ethnic Arithmetic or Political Calculus

Ethnicity is commonly treated as a key factor influencing the distribution of political power in the African state (Ndegwa, 1997; Mhlanga, 2012; Berman, 1998; Rothschild, 1995; Szeftel, 2000; Azam, 2001; Langer, 2005), to the degree that ethnic heterogeneity has been used as a proxy for estimating the topography of political competition and patronage networks (Posner, 2004a). Yet this literature has two weaknesses: that it focuses mainly on patterns of exclusion rather than patterns of power-sharing and that it fails to account for volatility in elite power-sharing arrangements.

This project finds that elite power sharing arrangements are not simply a reflection of a state's ethnic demography. While regimes tend to grant most of the main ethno-political blocs some level of inclusion within the senior government, cabinet posts are not shared proportionately between the different groups. Leaders over and underrepresent different ethnic groups within the cabinet, demonstrating that while African cabinets rarely fit the stereotype of exclusive ethnocracies, certain ethnic groups are usually favoured over others. This raises the question of which groups are favoured,

why, and whether these imbalances reflect imbalances of political power between different ethnic constituencies.

Secondly, the project finds that the ethno-political hierarchy is volatile in some states, with formerly underrepresented groups coming to dominate the cabinet and vice-versa. This demonstrates that the political calculations of leaders and regimes are liable to change based on changes in the distribution of political power. This finding then raises the question of what events or other political factors cause leaders and regimes to change their strategies of elite power sharing, including how power is shared amongst ethnic groups, and whether these shifts in representation reflect shifts in political power. The following chapters explore these questions.

9.2.2 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility

This chapter is the first to investigate whether specific factors, which are deemed to affect the distribution of political power, lead to visible changes in the composition of the cabinet. The factors studied in this chapter include regime strength, economic performance and whether there is an upcoming election. Existing literature on African politics largely agrees on the importance of state largess in coalition building (Arriola, 2009; Szeftel, 2000; Lindemann, 2008; Berman, 1998) and elections are often seen as potential flashpoints for upheaval (Schedler, 2013). But how these flashpoints affect leader or regime strategies of elite management is understudied.

Logistic regressions find that cabinets are not necessarily more volatile during these stress periods: mass changes of personnel do not occur with more regularity during periods of weak economic growth and are, in fact, less common in the run up to elections. Nevertheless, permutation tests demonstrated that these stress periods do exert an influence on how leaders organise their cabinet, dependent on the strength of a regime.

Competitive regimes, which are more vulnerable to external competition, create larger and more ethnically proportionate cabinets in the run up to elections to dampen the attraction of opposition parties. Leaders in hegemonic regimes do the opposite, creating more ethnically malapportioned cabinets in pre-election periods, with the leader's co-ethnics dominating the inner circle. This reflects the power dynamic in hegemonic regimes, where the real competition happens within the regime, often during electoral primaries, meaning leaders need to elevate their own supporters within the ruling coalition.

Leaders in competitive regimes contract their cabinet, making them smaller and less ethnically representative, during economic slumps because there are less resources to share with elites. Conversly, leaders in hegemonic regimes can rely on accumulated resources to avoid narrowing their coalition.

This chapter demonstrates how different combinations of regime strength and external conditions influence the variety of elite power-sharing arrangements seen across Africa. The chapter provides evidence that strategies of elite power-sharing co-vary with external events which change the distribution of political power and the distribution of posts in the senior government. It therefore supports the argument that the senior government is an effective means of estimating the topography of political power in African states.

9.2.3 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains

This chapter examines cabinet volatility post-elections to determine whether power-sharing strategies vary based on different power relationships between the regime and the electoral opposition. It does this by examining post-electoral cabinet reshuffles to show how different power relationships between the regime and the opposition result in leaders opting to engage in two different strategies frequently mentioned in the Africanist literature: the politics of the belly and the politics of co-option.

African regimes are described as both exclusionary, focused on cultivating the support of co-ethnics and loyal constituents, and broad-based coalitions which engage in co-option to minimise dissent (Dollbaum, 2017; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Lindemann, 2011b; Van de Walle, 2007; Langer, 2005; Posner, 2007; Ndegwa, 1997). But the contexts which motivate leaders or regimes to favour one strategy over the other remain understudied. Chapter four (Ethnic Arithmetic and Political Calculus) showed that regimes are rarely ethnically exclusive but that different groups are over or underrepresented at different points: this chapter demonstrates how political circumstances can lead to leaders promoting or demoting different groups.

Repeated out-of-sample non-parametric tests showed that leaders in competitive regimes co-opt ethnic groups affiliated with the opposition when democratic challengers are strong but if the opposition is fragmented, they capitalise on the opportunity to boost the representation of their co-ethnics. Leaders in hegemonic regimes also tend to grant more cabinet representation to opposition co-ethnics when facing a cohesive opposition, though this does not happen via immediate post-election reshuffles. This shows that hegemonic regimes also need to mitigate opposition threats with co-option and use the opportunity posed by a fragmented opposition to engage in the politics of the belly, but that these strategies are implemented on a slower timescale.

The main contribution of this chapter is that it contextualises popularly cited regime strategies as responses to the political environment. Regime strategies of prioritising co-ethnics or co-opting dissident groups are often treated unconditional traits of African regimes in the existing literature (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984; Van de Walle, 2007; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This chapter also provides robust evidence that political circumstances influence how leaders prioritise different groups within the cabinet and so furthers the argument that cabinets reflect the power dynamics in a country.

A major limitation is that the data is both limited and unbalanced, with more competitive regime observations than hegemonic regime observations. Though this chapter tried to overcome the data limitations through data resampling and partitions, there is still a possibility of both false positives and false negatives (particularly in the hegemonic regime observations).

9.2.4 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa

This chapter provides a more in-depth examination of how elite power-sharing strategies are adapted by the regime or the leader to counter specific types of political threat. It introduces the concept of 'crisis cabinets', where leaders instigate widespread reshuffles outside of the procedural cabinet changes which occur post-election. This chapter defines these reshuffles as occasions where more than half the cabinet is removed. By isolating cases of crisis cabinets over the past decade, the research found that these non-routine reshuffles were generally made after specific political crises or transitions. These crises included coups, factional infighting and mass protests.

Focussing on dramatic reshuffles made in response to mass protests, this chapter showed that although mass protests rarely prompt regimes to create crisis cabinets, in specific circumstances protests can have a major impact on the distribution of power in senior government. In response regimes create crisis cabinets defined by a high turnover in personnel, the dismissal of longstanding regime elites and a boost in the representation of protest hotspots. This chapter demonstrates how leaders and regimes seek to mollify public discontent through a mass influx of new elites into the power-sharing bargain. This chapter also shows that different regime types are vulnerable to different threats, with more autocratic regimes being highly vulnerable to protest while more democratic regimes are comparatively immune. This again demonstrates how different configurations of regime traits and external threats require leaders or regimes to engage in different survival strategies and forms of elite power-sharing.

A qualitative investigation of the political and historical context of the three protest-motivated crisis cabinets, shows that they all occur when protests cause a rupture within the regime elite. This could explain why some protests lead to crisis cabinets and a major reshaping of the elite power sharing bargain and others do not. Much of the current literature on volatility at the senior government level focusses on intra-elite rivalries (Albertus, 2012; Albertus and Menaldo, 2012; Roessler, 2011; Lindemann, 2011). But this chapter demonstrates how external events can cause leaders, regimes and regime elites to alter their political calculations and perceive previously stable power-sharing bargains as unsustainable.

In the case of Tunisia, the internal rupture led to the fall of the regime and the exile of the leader. In Ethiopia, the rupture in the elite caused a reformist faction within the regime to gain dominance and

reconfigure the power-sharing arrangement. In Guinea, the protests weakened the perceived strength of the president and allowed regime, opposition and civil society elites to exact concessions.

This chapter contributes to the core question of this thesis by showing how acute political crises, which dramatically change the balance of power in a country through exposing public discontentment with the regime, result in dramatic changes in the cabinet.

9.2.5 Inclusion, Volatility and Political Violence across African Regimes

This chapter examines how different types of threat and political violence emerge from different power sharing arrangements. It expands upon the current literature's focus on ethnic exclusion and state vs rebel civil wars to show that both included and excluded communities engage in political violence to put pressure on the regime (Østby, 2008; Buhaug et al., 2008; Roessler, 2011). Chapter four shows that African regimes are rarely exclusive ethnocracies. Furthermore, recent studies on political violence in Africa show that non-rebel violence, such as political militia activity, accounts for a large portion of violent events (Raleigh, 2016).

Quantitative tests demonstrated several key findings. Firstly, higher levels of ethnic representation do not necessarily prevent civil wars. Instead, the inequitable apportionment of cabinet posts among ethnic groups, rather than outright exclusion, increases the likelihood of anti-state rebel violence. Secondly, highly representative but malapportioned cabinets result in a higher level of anti-state violence by political militias, typically acting on behalf of elite interests. Lastly, higher levels of volatility in the cabinet increased the risk of infighting among non-state actors.

This chapter presents two key contributions. Firstly, the results show that violence is not restricted to marginalised communities but also includes elites and communities at the centre of the regime's power-sharing bargain. This runs contrary to a common view that ethnic exclusion from state power is a principal source of political violence (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer 2013). This finding is important as chapter three shows that while exclusive ethnocracies are a rarity in African states, the allocation of posts is frequently unbalanced. Instead, the analysis presents a more nuanced picture in which violence is used as a tool of competition within the political hierarchy.

Secondly, multiple studies argue elites employ violence to alter the distribution of power and therefore alter their place within the elite power-sharing settlement (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Raleigh, 2016; Mehler, 2007). That different traits and changes in the cabinet significantly changes the level and type of political violence indicates that cabinets are reflective of the distribution of political power.

9.3 Limitations

The main limitation of this study is firstly that the ACPED dataset only records a certain subsection of the elite, the cabinet ministers. There is consensus that ministerial positions serve as important means by which to forge an intra-elite bargain (Roessler, 2011; Bratton and Van De Walle, 1994; Lindemann, 2011a; Lindemann, 2011b; Rothchild, 1995; Arriola, 2009). Moody Stuart (1997) found that throughout the global south ministers represent the first tier below heads of state in terms of influence that can be bought and generally cost ten times as much to bribe as the next highest level, permanent secretaries. This high cost of bribery is indicative of the degree to which ministers can politically or economically advantage those within their patron-client network.

However, the cabinet is not an exhaustive record of relevant elites and the historical record points to many influential elite actors occupying positions outside of the cabinet. Many notable anti-government rebels have been drawn from the ranks of the military, such as Paul Rwarakabije of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and Francoise Bozize in CAR, or from the middle civil service or regional executives, such as Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed of the Justice and Equality Movement in Sudan or Charles Taylor of Liberia. Coup leaders are most frequently drawn from the military rather than the executive, for example Idi Amin of Uganda, Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo and Mathieu Kerekou of Benin. In some cases, more junior members of the government have proven important. Ahmed Gaid Salah, who pressured Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika to resign during the 2019 Algerian protests, occupied a junior post in the Ministry of Defence. Governors have proven to be influential in securing funds and support for regimes, including President Buhari's 2015 victory (Kenhammer, 2010; Africa Confidential, 2015b). Other studies focussed on one or two countries have typically included not just cabinet posts but the senior ranks of the military and civil service (Lindemann, 2011a; Lindemann, 2011b; Woldense, 2018).

Another limitation in the data is that the title of a ministerial portfolio may not reflect the actual influence the minister wields. For example, during the Zimbabwean unity government of 2008-2013, the opposition controlled the finance ministry. The ruling ZANU-PF controlled the ministry of mines, which functioned as a de facto treasury outside of the reach of the official finance ministry (Boosyen, 2014). Eventually finance minister Tendai Biti had to plead state bankruptcy and seek aid from the international community while President Mugabe and ZANU-PF retained control over an important stream of patronage. The ACPED database tries to remain consistent in its assessment of ministry importance but cannot account for willful subterfuge which clandestinely reallocates political power and influence between ministries.

Most of these limitations stem from time constraints and are due to this research project's focus on large-N comparable analysis. The project was unable to analyse how the different branches of the state – the junior executive, the judiciary, the security services and the legislature – reflect the

distribution of political power. Other projects within the VERSES and GEOPV projects – which funded this thesis – focus on creating an 'elite census' of influential figures across all branches of government and outside of the regime in a select number of countries.

9.4 Omitted Areas of Study

On top of the various limitations present in this thesis, there were some potential areas of study which are prominent in the literature on political power-sharing and strategies of survival that were omitted.

9.4.1 Electoral and Institutional Variation

Africa shows a wide degree of variation in the institutions or rules formally governing the limits of the leader's power in creating their ruling coalition. Many countries in Anglophone Africa inherited the parliamentary Westminster model but with an empowered president, while many Francophone countries adopted the French semi-presidential system. Yet these de jure rules on presidential power have little impact on the de facto powers of African heads of state. Van Cranenburgh (2008) argues that:

> "the conventional distinction between presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, besides being analytically inadequate, also tells us little about presidential power."

The main concern of this thesis – how leader's and regimes adapt their ruling coalitions and power sharing strategies to adapt to political events – relies on the assumption that leaders have a degree of freedom in choosing their cabinet ministers. Van Cranenburgh (2008) finds that regardless of institutional set up, heads of state exercise a high degree of de facto control over senior government appointments.

Furthermore, metrics from the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) dataset show that in 70 percent of the country-years covered by ACPED, the Head of State has de facto power to appoint the cabinet without requiring the approval of the Head of Government or the legislature (Coppedge et al., 2017). Only in 20 percent of observations was explicit or tacit consent from the legislature a factor in cabinet appointments (*ibid*.).

Another form of institutional variation across the continent is the electoral system. Electoral systems are widely believed to impact the number of parties, opposition coordination and the political expression of subnational identities (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Lust-Okar and Jamal, 2002; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, 2003).

This thesis looked at the impact of elections on the composition of the cabinet: firstly, as a threat to be anticipated in chapter 5; secondly, as a source of information on the relative strength of the regime vis-à-vis the opposition in chapter 6. In both chapters, what is under examination is whether elections

cause leaders to adapt their coalition to deal with the threats posed by external political rivals. In this case, how electoral systems impact regime patterns of dominance may be important.

To test this possibility, I examined the VDEM data and looked at how ruling party dominance of the legislature varied across electoral systems - single-member district (SMD), PR/multi-member districts and mixed systems (MMD/PR) – for the countries and time period covered in this thesis. Table 9.1 shows the results of parametric ANOVA and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests along with pairwise comparisons between systems. Over half (62 percent) of included countries use a single-member district electoral system, a quarter use a multi-member district or proportional representation system while around 13 percent use a mixed system.

Table 9.1 – Legislative dominance against electoral system

	Parametric (Tukey) significance	Non-Parametric (Dunn) significance
MMD/PR vs Mixed	0.16	0.09
SMD vs Mixed	0.76	0.26
SMD vs MMD/PR	0.19	0.2
Overall	ANOVA – 0.12	Kruskal-Wallis – 0.07

Overall the results show that electoral systems do not significantly impact regime dominance. This supports the claims of theorists such as Bogaards (2000) and Schedler (2013) who argue that pre-existing patterns of dominance impact the threat posed by opposition parties and external political rivals. It is certainly the case SMD systems can include strong dominant regimes (such as those seen in Uganda or Botswana) and more competitive fragmented party systems (such as those seen in Kenya or Malawi). Similarly, MMD/PR systems can include strong regimes (South Africa or Rwanda) and fragmented regimes (post-Ben Ali Tunisia). Only mixed systems seem to be associated with solely dominant regimes, being used in Cameroon and Ben Ali's Tunisia.

The impact of both institutional and electoral variation appears to be limited, which is why an in-depth study of these factors was omitted in this thesis.

9.4.2 External Factors

Another potentially important factor that is not studied in this thesis is the impact of external factors located outside of the country, particularly the influence of foreign allies or security guarantors. For a number of African leaders, Cold War superpowers or former colonial rulers have been an important source of material resources and regime security. This is particularly seen in Francophone countries

where potential political and military rivals are aware that France will use its military might to defend the incumbent from non-democratic challenges (Decalo, 1989).

This type of foreign sponsorship greatly empowers an incumbent leader against potential elite and popular threats (excluding electoral losses). The importance of an external sponsor was shown when France reinstated Gabonese president Leon M'ba after an attempted coup in 1964, aided Chad in an interstate conflict against Libya and supported the Malian government against rebellions in the North. Outside of Africa there are examples of the importance of security guarantors. For example, the Bahraini Royal Family held onto power despite widespread popular demonstrations due to military assistance from Saudi Arabia (Josua and Edel, 2015).

There are other foreign sources of security such as regional organisations and powerful neighbouring countries. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has proved to be an important source of security, playing an important role in enforcing regime security in Mali, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. This force is propped up the comparative military might of Nigeria, while post-apartheid South Africa similarly plays the role of regional sheriff in southern and central Africa (Flemes and Wojczewski, 2010).

The historical record suggests that the presence of external guarantors in an important factor in regime security. However, the presence of multiple levels of external security – regional actors such as ECOWAS, international organisations such as the UN, and former colonial rulers – along with informal 'gentlemen's agreements', mean that it can be hard to isolate when a regime is 'sufficiently' supported by external actors. Secondly, it is hard to accurately interpret the strength of foreign security guarantees. While the leadership in Bahrain was saved due to its close relationship with Saudi Arabia, many of the autocrats who were deposed during the Arab Spring were not saved by their regime's close ties to the United States (Selim, 2013). Lastly, an external guarantor may be a double-edged sword for regime survival, protecting rulers against non-democratic threats but also enforcing their adherence to the democratic process. This was shown when ECOWAS intervened to oust Gambian president Yahya Jammeh after he lost the 2016 election or the involvement of France in ousting Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo after he refused to cede power after losing the 2010/2011 election.

These complexities and ambiguities meant that time constraints prevented me from addressing these potentially significant factors in depth. Nevertheless, I consider it a potentially influential variable in informing a leader's strategic calculus, and therefore an interesting area for future study.

9.4 Contributions to Current Research

Despite these limitations, the previous chapters demonstrate convincingly that the senior government reflects the distribution of political power at any given moment. The question is then how these findings aid our understanding of the core themes within the African governance literature.

Political survival, or at least the maintenance of political order, remains a priority in practically all states across the globe, which allowed this research project to borrow heavily from the literature on elite bargaining, leadership survival and cabinet creation outside Africa. This has included a cross section of literature that analyses regimes in Latin America (Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Camerlo and Perez-Linan, 2015), Europe (Indridason and Kam, 2008; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo; 2008; Dollbaum, 2017), the Middle East (Josua and Edel, 2015; Lust-Okar, 2004), Asia (Barraclough, 1985) and studies which cut across all regions (Miller, 2015; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Schedler, 2013; Choi and Kim, 2018; Wimmer et al., 2009).

However politics in Africa is frequently portrayed as uniquely unstable, as demonstrated by the continent's prevalence of coups and civil wars (Decalo, 1989; Arriola, 2009), and lack of economic or human development (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Kramon and Posner, 2016; Lindemann, 2011b). 'African' states are often grouped, or treated as exceptional, due to shared political histories of rapid colonisation and decolonisation, cultural heterogeneity and pluralism, and high levels of poverty and stunted human development (Fourie et al., 2017). Consequently, Africa's diverse array of polities is often subject to overarching statements, which inevitably leads to arguments and contradictions within the literature. A key contribution of the research project is that it demonstrates empirically how some of these contradictions can be explained by varying political contexts and distributions of power.

An example is how this project resolves some of the contradictions in the literature on ethnic representation and exclusion. African regimes have been characterised as both exclusionary winner-takes-all ethnocracies and broad-based co-optative coalitions. Yet, while each of these characterisations is accurate for specific states at specific times, they obscure the variety demonstrated across and within the countries examined in this research project.

This project finds that most regimes represent most ethno-political blocs, but which blocs are represented is subject to change based on political factors such as economic conditions and regime strength. Similarly, just because ethnic groups are included in the cabinet does not mean that they are fairly represented. Leaders still judiciously choose which relevant groups to give prominence to in their regime and which groups to grant 'tokenistic' representation. Again, this decision is guided by factors such as regime strength, opposition cohesion and popular unrest.

Generalisations in the literature on African governance seem undermined by the actual variety of regimes and power-sharing strategies employed across the continent, raising the key question of

whether there is one or many Africas and whether one can talk about ‘African politics’ without being misleading (Allen, 1995).

This project shows that common themes in the literature on African politics - subnational identities, patronage and the personalised links between elites and communities – do not fully explain the diversity of elite settlements throughout Africa when studied in isolation. Instead, these factors interact with external events and elite ambitions to influence the power-sharing strategies and political survival calculations of leaders and regimes. Therefore, while the concept of ‘African politics’ or ‘African governance’ does have merit, the reality shows that the strategies of power-sharing are nuanced.

The project improves upon much of the existing literature on elite power-sharing and volatility in several ways. Firstly, existing large-N studies on representation in the senior government do not address how patterns can change in response to different political conditions (Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015). Secondly, most of the literature addressing volatility within the government and elite primarily attributes patterns of change to intra-elite conflict and ambition (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, 1993; Berman, 1998; Reno, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997). This thesis demonstrates how external factors such as public discontent or economic performance influence the political calculations of the leader and regime elites, which in turn changes the distribution of power and results in changes in senior government composition. It is the relationship between the varying internal and external pressures on the regime which help to explain the observed variety of power-sharing strategies seen across Africa.

The other major contribution is the ACPED data itself. Chapter three shows the advantages ACPED offers over existing datasets, through its disaggregation by month and multiple forms of identity. Chapters’ four to seven provide examples of how ACPED can be used to identify how different circumstances affect the balance of subnational identities within the governing elite (chapter four and five deal with just ethnicity, chapter six deals with ethnicity and political affiliation and chapter seven deals with regional affiliation).

A common adage in the literature on governance and one repeated throughout this thesis is that no leader, regardless of their political environment, rules alone. This argument is shown in studies not just on personalised or less democratic settings (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Kroeger, 2018; Lindberg, 2011a; Langer, 2005; Arriola, 2009; Albertus, 2012), but also on mature highly developed democracies (De Mesquita et al. 2005; Saalfeld, 2005; Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011). This thesis provides the important caveat that who the leader chooses to include or exclude is influenced by the distribution of political power in a country and co-varies with a range of political environments and events. This finding can be extended outside of the African context, and this thesis along with the

ACPED data provides a blueprint of how to investigate the influence of political factors on power-sharing strategies.

9.5 Implications for Future Research

This research project has covered just a few of the factors that could affect the size, composition and stability of the senior government. The existing literature shows many other political phenomena which could affect the composition of the senior government. Examples include the composition of the military (Lindemann, 2011b), whether the regime is supported by external patrons (Decalo, 1989), the reliance of the economy on taxation vs resource rents (De Mesquita et al., 2005) and the capacity of violent political challengers vis-à-vis the regime (De Waal, 2009; Mehler, 2011).

The focus of this research project is on how political events influence elite power-sharing strategies. It does not assess how these strategies actually affect regime or leader survival. Much of the literature on coalition management and African governance argues that miscalculations about elite power-sharing can quickly end in the regime or leader falling from power. Many of these studies rely on cruder measures such as EPR (Roessler, 2011; Roessler and Ohls, 2018), cabinet size (Arriola, 2009) or number of reshuffles per year (Albertus, 2012). More detailed studies tend to focus on one or two countries (Lindemann, 2011a; Lindemann, 2011b), meaning that larger trends across countries are extrapolated rather than observed and quantified. ACPED provides the means to create a detailed and comparative large-N analysis. The individual chapters of this thesis have demonstrated the variance of elite power-sharing strategies, but ACPED also provides the necessary data for future research to analyse the effectiveness of these different strategies.

Existing studies on how the composition of government affects the distribution of patronage generally only focus on the leader (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Jablonski, 2014; Holder and Raschky, 2014). ACPED allows this relationship to be expanded to include other members of senior government – as seen in Kramon and Posner (2016) – and the influence of specific ministries on the distribution of public goods.

A crucial, but untested, relationship in African politics is between an elite representative and their supposed constituency which is typically defined in ethnic, regional, party or religious terms (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997; Langer, 2005; Bratton et al., 2012). ACPED could be used to trace whether ethno-regional changes in the elite coalition can really influence the opinion of the subnational groups about the regime's performance, inclusivity and fairness in the delivery of public goods and government services.

This research project has sought to provide a reliable means of estimating the distribution of political power within a state. In attempting to fulfil this aim, this thesis has brought to the foreground factors which influence how leaders and regimes share power to ensure their political survival. These factors provide context for strategies of power-sharing and provide some explanation for the variety of

regimes witnessed across Africa. This is especially important for a continent which is frequently treated as both a political outlier and a monolithic political environment, and which is often subject to sweeping generalisations.

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11.0 Appendices

11.1 Literature Review

Figure 1 – Leader and Party Tenure 1990 vs 2017



11.2 Methodology and Data: the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset

Passage 1 – Methodology of assigning politically relevant ethnic categories

We did not use a pre-formed ethnic list from which ministerial ethnicities were initially chosen. I researching the ethnic identity of ministers, we came across a large amount of political identities. Some of these identities referred to small ethnic groups, dialects and clans within ethnic groups, or branches of larger ethnic macro-groups. Those ethnic identities are noted as the 'primary' ethnic attribution in the ACPED dataset.

At a second stage, we associated the identities of each minister reported to 'macro-groups' that come from existing ethnic rosters for each state. This macro-group defines the association to a larger, political relevant community within the state. This decision was motivated Posner's assertion that merely registering different ethnic groups provides not information on the salience of different ethnic cleavages within a state (for example Sri Lanka and Switzerland have similar levels of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation but very different ethno-political dynamics due to the salience of these identities). Further, while linguistic differences are common ways to assess the heterogeneity of African states, Africans often speak several languages and belong to multiple ethno-regional networks and other social categories (religious, livelihood etc.). Political identities are still often associated with ethnic association, but the ethnicity chosen as the dominant 'political' identity is based on a series of aggregation and strategic manoeuvring on the part on both the citizen and proposed representative.

ACPED's ministerial and macro identity groups are intended to show which ethnic identities or clusters of identities are 'politically relevant', allowing us to measure how leaders and regimes balance their cabinet to account for these different interests.

To create a roster of macro-groups that incorporated realistic, robust and consistent interpretation of political identities, we generate lists from several complementary sources. Our primary source is the Scarritt and Mozaffar (2007) scaled identity list available as a supplement to an article on ethnic cleavages and ethno political groups. These data provide a list of disaggregated, and aggregated, communities in all countries, with details on the share of population for each group, their spatial clustering and a justification for coding clusters. We supplement when necessary with the GREG list of African groups (Weidmann, Rød, and Cederman, 2010), EPR (Wimmer et al., 2009) and Ethnologue.

The process of assigning groups in the initial stages was completed using these datasets through creating a shapefile and seeing where ethnic categories matched Scarritt and Mozzafar's (hereafter SM) classification system. All ethnic group spatial categories were created from three distinct sets.

a. GEOEPR (large group but relatively poor coverage across Africa)
b. GREG- good coverage, but not necessarily PREG
c. Ethnologue- very good, disaggregated coverage but of linguistic communities and not PREGS

These files were used to create a fishnet square (approximately 50km). Each ethnic community are defined by the three available files is grafted onto each square- therefore, initially each square has up to three possible ethnic designations.

We then apply the following steps:

1. If all datasets match and fall within an SM category, that is considered a macro-group.
2. When Ethnologue has a group designation that is not a PREG macrogroup, we rely on the GREG or EPR designation.
3. When GREG or EPR have a group that is either too aggregated or outside of the PREG designation made by SM, and ethnologue has the correct designation (or names a subgroup within the SM classification) that group is chosen.

This process (hereafter 'GISprocess') was undertaken by Professor Clionadh Raleigh and Dr Giuseppe Maggio for the initial list of completed countries as the beginning of 2017: Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

Increasingly, we began relying on the information of the country consultants who helped us find background information for the ministers. These would be cross-referenced with SM and EPR classifications. Discrepancies would be investigated and the country consultants would be asked for their opinion over what categorisations were appropriate.

In many cases, the identity of the minister and the name of the macro-group are the same, however in other cases, we associated a disaggregated identity of the minister with a more aggregated category from a roster created by several relevant ethnic datasets. A list of macro-groups, their associated primary groups and their population is listed below in appendix table 1.

Table 1 – Politically relevant macro-groups, associated ethnicities and population percentages

Country	**Macro Group**	**Population**	**Associated Ethnic Groups**
Algeria	Arab	72	Arab
	Berber	28	Berber Mozabite Tuareg
Botswana	Barolong	1.9	Barolong
	Kalanga	14.3	Kalanga
	Kgatla	5.2	Bakgatla
	Kwena	11.7	Bakwena
	Lete/Lokwa	3	Balete
	Ngwaketse	11.7	Bangwaketse
	Ngwato	33.3	Bamangwato Batalaote
	Other Tswana	0.9	Babirwa Batswapong
	Other	8	Afrikaner Bakgalagadi Bakhurutshe
	Tawana	7	Batawana
Burundi	Hutu	82.8	Hutu
	Tutsi	13.6	Tutsi
	Other	3.6	Ganwa Twa
Cameroon	Bamileke	23	Bamileke
	Bamoun	10	Bamum
	Bassa-Bakoko-Douala	12	Bafia Bakossi Bakweri Bassa Mbam Sawa Yabassi
	Beti	15	Beti Fang
	Far North	3	Mbum Tupuri

	Fulani	14	Fulani Ngoh-Songo
	Gbaya	1	Gbaya
	Kanuri	1	Kanuri
	Kirdi	15	Maka Mandara Moundang
	North West	3	Tikar
	South West	3	Banyang Widekum Yambassa
Central African Republic	Banda	27	Banda Banda-Koro M'Poko Banda-Mbres Banda-Ndele Banda-Ngalabo Banda-Yakpa Dagba Gbanou Langbassi Mandja Mbangui Mbimou Ngbougou
	Fulani	1	Haoussa Mbororo Peuhl
	Gbaya	33	Gbaya Gbaya-Benzambe Gbaya-Bianda Gbaya-Boda Gbaya-Kaka Gbaya-Kara
	Mbaka	4	Mondjombo Nagbaka Ngbaka-Mandja Ngbaka-Yaka
	Mbum	7	Kare
	Ngbaka	4	Ngbaka
	Riverene/Sango/Banzeri	9	Ali Bofi Gbanziri Kaba Mbati Sango Souma Valle
	Sara and Northerners	10	Baguiro Goula Gouran Kara Ngama Runga Salamat Sara
	Yakoma	4	Yakoma Youlou
	Other	1	Borno International

			Nzakara Zande
Democratic Republic of Congo	Azande-Mangbetu	1	Azande Babwa
	Bakongo	15	Kongo
	Bangala (Lingala speakers)	3	Ngala
	Bemba-Enya-Lungu	2	Bemba Enya Lungu
	Hema-Lendu	1	Hema Lendu
	Hutu	2	Hutu
	Kivu province	5	Bembe Havu Shi Teke
	Kwilu region	4	Mbata
	Luba-Kasai	7	Luba (dependent on regional background) Luba-Songe
	Luba Shaba	5	Luba (dependent on regional background) Luntu
	Lulua	5	Rega Songe
	Mongo	16	Mbole Mongo
	Nande	3	Nande
	Ngbaka	2	Ngbaka
	Ngbandi	2	Ngbandi
	Pende-Yaka	1	Pende Yaka
	Tetela-Kusu	8	Kusu Tetela
	Tutsi/Banyamulenge	1	Tutsi
	Other	17	Alur Bodo Lokele Mituku Ngombe Rwanda Yanzi Yombe
Ethiopia	Afar	4.5	Afar
	Amhara	25	Amhara
	Banishangul/Gumez	3	Banishangul/Gumez
	Gambella	6	Gambella
	Harari	0.2	Harari
	Oromo	40	Oromo
	Somali	5.3	Somali
	Southern Peoples	9	Gurage Hadiyah Kambaata Sidama Silte Wolayta
	Tigray	7	Eritrean Tigray

Guinea	Fulani	28	Fulani
	Kissi-Toma	4	Kissi Toma
	Kpelle	4	Kpelle
	Malinke	30	Konianke Malinke
	Susu	16	Susu Yalunka
	Other	18	Diakhanke Foulakounda Mano
Ivory Coast	Agni-Attle	7	Agni Attie
	Baule-Akan	17	Akan Alladjan Anyin Avikam Baule
	Bete	9	Bete
	Kru	11	Dida Godie Kru Neo Ngere
	Malinke	3	Malinke
	Northeners (Manders-Senufo-Gur)	29	Djimini Koyaka Kulango Kweni Lobi Senufo Tagbana
	Other Akans	17	Abbe Abidji Aboure Abron Adjoukrou Appolo Ebrie Lagoon Mbato
	Southern Mande	7	Dan Gagu Gouro Wan
Kenya	Boran	1	Boran
	Coast	2	Coast
	Embu	2	Embu
	Gusii/Kisii	5	Gusii/Kisii
	Kalenjin	12	Kalenjin
	Kamba	10	Kemba
	Kikuyu	17	Kikuyu
	Luo	13	Luo
	Luhya	16	Luhya
	Masai	2	Masai
	Meru	5	Meru
	Mijikenda	4	Mijikenda
	Pokot	1	Pokot
	Somali	5	Somali

	Turkana	2	Turkana
	Other	3	Kuria Taita
Liberia	Americo-Libs	2	Americo-Libs
	Bassa	15	Bassa
	Gbandi	4	Gbandi
	Gio	9	Gio
	Gola	6	Gola
	Grebo	11	Grebo
	Kissi-Toma	6	Kissi
	Kpelle	21	Kpelle
	Krhan	7	Krhan
	Kru	6	Kru
	Loma	4	Loma
	Mandingo	3	Mandingo
	Southern Mande	1	Dan
	Vai	4	Vai
	Other	1	Mano Other
Malawi	Chewa	28	Chewa
	Lhomwe	19	Lhomwe
	Ngoni	9	Ngoni
	Mananja-Nyanja	15	No records
	Sena	4	Sena
	Tumbuka-Tonga-Nyakusya	8	Nyakusya Tonga Tumbuka
	Yao	14	Yao
	Other	3	European Indian International
Mali	Arab	3	Arab
	Bambara	30	Bambara
	Bozo	3	Bozo
	Dogon	3	Dogon
	Malinke	11	Malinke Khassonke
	Northeners (Manders-Senufo-Gur)	13	Senufo
	Peul-Fulani	14	Fulani
	Sarakole/Soninke	8	Soninke
	Songhai	6	Songhay
	Tuareg	8	Bellah Tuareg
	Other	1	Wolof Bobo (Bwa/Bwaba)
Morocco	Arab-Berber	99	Arab-Berber
	Rif	0.25	Riffian
	Sahrawi	0.25	Reguibat
	Shleuh	0.25	Chleuh
	Tamazinght	0.25	Tamazight
Nigeria	Edo	2	Edo Esan
	Fulani	4	Fulani
	Hausa	20	Hausa Kilba Tangale

	Hausa-Fulani	3	Hausa and Fulani (together)
	Ibibio-Efik-Ijaw	14	Efik Ibibio Ijaw Ogoni
	Igbo	16	Bahumono Boki Eket Igbo Ikwerre Oron
	Jukun	2	Jukun
	Kanuri	4	Babur Higgi Kanuri Ngizim
	Middle Belt	3	Angas Berom Eggon Gbari Geomai Godogodo Idoma Igala Igbirra Kagaro Kalabari Kambari Nupe Tarok
	Tiv	3	Tiv
	Yoruba	21	Baruba Uhrobo Yoruba
	Other	8	Atyap Bura Gimbana Gudurri Jawara Terawa Yala
Rwanda	Hutu	15	Hutu
	Tutsi	84	Tutsi
Sierra Leone	Krio	3	Creole
	Fulani	7	Fulani
	Gola	1	Gola
	Kissi-Toma	3	Gola Kissi
	Kono	5	Kono
	Limba	8	Limba Loko
	Mandingo	3	Mandingo
	Mende	31	Mende
	Sherbro	3	Sherbro
	Susu	2	Sherbro
	Temne	34	Temne
South Africa	Asian	3	Indian South African Asian

	Coloured	9	Coloured
	Sotho-Twana	24	Tswana Northern Sotho (Pedi) Northern Sotho (Balobedu) Sotho Southern Sotho
	Swazi	2.5	Swazi
	Tsonga	4	Tsonga
	Venda	2	Venda
	White	12.5	Anglo Afrikaans
	Xhosa	18.5	Xhosa
	Zulu	24.5	Zulu Ndebele
South Sudan	Azande-Mangbetu	10	Azande
	Bari	1	Bari Bari Lobonok
	Didinga	1	Didinga
	Dinka	40	Agaar Dinka Ajak Dinka Aweil Dinka Dinka Agar Dinka Bor Dinka Ngok Dinka Tonj Gogrial Dinka Gogrial Dinka (Awan-Chan) Malual Dinka Padang Dinka Tonj Dinka Twic Dinka
	Madi	1	Moru
	Murle	4	Murle
	Nuer	20	Bul Nuer Dok Nuer Gawaar Nuer Jikany Nuer Jikany Nuer (Western branch) Liech Nuer Lou Nuer
	Shilluk	5	Shilluk
	Toposa	8	Toposa
	Other	10	Acholi Baka Balanda Kakwa Kuku Lotuko Luo Pojullu
Tanzania	Chagga	3	Chagga
	Bena	3	Bena
	Gogo	5	Gogo
	Ha	4	Ha
	Haya	4	Haya
	Hehe	3	Hehe

			Kaguru Pogoro
	Iraqw	2	Iraqw
	Iramba	2	Iramba
	Makonde	4	Makonde
	Masai	3	Masai
	Makua	2	Makua Ngindo
	Pare	2	Pare
	Nyambo	2	Nyambo
	Nyakyusa	3	Nyakyusa
	Nyamwese	3	Nyamwese
	Nyaturu	2	Turu
	Sukuma	20	Jita Sukuma Zinza
	Shambala	3	Bondei Shambala
	Yao-Mwera	2	Mwera Yao
	Zaramo	3	Kwere Zaramo
	Zigula	2	Zigula
	Zanzibar	2	Pimbwe Swahili
	Other	21	Fipa Kinga Luo Mijikenda Ngoni Nihya Nyanja Other Pangwa Sagara Zanaki
Tunisia	Arab-Berber	100	Arab-Berber
Uganda	Acholi	5	Acholi
	Ankole	10	Ankole Hororo
	Baganda	17	Ganda
	Bakonjo	1	Konjo
	Banyarwanda	5	Fumbira
	Banyoro	3	Nyoro
	Basoga	9	Soga
	Gisu	5	Gisu
	Gwere	1	Gwere
	Kakwa	2	Kakwa
	Karamojong	2	Karamojong
	Kiga	7	Kiga
	Langi	6	Langi
	Lugbara	4	Lugbara
	Madi	1	Madi
	Padhola	1	No records
	Sebei	1	Sabiny
	Teso	7	Teso
	Toro	3	Toro
	Other	10	Samia

Zimbabwe	Karanga	22	Karanga
	Korekore	9	Korekore
	Manyika	13	Manyika
	Ndau	3	Ndau
	Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)	20	Ndebele Tonga
	White Zimbabwean	4	European
	Zezuru	18	Budya Zezuru
	Other Shona	8	No records
	Other	3	Sena Venda

Table 2 – Ethnic categorisation and population sources

Country	Sources of Ethnic Categories	Sources on Ethnic Populations
Algeria	GISprocess	GISprocess
Botswana	All existing datasets do not mention relevant subtribes of the Tswana. Relevant ethnic categories were got from wider research and country consultant	Rule, 1995
Burundi	Ganwa included as a separate 'Other' category. Other category also included in EPR.	Alesina et al., 2003
Cameroon	GISprocess	GISprocess
Central African Republic	Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999	Estimated between Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999
Democratic Republic of Congo	GISprocess	GISprocess
Ethiopia	Country consultant	Estimated between Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999
Guinea	Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 and Alesina et al., 2003	Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 and Alesina et al., 2003
Ivory Coast	Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 but 'Southern Mande' added as a category due to ethnic categorisation in Langer, 2005	New calculations required given the addition of Southern Mande category GISprocess
Kenya	Scarrit and Mozafar, but Keyio, Nandi, Kipsigis and Tugen were deleted and considered subsections of the Kalenjin. Rendille was moved to 'Other' because of how small and insignificant on the national stage it	Estimated between Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999. I think your calculations using ethnologue/GREG counts also did it
Liberia	Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999	Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999
Malawi	Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999	Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999
Mali	Country consultant and Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999	Added Bozo as discreet category and 'Other' category to capture groups such as the Wolof and Mossi, based on country consultant. Malinka and Duala combined based on country consultant. Scarrit and Mozzafar used otherwise
Morocco	GISprocess	GISprocess
Nigeria	GISprocess	GISprocess
Rwanda	EPR	EPR
Sierra Leone	Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Scarritt and Mozaffar, 1999	I think again the population was estimated by you and Giuseppe, but conforms closely (but not identically) to Fearon and Laitain, 2003 and Alesina et al.
South Africa	Country Consultant	Country Consultant and EPR
South Sudan	Country Consultant and EPR	EPR
Tanzania	Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 and Fearon and Laitin, 2003	Fearon and Laitin, 2003
Tunisia	GISprocess	GISprocess
Uganda	Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 with changes: Konjo/Bakonjo and Bambaa are considered part of the Rwenzuru group	GISprocess
Zimbabwe	Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999	Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999

Table 3 – Variance within and Across Polity Categories

Variable	Variance Across Means	Average Within-Sample Variance
Cabinet Size	6.46	40.09
Inner Circle Size	0.09	3.69
Outer Circle Size	5.29	35.36
Ethnic Representation	6.72	244.68
Ethnic Representation Inner Circle	27.66	512.5
Ethnic Representation Outer Circle	10.6	364.85
Regional Representation	31.87	469.77
Regional Representation Inner Circle	58.54	534.9
Regional Representation Outer Circle	41.08	586.15
Ethnic Disproprotion	4.08	94.09
Ethnic Disproprotion Inner Circle	1.41	111.56
Ethnic Disproprotion Outer Circle	2.38	97.49
Regional Disproprotion	0.74	45.02
Regional Disproprotion Inner Circle	8.2	106.64
Regional Disproprotion Outer Circle	1.43	58.45
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation	19.44	440.55
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Inner Circle	29.37	663.32
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Outer Circle	20.72	466.81
Leader Co-Regional Representation	33.45	203.85
Leader Co-Regional Representation Inner Circle	9.84	344.49
Leader Co-Regional Representation Outer Circle	40.26	226.94
No Of Parties	0.15	5.46
President Party Percent	119.59	770.76

Table 4 – Variance within and Across ARD Categories

Variable	Variance Across Means	Average Within-Sample Variance
Cabinet Size	3.25	25.03
Inner Circle Size	0.34	2.65
Outer Circle Size	2.04	23.43
Ethnic Representation	32.61	309.3
Ethnic Representation Inner Circle	127.91	442.76
Ethnic Representation Outer Circle	23.28	395.87
Regional Representation	132.22	337.51
Regional Representation Inner Circle	145.07	406.61
Regional Representation Outer Circle	148.71	399.9
Ethnic Disproprotion	81.75	68.99
Ethnic Disproprotion Inner Circle	51.08	134.51
Ethnic Disproprotion Outer Circle	78.43	79.8
Regional Disproprotion	6.27	35.49
Regional Disproprotion Inner Circle	28.56	71.98
Regional Disproprotion Outer Circle	5.89	41.97
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation	15.71	267.28
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Inner Circle	50.99	585.67
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Outer Circle	17.36	290.47
Leader Co-Regional Representation	6.74	140.55
Leader Co-Regional Representation Inner Circle	16.92	296.44
Leader Co-Regional Representation Outer Circle	7.3	155.64
No Of Parties	3	8.62
President Party Percent	NA	NA

Table 5 – Variance within and Across ARD Categories

Variable	Variance Across Means	Average Within-Sample Variance
Cabinet Size	0.75	46.95
Inner Circle Size	0.29	4.01
Outer Circle Size	0.12	42.99
Ethnic Representation	1.61	280.89
Ethnic Representation Inner Circle	3.25	610.42
Ethnic Representation Outer Circle	4.6	404.65
Regional Representation	25.07	467.42
Regional Representation Inner Circle	41.68	427.84
Regional Representation Outer Circle	23.33	577.99
Ethnic Disproprotion	7.86	112.47
Ethnic Disproprotion Inner Circle	3.51	142.76
Ethnic Disproprotion Outer Circle	4.82	117
Regional Disproprotion	0.1	46.35
Regional Disproprotion Inner Circle	1.26	108.35
Regional Disproprotion Outer Circle	0.33	61.98
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation	10.38	554.68
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Inner Circle	5.48	755.54
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Outer Circle	9.76	580.04
Leader Co-Regional Representation	14.1	171.08
Leader Co-Regional Representation Inner Circle	5.3	332.62
Leader Co-Regional Representation Outer Circle	17.94	184.5
No Of Parties	1.86	5.31
President Party Percent	279.74	730.34

11.3 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility

Table 1 - Means Table by Regime Table

Variable	Mean	Min	Max	Standard Deviation	Competitive Regime Mean	Competitive Regime SD	Hegemonic Regime Mean	Hegemonic Regime SD
Total Cabinet Size	26.523	1	47	6.773	26.004	5.751	27.524	8.311
Inner Circle Size	7.168	1	13	2.040	6.890	1.841	7.703	2.285
Outer Circle Size	19.352	0	36	6.444	19.114	5.378	19.812	8.096
Representation	75.640	6.250	100	15.254	76.819	14.951	73.367	15.579
Inner Circle Representation	45.708	6.250	100	19.146	45.503	16.652	46.105	23.211
Outer Circle Representation	68.643	0	100	18.490	70.337	18.283	65.379	18.457
Disproportion Cabinet	24.920	7.850	51.167	7.893	25.078	7.735	24.617	8.182
Disproportion Inner Circle	27.765	1.167	67.933	8.986	27.713	8.045	27.865	10.567
Disproportion Outer Circle	25.610	7.074	100	8.264	25.506	8.575	25.811	7.628
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation	25.947	0	64.706	15.282	26.168	15.215	25.520	15.406
Leader Co-Ethnic Inner Circle Representation	27.102	0	83.333	20.369	27.361	20.393	26.601	20.320
Leader Co-Ethnic Outer Circle Representation	25.547	0	75	16.228	25.833	16.650	24.995	15.371
GDP Growth	4.993	-36.700	106.280	6.667	4.609	7.853	5.735	3.231
Change in GDP Growth	-0.173	-76.072	94.159	7.475	-0.310	8.746	0.092	4.006
Low Growth Year	0.213	0	1	0.410	0.225	0.418	0.191	0.393
High Growth Year	0.247	0	1	0.431	0.233	0.423	0.274	0.446
Below Mean Level Growth	0.488	0	1	0.500	0.532	0.499	0.403	0.491
Below Median Level Growth	0.468	0	1	0.499	0.486	0.500	0.435	0.496
Before Any Election	0.238	0	1	0.426	0.248	0.432	0.220	0.414
Before Presidential Election	0.192	0	1	0.394	0.201	0.401	0.175	0.381
Before Parliamentary Election	0.196	0	1	0.397	0.206	0.404	0.178	0.383
Any Reshuffle	0.146	0	1	0.353	0.167	0.373	0.106	0.309
Major Reshuffle	0.056	0	1	0.229	0.062	0.241	0.043	0.204
Minor Reshuffle	0.091	0	1	0.287	0.105	0.306	0.063	0.243

Table 2 - Levene Tests of Unequal Variance by Variable

Variable	All Data Pre-Election	All Data High vs Low Growth	All Data Pre-Election - Competitive	All Data High vs Low Growth - Competitive	All Data Pre-Election - Hegemonic	All Data High vs Low Growth - Hegemonic
Cabinet Size	0.017	0.011	0.110	0	0.931	0.005
Disproportion	0	0.067	0	0	0.216	0.002
Inner Circle Disproportion	0.496	0.435	0.002	0	0.001	0
Inner Circle Size	0.021	0.072	0.055	0.040	0.384	0.232
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation	0.448	0	0.051	0	0.213	0.076
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Inner Circle	0.001	0	0.097	0	0	0
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Outer Circle	0.617	0.019	0.280	0.004	0.714	0.867
Outer Circle Disproption	0	0.019	0	0.020	0.001	0.222
Outer Circle Size	0.100	0.001	0.158	0	0.797	0.065
Representation	0.561	0.176	0.611	0.306	0.232	0.819
Representation Inner Circle	0.021	0.274	0.055	0.011	0.384	0.251
Representation Outer Circle	0.044	0	0.222	0	0.155	0.239

Table 3 – Independent variable correlations table

	Before Any Election	GDP Growth	After Election – No Change In Leader	After Election – Change In Leader	Non-Democratic Change In Power	Unity Government
Before Any Election	1	0.015	-0.127	-0.079	0.039	-0.090
GDP Growth	0.015	1	0.007	0.070	-0.171	-0.135
After Election – No Change In Leader	-0.127	0.007	1	-0.109	-0.061	-0.040
After Election – Change In Leader	-0.079	0.070	-0.109	1	-0.019	-0.044
Non-Democratic Change In Power	0.039	-0.171	-0.061	-0.019	1	0.182
Unity Government	-0.090	-0.135	-0.040	-0.044	0.182	1

Table 4 – Logistic Regression Base Model – All Regimes

	Dependent variable:						
	Major Reshuffle	Minor Reshuffle	Mass Change in Personnel	New Group	New Group Inner Circle	Exit Group	Exit Group Inner Circle
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Before Any Election	-0.286	0.075	-0.781**	-0.355	-0.267	-0.396	-0.295
	(0.154)	(0.121)	(0.246)	(0.246)	(0.218)	(0.254)	(0.222)
Growth Category - Low Growth	0.358*	0.088	0.158	0.271	0.535*	0.106	0.511*
	(0.171)	(0.148)	(0.249)	(0.265)	(0.248)	(0.278)	(0.248)
Growth Category - High Growth	0.050	-0.0005	-0.026	-0.099	0.171	0.059	0.061
	(0.155)	(0.128)	(0.225)	(0.246)	(0.229)	(0.249)	(0.231)
Constant	-2.719***	-2.334***	-0.987***	-1.385***	-1.247***	-1.461***	-1.241***
	(0.133)	(0.111)	(0.192)	(0.209)	(0.199)	(0.215)	(0.199)
Observations	4,536	4,536	708	712	712	712	712
Log Likelihood	-1,091.990	-1,387.423	-392.106	-347.686	-402.325	-340.011	-393.153
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,191.981	2,782.846	792.213	703.372	812.649	688.022	794.306

Note: *p**p***p<0.001

Table 5 - Volatility by Political Binaries and Economic Growth – Competitive Regimes

	Dependent variable:						
	Major Reshuffle	Minor Reshuffle	Mass Change in Personnel	New Group	New Group Inner Circle	Exit Group	Exit Group Inner Circle
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Before Any Election	-0.311	-0.055	-0.776*	-0.232	-0.061	-0.076	0.043
	(0.194)	(0.152)	(0.328)	(0.335)	(0.258)	(0.345)	(0.283)
Growth Category - Low Growth	0.067	0.160	-0.208	0.270	0.464	0.064	0.686
	(0.228)	(0.198)	(0.370)	(0.404)	(0.305)	(0.430)	(0.356)
Growth Category - High Growth	-0.109	0.014	-0.065	0.210	0.364	0.434	0.284
	(0.194)	(0.163)	(0.314)	(0.356)	(0.273)	(0.363)	(0.312)
After Election – No Change In Leader	0.467*	-0.303	1.466***	0.728*	0.508	0.832*	0.304
	(0.198)	(0.195)	(0.314)	(0.360)	(0.278)	(0.373)	(0.333)
After Election – Change In Leader	0.627**	-0.263	1.577***	1.343***	1.127***	1.355***	1.206***
	(0.239)	(0.245)	(0.365)	(0.395)	(0.315)	(0.388)	(0.351)
Non- Democratic Change In Power	1.363***	0.198	1.661**	1.276*	0.841	1.722**	0.543
	(0.357)	(0.426)	(0.548)	(0.613)	(0.453)	(0.648)	(0.512)
Unity Government	0.640*	-0.435	1.071*	0.826	0.777	0.479	0.297
	(0.306)	(0.356)	(0.505)	(0.584)	(0.411)	(0.671)	(0.519)
Months Since Last Reshuffle	0.044**	0.012					
	(0.015)	(0.014)					
Constant	-3.254***	-2.766**	0.007	-1.696	-1.682***	-2.752	-1.600
	(0.877)	(0.868)	(1.246)	(1.423)	(0.255)	(1.446)	(1.354)
Observations	3,010	3,010	543	547	547	547	547
Log Likelihood	-751.118	-964.335	-256.177	-215.883	-297.426	-206.854	-271.107
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,594.236	2,020.670	602.355	521.767	610.851	503.708	632.214

Note: *p**p***p<0.001

Table 6 - Volatility by Political Binaries and Economic Growth – Hegemonic Regimes

	Dependent variable:						
	Major Reshuffle	Minor Reshuffle	Mass Change in Personnel	New Group	New Group Inner Circle	Exit Group	Exit Group Inner Circle
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Before Any Election	0.001	-0.054	-1.706	1.485	-0.178	0.731	-1.891
	(0.377)	(0.305)	(1.134)	(1.092)	(0.804)	(1.194)	(1.020)
Growth Category - Low Growth	1.269*	0.187	0.348	5.356*	1.307	0.570	-0.706
	(0.532)	(0.452)	(1.208)	(2.615)	(1.236)	(1.479)	(1.224)
Growth Category - High Growth	1.125**	-0.038	1.970*	3.434	0.776	1.704	-0.292
	(0.401)	(0.353)	(0.950)	(1.952)	(0.934)	(1.239)	(0.845)
After Election – No Change In Leader	1.188***	-0.328	4.065***	5.310**	2.110*	2.070	0.459
	(0.344)	(0.341)	(0.984)	(1.772)	(0.852)	(1.066)	(0.806)
After Election – Change In Leader	1.198	1.184	2.462	-3.782*	1.038	1.446	2.998
	(0.760)	(0.797)	(1.494)	(1.846)	(1.377)	(1.734)	(1.648)
Non- Democratic Change In Power	3.908*	2.781	3.329	32.873	1.323	-0.954	-17.441
	(1.694)	(1.589)	(2.334)	(14,941.650)	(1.998)	(14,176.720)	(4,612.202)
Unity Government							
Months Since Last Reshuffle	0.082***	0.022					
	(0.020)	(0.020)					
Constant	-4.660***	-17.468	-19.719	12.947	-0.530	-1.431	-17.113
	(1.276)	(959.171)	(1,270.655)	(4,959.412)	(2.076)	(2.364)	(3,606.147)
Observations	1,401	1,401	165	165	165	165	165
Log Likelihood	-246.706	-311.725	-58.352	-41.078	-66.227	-45.676	-56.304
Akaike Inf. Crit.	569.413	699.450	190.704	156.156	206.455	165.352	186.607

Note: *p **p ***p<0.001

Figure 1 – Pre-Electoral Permutation Tests Competitive Regimes



Figure 2 – Pre-Electoral Permutation Tests Hegemonic Regimes



Figure 3 – Economic Performance Permutation Tests Competitive Regimes



Figure 4 – Economic Performance Permutation Tests Hegemonic Regimes



Figure 5 – Pre-Electoral Permutation Welch's T-Tests Competitive Regimes



Figure 6 – Pre-Electoral Permutation Welch's T-Tests Hegemonic Regimes



Figure 7 - Economic Performance Permutation Welch's T-Tests Competitive Regimes



Figure 8 - Economic Performance Permutation Welch's T-Tests Hegemonic Regimes



11.4 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains

Figure 1 – Cabinet Size and Representation Status



Figure 2 – Leader and Opposition Co-Ethnics Representation Status



Figure 3 – Regime Party and Opposition Party Presence Status



Table 1 – Primary Opposition Leader Ethnicities

Country Election	Primary Opposition Name	Primary Opposition Ethnicity	Source
Botswana 1999 Parliamentary Election	Kenneth Koma	Ngwato	Breytenbach, W.J., 1975. Pluralism and the integrative role of governmental institutions in Botswana. *Africa Insight*, *5*(1), pp.78-85.
Botswana 2004 Parliamentary Election	Otsweletse Moupo	Ngwato	Makgala, C., 2006. *Opposition cooperation needs the 'big-two' approach*. The Monitor, available at: http://www.mmegi.bw/2006/October/Friday13/8135712711288.html [Accessed 12 December 2018].
Botswana 2009	Otsweletse Moupo	Ngwato	Same as above
Botswana 2014	Xhosa	Duma Boko	Sunday Standard,. 2013. *On One Ground*. Sunday Standard, available at: http://www.sundaystandard.info/one-ground [Accessed 12 December 2018].
Burundi 2015	Agathon Rwasa	Hutu	Vandeginste, S., 2011. Power-sharing as a fragile safety valve in times of electoral turmoil: the costs and benefits of Burundi's 2010 elections. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *49*(2), pp.315-335.
Cameroon 1997 Legislative Election	John Fru Ndi	North West	Wikileaks. 2008. *08YAOUNDE586_a - CAMEROON'S NORTHWEST PROVINCE: NEGLECTED SEAT OF THE OPPOSITION*. Wikileaks, available at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08YAOUNDE586_a.html [Accessed 12 December 2018].
Cameroon 2002 Legislative Election	John Fru Ndi	North West	Same as above
Cameroon 2004 Presidential Election	John Fru Ndi	North West	Same as above
Cameroon 2007 Parliamentary	John Fru Ndi	North West	Same as above
Cameroon 2011 Presidential	John Fru Ndi	North West	Same as above
Cameroon 2013 Parliamentary	John Fru Ndi	North West	Same as above
CAR 1999	André Kolingba	Yakoma	Bradshaw, R. and Fandos-Rius, J., 2016. *Historical Dictionary of the Central African Republic*. Rowman & Littlefield.
CAR 2005	Martin Ziguele	Riverene/ Sango/ Banzeri	ACPED
CAR 2011	Ange-Felix Patasse	Sara and Northerners	ACPED
Ethiopia 2005	Hailu Shawel	Amhara	Arriola, L.R., 2013. *Multi-ethnic coalitions in Africa: Business financing of opposition election campaigns*. Cambridge University Press.
Ethiopia 2010	Birtukan Mideksa	Oromo; Amhara	ecadforum., 2010. *Ethiopia: Birtukan Mideksa's child Hale birthday pictures*. ECADF, available at:

			https://ecadforum.com/blog1/ethiopia-birtukan-mideksas-child-hale-birthday-pictures/ [Accessed 1 March 2019].
Guinea 1998 Presidential Election	Mamadou Boye Bah	Fulani	O'Toole, T. and Baker, J.E., 2005. *Historical dictionary of Guinea* (Vol. 94). Scarecrow Press.
Guinea 2002 Parliamentary	Siradiou Diallo	Fulani	Fall, E., 2004. Siradiou Diallo. Jeune Afrique, available at: https://www.jeuneafrique.com/83334/archives-thematique/siradiou-diallo/ [Accessed 30 December 2018].
Guinea 2003 Presidential	Mamadou Bhoye Barry	Fulani	Approximated from surname (Barry is a Fulani surname) see Samake, M., 2012. *What's in a Name?* Moving Mali Forward blog, available at: https://firstladymali.com/2012/08/26/whats-in-a-name/ [Accessed 30 December 2018].
Guinea 2013 Parliamentary	Cellou Dalein Diallo	Fulani	ACPED
Guinea 2015 Presidential	Cellou Dalein Diallo	Fulani	ACPED
Kenya 1997	Mwai Kibaki	Kikuyu	ACPED
Kenya 2007	Raila Odinga	Luo	ACPED
Kenya 2017	Raila Odinga	Luo	ACPED
Liberian 2011 General Election	George Weah	Kru	Armstrong, G., 2007. The global footballer and the local war-zone: George Weah and transnational networks in Liberia, West Africa. *Global Networks*, *7*(2), pp.230-247.
Malawi 1999	Gwanda Chakuamba	Sena	ACPED
Malawi 2009	John Tembo	Ngoni	Libby, R.T., 2014. *The politics of economic power in Southern Africa* (Vol. 808). Princeton University Press.
Mali 2007	Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta	Malinke	ACPED
Nigeria 2003 General Election	Mahammadu Buhari	Fulani	ACPED
Nigeria 2011 General Election	Mahammadu Buhari	Fulani	ACPED
Rwanda 2003	Faustin Twagiramungu	Hutu	BBC News., 2003. *Rwandan ex-PM goes home*. BBC News online, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3006622.stm [Accessed 15 January 2019].
Rwanda 2008 Parliamentary	Vincent Biruta	Tutsi	ACPED
Rwanda 2010 Presidential	Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo	Hutu	Capital News., *Rwanda Dep Speaker to challenge Kagame*. Capital News, available at: https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2010/05/rwanda-dep-speaker-to-challenge-kagame/ [Accessed 15 January 2019].
Rwanda 2013 Parliamentary	Vincent Biruta	Tutsi	ACPED
Sierra Leone 2002 General Election	Ernest Bai Koroma	Temne	ACPED
Sierra Leone 2012 General Election	Julius Maada Bio	Sherbro	APA-Freetown., 2018. *Sierra Leone: Newly elected president Bio's road to state house*. Agence de Presse Africaine, available at: http://apanews.net/en/news/sierra-leone-elects-maada-bio-as-president [Available at 30 December 2018].

South Africa 1999	Tony Leon	White	Giliomee, H., 2005. White-led opposition parties and white minorities under South Africa's 'liberal'dominant party system. In *Workshop on "Dominant Parties and Democracy," European Consortium of Political Science, Granada, Spain*.
South Africa 2004	Tony Leon	White	Same as above
South Africa 2009	Helen Zille	White	Southern, N., 2011. Political opposition and the challenges of a dominant party system: The Democratic Alliance in South Africa. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *29*(3), pp.281-298.
South Africa 2014	Helen Zille	White	Same as above
Tanzania 2000 Election	Ibrahim Lipumba	Nyamwesi	Kagashe, B., 2010. *Tanzania: CUF – Why You Should Vote for Lipumba*. The Citizen, available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/201008300356.html [Accessed 18 November 2018].
Tanzania 2005 Election	Ibrahim Lipumba	Nyamwesi	Same as above
Tanzania 2010 Election	Willibrod Slaa	Iraqw	Olufemi Peniel, A., 2016. Comparative Analysis on Political Culture Political Socialization in Tanzania and South Africa. *International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Science* 1(1), pp.25-33.
Tanzania 2015 Election	Edward Lowassa	Masai	ACPED
Uganda 2001 Presidential	Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere	Buganda	Oloya, O., 2013. *Child to soldier: stories from Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army*. University of Toronto Press.
Uganda 2006	Kizza Besigye	Bahororo	Bareebe, F., 2011. *Uganda: Place Country Above Tribe, Besigye Says in Ankole*. The Monitor, available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/201102040857.html [Accessed 18 November 2018].
Uganda 2011	Kizza Besigye	Bahororo	Same as above
Uganda 2016	Kizza Besigye	Bahororo	Same as above
Zimbabwe 2000 Parliamentary Election	Morgan Tsvangirai	Karanga	ACPED
Zimbabwe 2002 Presidential Election	Morgan Tsvangirai	Karanga	ACPED

Table 2 - KNN Results - bootstrap basic

Type	k	Accuracy	Kappa	AccuracySD	KappaSD
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	1	0.458	-0.053	0.129	0.243
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	3	0.470	-0.045	0.142	0.266
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	5	0.485	-0.015	0.136	0.246
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	7	0.504	0.023	0.141	0.251
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	9	0.511	0.049	0.140	0.239
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	1	0.405	-0.130	0.152	0.280
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	3	0.484	0.006	0.157	0.267
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	5	0.496	0.030	0.157	0.253
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	7	0.488	0.021	0.155	0.230
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	9	0.481	0.008	0.155	0.208
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	1	0.653	0.309	0.115	0.215
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	3	0.653	0.309	0.134	0.255
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	5	0.648	0.310	0.129	0.234
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	7	0.633	0.290	0.129	0.229
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	9	0.620	0.277	0.127	0.213
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	1	0.512	0.044	0.147	0.271
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	3	0.520	0.067	0.156	0.273
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	5	0.495	0.046	0.169	0.267
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	7	0.493	0.045	0.160	0.231
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	9	0.490	0.044	0.157	0.212
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	1	0.565	0.103	0.123	0.235
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	3	0.581	0.152	0.129	0.241
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	5	0.610	0.216	0.136	0.248
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	7	0.633	0.266	0.135	0.249
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	9	0.637	0.286	0.135	0.242
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	1	0.686	0.374	0.143	0.273
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	3	0.689	0.382	0.166	0.305
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	5	0.707	0.414	0.161	0.292
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	7	0.715	0.428	0.165	0.296
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	9	0.716	0.434	0.167	0.283

Table 3 - KNN Results - bootstrap with 632 correction results

Type	k	Accuracy	Kappa	AccuracySD	KappaSD	AccuracyApparent	KappaApparent
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	1	0.654	0.327	0.133	0.248	1	1
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	3	0.581	0.160	0.142	0.264	0.750	0.482
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	5	0.575	0.154	0.136	0.249	0.719	0.424
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	7	0.576	0.156	0.141	0.242	0.688	0.352
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	9	0.579	0.158	0.139	0.242	0.688	0.336
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	1	0.621	0.279	0.162	0.293	1	1
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	3	0.576	0.167	0.163	0.273	0.739	0.473
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	5	0.617	0.253	0.162	0.261	0.826	0.649
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	7	0.550	0.114	0.154	0.237	0.652	0.281
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	9	0.542	0.105	0.160	0.235	0.652	0.281
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	1	0.780	0.562	0.116	0.216	1	1
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	3	0.728	0.454	0.138	0.251	0.844	0.672
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	5	0.728	0.462	0.132	0.241	0.844	0.688
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	7	0.681	0.382	0.133	0.236	0.750	0.517
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	9	0.663	0.350	0.129	0.222	0.719	0.450
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	1	0.626	0.262	0.143	0.267	0.826	0.652
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	3	0.583	0.182	0.159	0.276	0.696	0.383
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	5	0.556	0.139	0.157	0.259	0.652	0.292
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	7	0.568	0.169	0.157	0.235	0.696	0.383
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	9	0.553	0.137	0.161	0.217	0.652	0.281
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	1	0.722	0.423	0.119	0.230	1	1
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	3	0.655	0.295	0.128	0.242	0.781	0.541
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	5	0.665	0.303	0.129	0.243	0.750	0.455
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	7	0.677	0.343	0.128	0.235	0.750	0.482
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	9	0.681	0.357	0.134	0.246	0.750	0.482
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	1	0.783	0.567	0.146	0.274	0.957	0.913
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	3	0.749	0.501	0.168	0.308	0.870	0.738
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	5	0.760	0.520	0.167	0.295	0.870	0.738
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	7	0.732	0.460	0.167	0.289	0.783	0.556
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	9	0.738	0.474	0.168	0.279	0.783	0.556

Table 4 - KNN Results - 4 Fold Repeated Cross Validation

Type	k	Accuracy	Kappa	AccuracySD	KappaSD
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	1	0.463	-0.071	0.152	0.295
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	3	0.471	-0.083	0.161	0.320
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	5	0.512	-0.004	0.163	0.321
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	7	0.563	0.106	0.165	0.324
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	9	0.555	0.088	0.156	0.316
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	1	0.406	-0.186	0.183	0.363
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	3	0.527	0.037	0.163	0.326
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	5	0.529	0.032	0.140	0.281
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	7	0.547	0.061	0.126	0.256
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables)	9	0.526	0.010	0.089	0.171
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	1	0.658	0.318	0.140	0.272
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	3	0.717	0.428	0.148	0.293
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	5	0.687	0.394	0.135	0.250
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	7	0.669	0.367	0.145	0.262
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change	9	0.634	0.312	0.141	0.250
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	1	0.543	0.068	0.167	0.338
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	3	0.574	0.127	0.155	0.315
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	5	0.536	0.056	0.157	0.313
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	7	0.550	0.071	0.125	0.248
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change	9	0.575	0.120	0.121	0.243
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	1	0.567	0.082	0.146	0.297
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	3	0.615	0.200	0.134	0.273
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	5	0.697	0.367	0.131	0.272
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	7	0.728	0.449	0.133	0.264
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status	9	0.724	0.444	0.132	0.260
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	1	0.723	0.441	0.160	0.321
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	3	0.797	0.588	0.158	0.323
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	5	0.766	0.516	0.128	0.269
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	7	0.784	0.551	0.129	0.273
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status	9	0.784	0.551	0.129	0.273

Table 5 – KNN Bootstrap Confusion Matrices and Results

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (best predictors)

	Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition
Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	4437	1534
Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition	2496	3133

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors)

	Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	1407	1426
Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition	2553	2895

Post-Election Cabinet Status – Competitive Regimes (best predictors)

	Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition
Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	4402	1748
Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition	2490	2990

Post-Election Cabinet Status – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors)

	Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	1920	339
Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition	2011	3898

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (all predictors)

	Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition
Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	3884	2719
Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition	2974	2021

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (all predictors)

	Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	1229	1458
Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition	2709	2880

General Results

	Competitive Change	Hegemonic Change	Competitive Status	Hegemonic Status	Competitive All Post-Electoral Change Variables	Hegemonic All Post-Electoral Change Variables
Accuracy	0.653	0.52	0.636	0.712	0.509	0.496
Kappa	0.301	0.026	0.263	0.415	-0.007	-0.024
AccuracyLower	0.644	0.509	0.627	0.702	0.5	0.486
AccuracyUpper	0.661	0.53	0.644	0.722	0.518	0.507
AccuracyNull	0.598	0.522	0.593	0.519	0.591	0.524
AccuracyPValue	<0.001	0.666	<0.001	<0.001	1	1
Pos Pred Value	0.743	0.497	0.716	0.85	0.588	0.457
Neg Pred Value	0.557	0.531	0.546	0.66	0.405	0.515
Balanced Accuracy	0.656	0.513	0.635	0.704	0.496	0.488

Table 6 – KNN Bootstrap Efron Correction Confusion Matrices and Results[93]

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (best predictors)

	Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition
Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	4339	1447
Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition	2570	3189

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors)

	Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	1392	1499
Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition	2547	2815

Post-Election Cabinet Status – Competitive Regimes (best predictors)

	Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition
Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	4602	2808
Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition	2321	1962

[93] Efron correction is applied after bootstrapping and calculation. Therefore accuracy estimates will not reflect those in table 2 or in the main article.

Post-Election Cabinet Status – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors)

	Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	2582	1243
Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition	1416	3079

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (all predictors)

	Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition
Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	3232	2687
Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition	3575	1975

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (all predictors)

	Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	1461	2477
Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition	2442	1850

General Results

	Competitive Change	Hegemonic Change	Competitive Status	Hegemonic Status	Competitive All Post-Electoral Change Variables	Hegemonic All Post-Electoral Change Variables
Accuracy	0.652	0.51	0.561	0.68	0.454	0.402
Kappa	0.304	0.006	0.077	0.359	-0.099	-0.198
AccuracyLower	0.643	0.499	0.552	0.67	0.445	0.392
AccuracyUpper	0.661	0.521	0.57	0.69	0.463	0.413
AccuracyNull	0.598	0.523	0.592	0.519	0.594	0.526
AccuracyPValue	<0.001	0.991	1	<0.001	1	1
Pos Pred Value	0.75	0.481	0.621	0.675	0.546	0.371
Neg Pred Value	0.554	0.525	0.458	0.685	0.356	0.431
Balanced Accuracy	0.658	0.503	0.538	0.679	0.449	0.401

Table 7 – KNN 4 Fold Repeated Cross Validation Confusion Matrices and Results

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (best predictors)

	Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition
Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	13627	3676
Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition	5373	9324

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors)

	Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	2273	1095
Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition	8727	10905

Post-Election Cabinet Status – Competitive Regimes (best predictors)

	Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition
Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	13830	3530
Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition	5170	9470

Post-Election Cabinet Status – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors)

	Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	7571	1253
Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition	3429	10747

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (all predictors)

	Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition
Competitive Regime Cohesive Opposition	11772	6792
Competitive Regime Fragmented Opposition	7228	6208

Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (all predictors)

	Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive Opposition	1705	1183
Hegemonic Regime Fragmented Opposition	9295	10817

General Results

	Competitive Change	Hegemonic Change	Competitive Status	Hegemonic Status	Competitive All Post-Electoral Change Variables	Hegemonic All Post-Electoral Change Variables
Accuracy	0.717	0.573	0.728	0.796	0.562	0.544
Kappa	0.426	0.119	0.447	0.589	0.097	0.058
AccuracyLower	0.712	0.567	0.723	0.791	0.556	0.538
AccuracyUpper	0.722	0.579	0.733	0.802	0.567	0.551
AccuracyNull	0.594	0.522	0.594	0.522	0.594	0.522
AccuracyPValue	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	1	<0.001
Pos Pred Value	0.788	0.675	0.797	0.858	0.634	0.59
Neg Pred Value	0.634	0.555	0.647	0.758	0.462	0.538
Balanced Accuracy	0.717	0.558	0.728	0.792	0.549	0.528

Figure 4 – KNN ranked variable importance – post-electoral cabinet change and cabinet status



Table 8 – Correlations in Post-Electoral Cabinet Change - Competitive Regimes

	Change in Cabinet Size	Change in Inner Circle Size	Change In Outer Circle Size	Change in Representation	Change in Inner Circle Representation	Change in Outer Circle Representation	Change in Leader Co-Ethnic Representation	Change in Leader Co-Ethnic Inner Circle Representation	Change in Leader Co-Ethnic Outer Circle Representation	Change in Opposition Co-Ethnic Representation	Change in Opposition Co-Ethnic Inner Circle Representation	Change in Opposition Co-Ethnic Outer Circle Representation	Change in Leader Party Cabinet Presence	Change in Leader Party Inner Circle Presence	Change in Leader Party Outer Circle Presence	Change in Opposition Party Cabinet Presence	Change in Opposition Party Inner Circle Presence	Change in Opposition Party Outer Circle Presence
Change in Cabinet Size	1	0.580	0.940	0.420	0.460	0.150	-0.360	-0.200	-0.230	0.370	-0.140	0.450	-0.520	-0.310	-0.510	0.470	0.470	0.430
Change in Inner Circle Size	0.580	1	0.280	0.290	0.450	0.070	-0.290	0	-0.290	0.280	-0.180	0.420	-0.550	-0.280	-0.560	0.560	0.310	0.570
Change In Outer Circle Size	0.940	0.280	1	0.380	0.360	0.160	-0.310	-0.230	-0.160	0.310	-0.080	0.350	-0.390	-0.250	-0.370	0.330	0.430	0.270
Change in Representation	0.420	0.290	0.380	1	0.070	0.600	-0.270	0.010	-0.170	0.070	-0.420	0.300	-0.430	-0.260	-0.410	0.360	0.290	0.330
Change in Inner Circle Representation	0.460	0.450	0.360	0.070	1	-0.230	0.060	-0.110	0.030	0.150	0.040	0.150	-0.460	-0.320	-0.430	0.330	0.440	0.280
Change in Outer Circle Representation	0.150	0.070	0.160	0.600	-0.230	1	-0.400	-0.110	-0.270	-0.090	-0.180	0.020	-0.310	-0.030	-0.360	0.290	0.290	0.250
Change in Leader Co-Ethnic Representation	-0.360	-0.290	-0.310	-0.270	0.060	-0.400	1	0.300	0.750	-0.480	0.070	-0.520	0.390	0.150	0.400	-0.260	-0.160	-0.250
Change in Leader Co-Ethnic Inner Circle Representation	-0.200	0	-0.230	0.010	-0.110	-0.110	0.300	1	-0.330	-0.260	-0.400	-0.120	0.080	-0.070	0.080	-0.050	-0.010	-0.040
Change in Leader Co-Ethnic Outer Circle Representation	-0.230	-0.290	-0.160	-0.170	0.030	-0.270	0.750	-0.330	1	-0.300	0.320	-0.420	0.370	0.160	0.390	-0.250	-0.140	-0.240
Change in Opposition Co-Ethnic Representation	0.370	0.280	0.310	0.070	0.150	-0.090	-0.480	-0.260	-0.300	1	0.280	0.880	-0.280	0.100	-0.330	0.380	0.120	0.400
Change in Opposition Co-	-0.140	-0.180	-0.080	-0.420	0.040	-0.180	0.070	-0.400	0.320	0.280	1	-0.170	0.210	0.290	0.160	-0.120	-0.020	-0.140

Ethnic Inner Circle Representation																	
Change in Opposition Co-Ethnic Outer Circle Representation	0.450	0.420	0.350	0.300	0.150	0.020	-0.520	-0.120	-0.420	0.880	-0.170	1	-0.430	-0.060	-0.460	0.490	0.180	0.510
Change in Leader Party Cabinet Presence	-0.520	-0.550	-0.390	-0.430	-0.460	-0.310	0.390	0.080	0.370	-0.280	0.210	-0.430	1	0.620	0.960	-0.800	-0.680	-0.750
Change in Leader Party Inner Circle Presence	-0.310	-0.280	-0.250	-0.260	-0.320	-0.030	0.150	-0.070	0.160	0.100	0.290	-0.060	0.620	1	0.390	-0.260	-0.520	-0.170
Change in Leader Party Outer Circle Presence	-0.510	-0.560	-0.370	-0.410	-0.430	-0.360	0.400	0.080	0.390	-0.330	0.160	-0.460	0.960	0.390	1	-0.870	-0.630	-0.840
Change in Opposition Party Cabinet Presence	0.470	0.560	0.330	0.360	0.330	0.290	-0.260	-0.050	-0.250	0.380	-0.120	0.490	-0.800	-0.260	-0.870	1	0.660	0.980
Change in Opposition Party Inner Circle Presence	0.470	0.310	0.430	0.290	0.440	0.290	-0.160	-0.010	-0.140	0.120	-0.020	0.180	-0.680	-0.520	-0.630	0.660	1	0.520
Change in Opposition Party Outer Circle Presence	0.430	0.570	0.270	0.330	0.280	0.250	-0.250	-0.040	-0.240	0.400	-0.140	0.510	-0.750	-0.170	-0.840	0.980	0.520	1

11.5 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa

Table 1 – ACLED Variables

Variable	Description
Demonstrations in Previous Six Months	The number of discreet events involving riots or protests in the previous six months.
Percent Change in Demonstrations	The percent increase or decrease between the number of demonstrations in the previous six months and those in the prior six-month period.
Demonstrations as a Percent of Conflict	The proportion of total conflict events in the previous six months which are demonstrations.
Number of Clusters 100km	This counts the amount of distinct clusters of protest. Demonstrations within 50km or 100km of each other are counted as the same cluster.[94]
Herfindahl Index of Clusters	A herfindahl index which captures the degree of fragmentation among the clusters. A high value shows that one cluster is responsible for the majority of demonstration events while a low value shows an even distribution of demonstrations across clusters.

Table 2: 'Crisis Cabinets' in Africa, 2007-2018[95]

Country Year	Ministerial Turnover	Preceding Crisis
Burundi 2007	52.17	Vice President Martin Nduwimana resigns to break a political deadlock which had spurred an opposition boycott of parliament. Nduwimana's resignation allowed President Nkurunziza to create a new 'government of national consensus' which included opposition parties (Swiss Peace, 2007; Basutama, 2007).
CAR 2008	50.00	Prime Minister Elie Dote resigns after a threatened vote of no confidence. The proposed vote of no confidence happens within the context of a public sector strike over payment arrears (Ngoupanda, 2008).
CAR February 2013	82.76	Bozize forms a unity government in an attempt to stall the territorial gains of the rebel Seleka coalition (Bradshaw and Fandos-Ruis, 2016).
CAR April 2013	53.85	Bozize is deposed in March 2013 and Seleka political leader Michel Djotodia becomes president (Bradshaw and Fandos-Ruis, 2016).
CAR 2014	79.31	Michel Djotodia steps down amid escalating sectarian violence. The recently created National Transitional Council elect Catherine Samba-Panza as the interim president (Bradshaw and Fandos-Ruis, 2016).
Ethiopia April 2018	52.50	Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigns after two years of ongoing protests in Ethiopia. Ahmed Abiy is elected leader of the ruling Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and thus prime minister. He sets about creating a cabinet to appease the unrest (Maasho, 2018; Africa Confidential, 2018a).

[94] This is achieved through hierarchical clustering methods with the distance (in kilometres) between events used to dictate the cutting threshold.

[95] Only Ethiopia includes 2018 data

Ethiopia October 2018	53.33	Abiy makes another large cabinet reshuffle in the face of continued protest, ethnic violence and a potential attempted coup by the military (Africa Confidential, 2018b; Reuters, 2018)
Guinea 2007	88.89	Protests force President Lansana Conte to name a new Prime Minister from a shortlist of candidates selected by unions and civil society groups. The process is mediated by neighbouring states and the trade union candidate, Lansana Kouyate, is selected (Africa Confidential, 13 April 2007).
Guinea 2008	60.00	After Prime Minister Kouyate launches an audit investigating corruption by the President's allies, Conde fires Kouyate and refills with cabinet with allied politicians (Africa Confidential, 2008).
Guinea 2009	85.29	After President Conde's death, a faction of the military led by Captain Dadis Camara launch a coup.
Guinea 2010	60.00	The Presidential Guard of Moussa Dadis Camara massacre protesters from opposition parties in Guinea stadium (Africa Confidential, 6 November 2009). Camarra resigns after being shot by a former aid and Defence Minister Sekouba Konate becomes interim president (Africa Confidential, 2009).
Malawi 2012	61.11	President Mutharika dies in office. Vice-President Joyce Banda, as per the constitution takes over as leader. Banda had been expelled from the ruling party after failing to support Mutharika's plan to nominate his brother as successor (Dionne and Dulani, 2013; Cammack, 2012). Upon taking control of the cabinet, Banda ousts Mutharika's old allies.
Mali 2012	100.00	Soldiers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo launch a coup after the army is routed by Tuareg rebels in the north of the country (Africa Confidential, 2012).
Nigeria 2010	100.00	Acting President Goodluck Jonatan removes cabinet ministers loyal to the ailing President Musa Yar'Adua (Smith, 2010)
Tunisia 2011	100.00	Widespread demonstrations combined with the military's refusal to fire upon protesters forces long-time president Ben Ali to flee the country. An interim regime is set up and promises elections and a new constitution within six months (Africa Confidential, 2011).
Tunisia 2014	92.86	Ennadha government resigns as a part of a political agreement with opposition parties to break Tunisia's political deadlock (Gall, 2014).
Tunisia 2016	67.74	President Essebsi tries to oust unpopular president Habib Essid, who argues the vote should be put to parliament. He is voted out in a vote of no confidence.
Zimbabwe 2017	54.55	President Robert Mugabe is deposed by a coup led by the former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his military allies. The coup comes after years of tension within the ruling party over who would succeed Mugabe.

Table 3 – ICEWS Government to Protester Interactions and Protest-Motivated Crisis Cabinet Selection

Government Protester Interaction	**Counted as Protest Motivated Crisis Cabinet**
Accuse	
Coerce	
Consult	
Cooperate militarily	
Criticize or denounce	
Engage in diplomatic cooperation	X
Engage in mass killings	
Express intent to accept mediation	
Express intent to meet or negotiate	
Express intent to release persons or property	
fight with artillery and tanks	
fight with small arms and light weapons	
Make an appeal or request	
Make statement	
Mediate	X
Physically assault	
Praise or endorse	
Return, release person(s)	
Sexually assault	
Threaten with repression	
Use conventional military force	
Use tactics of violent repression	
Use unconventional violence	
Yield	X

Figure 1 – Protest against Ministerial Volatility – Autocracy vs Democracy[96]



[96] Democratic observations have a VDEM score of 0.5 or over, Autocratic observations have a VDEM score of under 0.5.

Figure 2 – Protest against Ministerial Volatility – Hegemonic vs Competitive Regimes [97]

[97] Hegemonic observations have a regime which occupies more than two thirds of the seats in the lower house, while competitive regimes occupy less than two thirds.

Table 4 – Crisis Cabinets and Preceding Protest Activity

Country Year	Preceding Protest Activity	Country Year	Preceding Protest Activity
Burundi 2007	Demonstrations: 0 Fatalities: 0 % of all events: 0 % involving state forces: 0 % change: 0 Clusters: 0	Guinea 2009	Demonstrations: 5 Fatalities: 0 % of all events: 45.45 % involving state forces: 80.00 % change: ∞ Clusters: 1
CAR 2008	Demonstrations: 0 Fatalities: 0 % of all events: 0 % involving state forces: 0 % change: -100 Clusters: 0	Guinea 2010	Demonstrations: 12 Fatalities: 159 % of all events: 50 % involving state forces: 50 % change: 1100 Clusters: 4
CAR February 2013	Demonstrations: 11 Fatalities: 1 % of all events: 13.92 % involving state forces: 18.18 % change: 175 Clusters: 6	Malawi 2012	Demonstrations: 3 Fatalities: 0 % of all events: 37.5 % involving state forces: 33.33 % change: -70 Clusters: 1
CAR April 2013	Demonstrations: 18 Fatalities: 94 % of all events: 20.69 % involving state forces: 11.11 % change: 500 Clusters: 5	Mali 2012	Demonstrations: 7 Fatalities: 0 % of all events: 13.73 % involving state forces: 0 % change: ∞ Clusters: 1
CAR 2014	Demonstrations: 122 Fatalities: 166 % of all events: 20.85 % involving state forces: 0.82 % change: 713.33 Clusters: 10	Nigeria 2010	Demonstrations: 62 Fatalities: 36 % of all events: 27.19 % involving state forces: 9.68 % change: 181.82 Clusters: 18
Ethiopia April 2018	Demonstrations: 206 Fatalities: 255 % of all events: 54.64 % involving state forces: 41.75 % change: 126.37 Clusters: 30	Tunisia 2011	Demonstrations: 127 Fatalities: 95 % of all events: 92.70 % involving state forces: 45.67 % change: 6250 Clusters: 11
Ethiopia October 2018	Demonstrations: 193 Fatalities: 73 % of all events: 44.68 % involving state forces: 26.94 % change: -6.31 Clusters: 39	Tunisia 2014	Demonstrations: 129 Fatalities: 3 % of all events: 73.30 % involving state forces: 27.13 % change: 37.23 Clusters: 10
Guinea 2007	Demonstrations: 21 Fatalities: 42 % of all events: 70 % involving state forces: 52.38	Tunisia 2016	Demonstrations: 241 Fatalities: 1 % of all events: 82.53 % involving state forces: 5.81

	% change: 600 Clusters: 7		% change: -31.34 Clusters: 18
Guinea 2008	Demonstrations: 0 Fatalities: 0 % of all events: 0 % involving state forces: 0 % change: 0 Clusters: 0	Zimbabwe 2017	Demonstrations: 68 Fatalities: 3 % of all events: 43.87 % involving state forces: 44.12 % change: 38.78 Clusters: 12

Table 4 – ACPED Variables

Variable	Description
Percent Change in Personnel/Percent Change in Inner Circle	Calculates the number of dropped ministers as a percentage of the previous cabinet's size. Can also be applied to more important posts known as the 'inner circle'. [98] $$PercentChange = \left(1 - \frac{\mathrm{P} - \mathrm{D}}{P}\right) * 100$$ P represents previous cabinet/inner circle size, while D represents the number of ministers dropped from the cabinet/inner circle.
Change in Representation	Government 'representation' is assessed by calculating the percent of primary administrative divisions which have a representative in cabinet. The index assumes a value between 0 and 100, where 100 means total representation of all politically relevant regional in the population. This variable is applied to the whole cabinet and the inner circle. During cabinet reshuffles, a change in representation measure is created through subtracting current representation against the previous cabinet-month's value.
Change in Disproportion	The disproportion measure calculates whether representatives in a cabinet have a share of the seats that reflects their regional population. The measure is an indication of whether power in a cabinet is balanced between included groups and adapted from studies by Samuels and Snyder (2001).[99] $$DIS = (\frac{1}{2}) \sum_{i=1}^{n} \lvert x_i - y_i \rvert$$ Sigma indicates the summation over all region i, xi is the percentage of all cabinet positions allocated to province i, and yi is the percentage of population living in region i. This measure is applied only to identity groups occupying at least one post within the cabinet. During cabinet reshuffles, a change in disproportion measure is created through subtracting current disproportion against the previous cabinet-month's value.
Mean Tenure of Dismissed Ministers	An average tenure (in number of months) of ministers dropped from the cabinet prior to their dismissal.

[98] All cabinet posts are not of equal importance and existing studies on cabinet composition agree that different posts hold different degrees of importance (Lindemann, 2011; Francois et al., 2015). Consequently posts in the cabinet are further separated into the inner circle posts, representing posts which hold significant power over the state apparatus, and outer circle posts which generally deal with service provision and cultural issues.

[99] A score of 10 would indicate that 10 percent of cabinet posts are allocated to groups that would not receive them if posts were distributed purely on population.

11.6 Inclusion, Volatility and Political Violence across African Regimes

This document presents a correlation matrix for explanatory variables and the results of robustness checks that could not be included in the text *due to space constraints. Models 4a-6b in Table A2* include a lagged dependent variable (LDV) and yearly dummies. LDV adjusts for autocorrelation within clusters in the time-varying dataset (Wilson and Butler 2007). Yearly dummies capture the effect of widespread shocks as well as other dimensions simultaneously affecting the entire sample, such as a sudden shift in global demand. These events could affect income and consequently, the state's propensity to engage in conflict.

Models 7a and 7b in Table A3 test whether our results are sensitive to the change in the operationalization of volatile cabinet. Here we decrease the threshold level of volatility that is used to code the *Volatility* variable. It is now coded as 1 if the number of ministers in a given month is greater than one and a half standard deviations above or below the long-term average, and 0 otherwise. In models 8a and 8b, we test H3 using an alternative measure of non-state infighting: political militias against political militias.

These changes make no substantive difference for our main findings. The only exception is that there is no longer a significant interaction between *Malapportionment* and *Representation* in model 5c. Nevertheless, in models 5a and 5b, the level of malapportionment in the cabinet remains a significant and powerful determinant of anti-state militia violence (H2).

Table A1: Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables, Pearson's *r*

	Represent.	Malappor.	Volatility	Cabinet Size	Ethnicities in Cabinet	Democracy	GDP per capita	Economic Growth	Population	Civil War
Representation	1.0000									
Malapportionment	-0.1634	1.0000								
Volatility	-0.0370	0.1952	1.0000							
Cabinet Size	0.3172	-0.0735	-0.0139	1.0000						
Ethnicities in Cabinet	-0.2513	0.2286	0.0099	0.1269	1.0000					
Democracy	0.1400	-0.2210	-0.0160	-0.0822	0.2270	1.0000				
GDP per capita	0.5024	-0.2160	-0.0111	0.3639	-0.3283	-0.0015	1.0000			
Economic Growth	-0.1412	0.0667	-0.1122	-0.0246	0.1106	0.1207	-0.0539	1.0000		
Population	0.0937	-0.1684	-0.0421	0.2999	0.1708	0.0302	0.4591	0.0183	1.0000	
Civil War	-0.0498	-0.0047	0.0186	-0.1235	-0.2289	-0.1182	0.1857	-0.0939	0.1778	1.0000

Table A2: Adding lagged dependent variables and yearly dummies

	4a	4b	4c	5a	5b	5c	6a	6b
Variables	*Rebels vs. Government*			*Militias vs. Government*			*Militias vs. Non-state actors*	
Representation$_{t-1}$	0.004	-0.542	5.875		1.246	-0.581		1.493
	(0.947)	(0.942)	(2.300)**		(0.589)**	(1.643)		(0.796)*
Malapportionment$_{t-1}$		4.968	28.240	2.134	2.004	-4.916		2.680
		(0.898)***	(7.123)***	(0.774)***	(0.754)***	(6.011)		(1.144)**
Volatility$_{t-1}$		-0.035	-0.291		-0.064	-0.016	1.070	1.037
		(0.440)	(0.487)		(0.480)	(0.445)	(0.513)**	(0.495)**
RepresentationxMalapportionment			-25.983			7.536		
			(7.984)***			(6.665)		
Cabinet Size	0.024	0.030	0.018	0.026	0.023	0.025	-0.014	-0.018
	(0.016)	(0.015)*	(0.016)	(0.009)***	(0.009)**	(0.010)**	(0.013)	(0.014)
Ethnicities in Cabinet	-0.105	-0.093	-0.074	-0.002	-0.031	-0.027	0.074	0.032
	(0.042)**	(0.046)**	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.044)*	(0.046)
Democracy	-0.247	-0.231	-0.219	-0.051	-0.056	-0.055	-0.092	-0.094
	(0.028)***	(0.028)***	(0.025)***	(0.020)**	(0.018)***	(0.020)***	(0.031)***	(0.029)***
Log(GDP per capita)	1.369	1.260	1.201	-0.195	-0.205	-0.199	-0.902	-0.931
	(0.248)***	(0.267)***	(0.247)***	(0.150)	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.217)***	(0.213)***
Economic Growth	-0.009	-0.004	-0.006	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.015	0.015
	(0.005)*	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.008)*
Log(Population)	-3.985	-4.124	-2.798	-0.723	-1.052	-1.310	-6.507	-7.060
	(1.469)***	(1.345)***	(1.390)**	(1.005)	(1.003)	(1.067)	(1.575)***	(1.625)***
Civil War				0.451	0.433	0.441	0.777	0.689
				(0.144)***	(0.148)***	(0.145)***	(0.149)***	(0.144)***
Lagged DV	0.142	0.135	0.132	0.129	0.126	0.125	0.195	0.195
	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.012)***	(0.013)***	(0.012)***	(0.029)***	(0.031)***
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yearly fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	56.230	58.149	31.446	9.828	14.479	20.198	107.840	115.572
	(23.437)**	(21.657)***	(23.080)	(16.211)	(16.169)	(17.469)	(25.536)***	(26.094)***
Number of Countries	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Number of Observations	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409

Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests)

Table A3: Using alternative measures of volatility and non-state infighting

Variables	7a	7b	8c	8b
	Militias vs. Non-state actors with Volatility (S.D.>1.5)		*Militias vs. Militias*	
$Representation_{t-1}$		-1.841		-0.828
		(0.969)*		(1.061)
$Malapportionment_{t-1}$		4.008		3.496
		(1.221)***		(1.276)***
$Volatility_{t-1}$	1.018	0.972	1.723	1.562
	(0.222)***	(0.200)***	(0.543)***	(0.515)***
Cabinet Size	-0.015	-0.009	-0.002	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Ethnicities in Cabinet	0.049	0.086	-0.002	0.002
	(0.047)	(0.043)**	(0.055)	(0.048)
Democracy	-0.107	-0.097	-0.055	-0.053
	(0.030)***	(0.030)***	(0.031)*	(0.031)*
Log(GDP per capita)	-0.909	-0.864	-1.074	-1.091
	(0.196)***	(0.204)***	(0.215)***	(0.214)***
Economic Growth	0.012	0.015	0.006	0.010
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Log(Population)	3.487	3.752	7.073	7.524
	(0.678)***	(0.713)***	(1.081)***	(0.986)***
Civil War	0.897	0.891	-0.052	-0.094
	(0.149)***	(0.152)***	(0.237)	(0.227)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-53.508	-57.949	-113.081	-120.553
	(10.193)***	(10.763)***	(16.742)***	(15.248)***
Number of Countries	15	15	15	15
Number of Observations	3,409	3,409	3,409	3,409

Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$ (two-tailed tests)